Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
PhD Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

7-6-2015

Unionization at Justice Canada: A Case Study
Andrij Roman Kowalsky

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/phd
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Kowalsky, Andrij Roman, "Unionization at Justice Canada: A Case Study" (2015). PhD Dissertations. 14.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/phd/14

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in PhD Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.

UNIONIZATION AT JUSTICE CANADA: CASE STUDY

ANDRIJ KOWALSKY

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN LAW
OSGOODE HALL LAW SCHOOL OF YORK UNIVERSITY
TORONTO, ONTARIO
JULY 2015

© Andrij Kowalsky, 2015

ABSTRACT
Researchers of the Canadian legal profession know very little about lawyers unionizing
and collectively bargaining. A breakthrough for expanding this subject occurred in April 2005
when non-management lawyers working at the federal Department of Justice Canada (DOJ) were
recognized by the Public Service Labour Relations Act (PSLRA) as employees. This dissertation
explores DOJ lawyers unionizing by addressing two research questions: (1) what led DOJ
lawyers to unionize with the Association of Justice Counsel (AJC)? and (2) what was the AJC’s
experience in negotiating a first collective agreement?
The dissertation is organized using a conventional structure. The literature review
presented in Chapter 2 maps the academic study of lawyer unionization while also serving as a
guide for framing the content of interview protocols. Chapter 3 elaborates on the dissertation’s
research design as a case study. Chapter 4 explains DOJ lawyers’ exclusion from the Public
Service Staff Relations Act, the DOJ’s administration of the individual employment relationship,
as well as introducing the Legal Officers’ Advisory Committee (LOAC). Chapter 5 provides a
historical analysis of events leading to LOAC becoming the AJC, which is traced to June 1990,
when lawyers employed at the DOJ’s Toronto office received an exclusive wage premium
known as the “Toronto differential”. The chapter describes how redressing the Toronto
differential helped LOAC generate employee support for forming the AJC as a professional
association, and, later, campaigning for union recognition under the PSLRA. Chapter 6 presents
the AJC’s negotiation and completion of a first labour agreement. Chapter 7 concludes the work
by assessing the study’s key goals and interpreting the overview in relation to the broader
literature.
Findings from the seven chapters are synthesized into a descriptive theory that addresses the two
research questions. Its thesis is that DOJ lawyers’ desire for workplace representation and
improved wages, executive level support from the DOJ, and introduction of the PSLRA
facilitated the creation and development of the AJC into a vehicle that directed the unionization
process. At the same time, the argument holds that the AJC negotiated a first collective
agreement with an employer who engaged in hard bargaining that resulted in deadlocked
negotiations, but was conduct, nonetheless, the courts determined had allowed the AJC a
meaningful process of collective bargaining prior to the imposition of wage-restraint legislation.
The dissertation’s findings: (1) detail the establishment of a new professional union in Canada’s
federal public service; (2) confirm the relevance of the processual model for understanding DOJ
lawyers unionizing; and (3) suggest that litigation challenging legislation remains unpredictable
despite jurisprudence that protects entitlement to the process of collective bargaining.
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C H A P T E R 1: Introduction
1.1

Overview
This dissertation investigates the unionization of non-management lawyers at the

Department of Justice Canada, and the attempt of their bargaining agent, the Association of
Justice Counsel, to negotiate a first collective agreement. Both stages of the unionization process
(organization and bargaining) are interpreted from employee and union perspectives.

The

inquiry adopts a qualitative case study methodology for obtaining, analyzing, and reporting
findings. Primary and secondary document review, twenty-three semi-structured interviews, and
participant observation were the data sources used for the study.

The goal of chapter 1 is to introduce and outline the key discussion points and format of
the dissertation. The first section, background to the study, presents the research problem that
rationalizes the conduct of this project and that yields the study’s central research questions. The
next section, which deals with research aims, documents this investigation’s key objectives, and
then a brief segment on the appropriateness of adopting a case study approach follows. Chapter
1 concludes by prefacing the remaining six chapters of the work, which cover the literature
review, research design, findings, and conclusion.

1.2

Background to the Study
The Canadian legal industry is slowly, but surely changing. Writing at the turn of the

new millennium, futurists foresaw modernization altering the practice of law. They identified
progressive technology and the new economy as liberalizing the legal services market at the
expense of softening lawyers’ practice monopoly.1 The corresponding evolution of the access to
justice movement, advances in legal services production techniques, and practitioner and law
student oversupply confirm observers’ speculations while also suggesting an impending
1

H.W. Arthurs, “Lawyering in Canada in the 21st Century” (1996) 15 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 202 at
217; H.W. Arthurs & R. Kreklewich, “Law, Legal Institutions, and the Legal Profession in the New Economy”
(1996) 34:1 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1 at 46; K. Roach, “The Changing Nature of the Legal Profession” in W.A.
Bogart, ed., Access to Affordable and Appropriate Law Related Services in 2020 (Ottawa: Canadian Bar
Association, 1999) 77 at 81; R. A. Macdonald, “Let Our Future Not Be Behind Us: The Legal Profession in
Changing Times” (2001) 64 Saskatchewan Law Review 1 at 18; D. Brusegard, Economic Implications and Realities:
The Potential Economic Impacts of Demographic and Social Change in the Law Profession and Business of Law
(Toronto:
Canadian
Bar
Association,
2004)
at
7-8,
online:
Canadian
Bar
Association
<https://www.cba.org/cba/futures/pdf/economic_implications.pdf> (last modified: 3 February 2004).

1

deprofessionalization of law. Lawyers adopting collective bargaining to challenge how their law
firm, in-house department, or government office exploits new practice trends to restructure
operations may surprise readers.
Canadian law societies, as overseers of a province’s legal profession, encourage a
consumer friendly, access to justice movement in the name of the public interest that deemphasizes lawyers as exclusive providers of legal services and their maintenance of a closed
practice domain.2 Serving middle-class and low-income people is synonymous with solo and
small firm practitioners whose availability to the general public earns them the reputation as
being the backbone of the profession. Their inexorable reliance on a high-turnover, diverse, feepaying customer base exposes them to a broad range of potential clientele. This clientele,
however, is a wholly unstable lot, who are courted by, and can find better value for their dollar
with, encroaching service providers. Paralegals, prepaid insurance plans, and on-line, electronic
unregulated providers fill a demand for affordable and basic legal services that influences the
public perception that a lawyer’s services should be costly or even necessary. 3 Competition
among the bar for work where legal expertise is obligatory will reward those practitioners
capable of stirring demand by aggressively advertising value-added services as their calling card
for new clients. This is a business model that favours established, financed, entrepreneurial,
specialized, and lean law firms, and it has become a popular mode for mass marketing personal
injury legal services in and around Canada’s largest population centre, the Greater Toronto
Area.4 This ubiquitous legal advertising found atop of cabs, on the exteriors of public transit
busses, on the walls of subway cars, and on many radio and television stations demonstrates both

2

D.R. Mah et al., Alternate Delivery of Legal Services: Final Report (Calgary: Law Society of Alberta, 2012) at 10,
online: Law Society of Alberta <http://www.lawsociety.ab.ca/files/adls/ADLS_Final_Report.pdf> (last modified
February 2012).
3
D. Pinnington, “The Future of Law: The Challenges and Opportunities of Practicing Law in a Global Village”
LawPro Magazine 12:2 (September 2013) 25 at 26-27.
4
Statistics Canada estimated that in 2011, the census metropolitan area of Toronto, Ontario, which extends into the
four outlining regional municipalities of Halton, Peel, York and Durham consisted of 5,583,064 people. Statistics
Canada, 2011 Census of Population – Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 98-316-XWE (Ottawa: Statistics Canada,
2012), online: Statistics Canada
<http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011/dp-pd/hlt-fst/pd-pl/TableTableau.cfm?LANG=Eng&T=201&S=3&O=D&RPP=150> (last modified: 1 January 2013).
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a merging of lawyer professionalism with commercialism and the measures plaintiff-side
lawyers have taken to ply their trade.5

Like solo and small firm practitioners, large law firm associates also face uncertain
prospects. Law firm associates work long and gruelling work hours and suffer from low job
satisfaction and career stagnation because of their employers perpetuating and profiting from a
hierarchical division of labour and entitlements.6 Recent findings suggest that these types of
positions are fungible as well given the emergence of modern legal services production methods.
As a matter of course, law firm human resources intensify the shedding of positions when they
fragment job responsibilities by assigning contingent legal work, routinized transaction, and
document review to employment agencies staffed by freelance lawyers.7 These same strategists
can seek even more ambitious cost reductions by off-shoring work to common-law trained
lawyers who practice at lower rates than domestic competitors.8 The dawn of new-age computer
applications and technologies threaten to deskill and mechanize legal work all together.9
Artificial intelligence and robotics excising human intervention from non-sophisticated legal
tasks can antiquate outsourcing, thereby rendering the personnel administrator as redundant to
the law firm as the associate positions they once shed.10

Current realities spare little relief for the newest entrants to the profession where
competition for entry-level positions is stiff. Between 2004 and 2008, American law firms
5

The issue of whether law is a business or profession remains a current topic. See S.J. Levine, “Foreword to the
Conference: The Law: Business or Profession? The Continuing Relevance of Julius Henry Cohen for the Practice of
Law in the Twenty-First Century” (2012) 40 Fordham Urban Law Journal 1. This journal volume published papers
from the Fordham Law School Conference of 23-24 April 2012, The Law: Business or Profession? The Continuing
Relevance of Julius Henry Cohen for the Practice of Law in the Twenty-First Century.
6
J. Hagan & F. Kay, Gender in Practice: A Study of Lawyers’ Lives (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) at
48; S.S. Fortney, “Soul For Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects
of Billable Hour Requirements” (2000) 69:2 University of Missouri - Kansas City Law Review 243 at 248; W.D.
Henderson & D. Zaring, “Young Associates in Trouble” (2007) 105:6 Michigan Law Review 1087 at 1103.
7
R.A. Brooks, Cheaper By the Hour: Temporary Lawyers and the Deprofessionalization of the Law (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 2011) at 28-39.
8
A. Sechooler, “Globalization, Inequality and Legal Services” (2008) 15:3 International Journal of the Legal
Profession 231 at 237-241.
9
R. Susskind, The End of Lawyers? Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services (New York: Oxford University Press,
2008) at 145.
10
Canadian Bar Association, The Future of Legal Services in Canada: Trends and Issues (Ottawa: Canadian Bar
Association,
2013)
at
27,
online:
Legal
Futures
Initiatives
<http://www.cbafutures.org/CBA/media/mediafiles/PDF/Reports/trends-isssues-eng.pdf?ext=.pdf> (last modified:
12 June 2013).
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managed declining rates of growth by eliminating 20,000 jobs.11 In 2009 and 2010, 250 of
America’s largest law firms cut 9,500 positions and delayed hiring.12

Their proactive

employment practices—the measuring and adjusting of labour resources according to economic
hardship—showed that large law firms are similar to the organizations they represent.
Intensifying competition for lucrative new clients and their business (which spin-off more work
and new jobs for associates) exists in Canada too and it is causing a shakeout, or perhaps an
implosion, at one or more of the nation’s largest firms.13 The principles of supply and demand
suggest that the glut of new lawyers in America may not get their start in the profession before
shrinking law school enrollments (which have fallen by 24 percent from 2010 and hover at
figures not seen since 1975) correct the disequilibrium by churning out fewer graduates. 14 While
in Ontario, the problem of excess law school graduates (trained either in the province or abroad
and who became unplaced articling students) forced the Law Society of Upper Canada to
implement an alternative licensing program, which consists of a four month skills-based training
course, and a four month work placement, despite fears over implementing a “two-tier” system
that may stigmatize the credentials of program graduates to prospective employers.15 Deliberate
policy intervention that allows more people to become lawyers and set up shop in a soft economy
benefits the law societies who license them, and not the main street practitioners whose
livelihoods are sensitive to a flood of new entrants. Adding lawyers to an already crammed
system gives law societies a steady pool of fee-paying licensees, but at the expense of a bloated
labour supply.

11

W.D. Henderson & R.M. Zahorsky, “Law Job Stagnation May Have Started Before the Recession—And it May
Be a Sign of Lasting Change” ABA Journal (1 July 2011), online: ABA Journal
<http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/paradigm_shift/> (last modified: (1 July 2011).
12
“Law Firms: A Less Gilded Future” The Economist (5 May 2011), online:
The Economist
<http://www.economist.com/node/18651114> (last modified 5 May 2011).
13
J. Melnitzer, “Another Canadian Law Firm Will Follow Hennan Blaikie to collapse in 2014, Deloitte Report Set
to
Predict”
Law
Post
(12
March
2014),
online:
Financial
Post
<http://business.financialpost.com/2014/03/12/another-canadian-law-firm-will-follow-heenan-blaikie-to-collapse-in2014-deloitte-report-said-to-predict/> (date accessed: 24 September 2014).
14
M. Hansen, “Law school enrollment down 11 percent this year over last year, 24 percent over 3 years data shows”
ABA
Journal
(17
December
2013),
online:
ABA
Journal
<http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_school_enrollment_down_11_percent_this_year_over_last_year_data
_shows> (date accessed: 26 September 2014).
15
A. Ballingall, “Law Society of Upper Canada expected to clear new path to enter profession” Toronto Star (22
November 2012) A6. Articling rounds out an aspiring lawyer’s pre-service training by requiring them to apprentice
under an approved principal (lawyer) for a requisite time period and receive experiential training in order to satisfy
requirements for licensure by a provincial law society.

4

Provincial law societies will not intervene to help navigate lawyers through a laissez-faire
economy.

They have all but retreated from being a locus for collectively advancing the

profession.16 For the foreseeable future, at least, they will continue to regulate the profession by
licensing members, setting professional standards, and policing disreputable counsel. Their days
of restraining competition among practitioners, however, are distant history.17 By the late 1980s,
most provincial law societies succumbed to the demand to allow lawyers to advertise, and the
courts confirmed legislation that prohibited county associations from price fixing with fee
schedules.18 In two noteworthy 1989 cases, the Supreme Court of Canada repealed provincial
law society bans on non-nationals practicing law, and out-of-province lawyers practicing with
those who were ordinarily resident in a host jurisdiction.19 The economies of scale have caused
law firm and government employment to become the dominant and preferred practice structures
in comparison to the insecurities of sole-proprietorship.20 These workplaces are bureaucratized,
though, and lawyers yield their professional autonomy and work control to the employer in
exchange for a career.21 As a general rule, professional associations and law societies do not
intercede in disputes between employee-members and employers.22

Workers of various skill levels and occupations have embraced trade unionism in order to
shield themselves from an open labour market, except for lawyers employed in private practice.
Historically, lawyers professionalized law and profitably sold it as an intellectual product and
service to businesses and affluent families.23 This privileged and exclusive standing in the

16

A.M. Francis, “Out of touch and out of time: lawyers, their leaders and collective mobility within the legal
profession” (2004) 24:3 Legal Studies 322 at 323.
17
J. Nieuwenhuysen & M. Williams-Wynn, Professions in the Marketplace: An Australian Study of Lawyers,
Doctors, Accountants, and Dentists (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1982) at 20; M. Angel, “Professionals
and Unionization” (1981) 66:3 Minnesota Law Review 383 at 391.
18
D.A.A. Stager & H.W. Arthurs, Lawyers in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) at 193, 219.
19
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143, 1989 CanLII 2 (SCC); Black v. Law Society of
Alberta, [1989] 1 SCR 591, 1989 CanLII 132 (SCC).
20
M. Fleming, Lawyers, Money and Success: The Consequences of Dollar Obsession (Westport: Quorum Books,
1997) at 11; D. Litowitz, The Destruction of Young Lawyers: Beyond One L (Akron: University of Akron Press,
2006) at 71; E. Raymer, “Fewer Lawyers want to become sole practitioners, survey finds” The Lawyers Weekly (8
July 2005) LB7.
21
M. Crain, “The Transformation of the Professional Workforce” (2004) 79:2 Chicago-Kent Law Review 543 at
577.
22
G.W. Adams, “Collective bargaining by salaried professionals” in P. Slayton & M.J. Trebilcock, eds., The
Professions and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978) 264 at 270.
23
D. Klegon, “The Sociology of Professions: An Emerging Perspective” (1978) 5:3 Work and Occupations 259 at
269.

5

marketplace afforded them a strong sense of entrepreneurialism, secure self-employment and
small law firm ownership, along with the idealization of petty capitalist interests that encouraged
lawyers to maximize the labour of their staff (than stand beside them in a common cause of
worker advancement). While some researchers have re-conceptualized professionalization and
unionization as contending processes in the struggle of an occupational group to achieve work
autonomy, improved wages, and better working conditions,24 others pointed out that lawyers do
not fit within the paradigm of organized labour because they have limited use for unions. They
maintained that lawyers achieve occupational status, prestige, and income from a monopoly that
is sustained through state bar associations (the equivalent of provincial law societies in
Canada).25 This presumption, however, needs revisiting as ongoing structural changes in legal
practice, some of which have already been noted above, expose growing fissures in the
profession’s market control from which its practitioners’ economic self-sufficiency flows.

Work restructuring in the practice of law abets the process of deprofessionalization and
will cause a decline in the autonomy and monopolistic privileges of various lawyers in Canada.26
Raelin proposed deprofessionalization may incite professionals to unionize as a way to stave off
structural forces from eroding the power base of the occupation.27 However, due to scant
academic interest in why lawyers collectively bargain in the first place, we simply lack a clear
baseline to assess whether, in the face of disruptive practice developments intensifying, law firm
associates and other employed counsel would continue to scorn unionization (while members of
the Canadian public sector bar already exert their group influence through employee
representatives). The few available studies on the subject offer a toehold to spark the overdue
and multifaceted debate about lawyers reorganizing conventional practice arrangements by
adopting collective bargaining.

24

M.R. Haug & M.B. Sussman, “Professionalization and Unionism: A Jurisdictional Dispute” in E. Freidson, ed.,
The Professions and Their Prospects (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972) 89 at 100.
25
S.A. Levitan & F. Gallo, “Collective Bargaining and Private Sector Professionals” (September 1989) Monthly
Labor Review 24 at 25; S. Milner, “The legal professions and trade unionism: the ‘Dicey’ dilemma” (1990) 21:4
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In their now classic treatise of the Canadian legal profession, Stager and Arthurs skim the
topic of lawyer unionization. The study’s panoptic focus and finding of variations in statutory
coverage for lawyers in different federal and provincial jurisdictions allowed the authors to limit
the discussion by posing three rhetorical questions: (1) should lawyers be excluded from
collective bargaining? (2) can unionized lawyers fully withdraw legal services? (3) does a
professional obligation prohibit them from doing so?28 Thornicroft’s examination into collective
bargaining by Canadian lawyers clarified that the federal government and the provinces of
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Quebec, British Columbia, and Ontario engage in some form of
collective negotiations with Crown Attorneys, staff lawyers or legal aid lawyers.29

The

exploratory orientation of his study illustrated an immature state of knowledge on the subject (as
of 1993, the time of article publication). Thornicroft’s findings were reported through the
themes of legal environment, lawyers’ unions and collective bargaining, and professional
responsibility, and he speculated that lawyers would be attracted to collective bargaining to
improve wages, increase job security, and protect professional concerns. Certain groups of
public sector lawyers were excluded from Thornicroft’s analysis because of statutory bans on
lawyer unionization that existed in the provinces in which they practiced. In 2000, the situation
changed in one of those jurisdictions, Nova Scotia, after the province recognized the Nova Scotia
Crown Attorneys Association and signed a framework agreement that allowed joint negotiations
over salaries as part of an initial collective bargaining relationship with their members.
Campbell analyzed the policy adjustment that circumvented legislation prohibiting counsel from
organizing and went on to author a doctoral dissertation in the field of management studies. She
focussed on how occupational community allowed Crown prosecutors to syncretise the dual
market closure strategies of professionalization and collective bargaining in order to assert
greater control over their labour.30 Lawyers’ motivations for pursuing collective bargaining were
tested in relation to closure theory, a fundamental concept derived from sociology, in addition to
being cast to understand the different bureaucratized conditions Nova Scotia’s prosecutors
laboured under.

28
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Organized labour ruminated on the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2001 ruling of Dunmore
v. Ontario (Attorney General)31 as a touchstone for organizing droves of professional workers,
including associate lawyers in large law firms.32

In that case, the nation’s highest court

determined that the province of Ontario had a duty to protect the fundamental freedom of
vulnerable workers to form associations by prohibiting employer interference. Despite union
plans for parlaying jurisprudence into an organizing movement, the campaign fizzled. A decade
later, in fall 2012, lawyers employed by Legal Aid Ontario became the newest group of
practitioners to demand that an intractable employer voluntarily recognize them in a collective
bargaining relationship.33 The situation of Legal Aid Ontario lawyers illustrates that when
labour legislation restricts Canadian public and private sector lawyers from its application, there
is no opportunity to research the circumstances that compel lawyers to adopt collective
bargaining since there is no critical incident to explore. Without such an occurrence, the
empirical basis for undertaking such a study is lacking and it leaves researchers desirous of any
new developments for moving the subject past its stasis.

A significant breakthrough for the academic study of public sector lawyer unionization,
however, finally occurred when lawyers working for the Department of Justice Canada (DOJ)—
the bureau that represents the Canadian government in legal matters—were recognized as
employees under new federal labour legislation. Since 1967, the Public Service Staff Relations
Act,34 the statute responsible for introducing and regulating collective bargaining in the civil
service of Canada, deemed the positions of DOJ lawyers as managerial or confidential and
prohibited these professionals from forming or being represented by an employee organization.
That prohibition ended on 1 April 2005, with the Public Service Labour Relations Act35 coming
into force, repealing the PSSRA, and acknowledging that non-management DOJ lawyers could
now collectively bargain some thirty-five years after the right was first denied to them. On 28
April 2006, the Public Service Labour Relations Board (PSLRB) certified the Association of
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Justice Council36 (AJC) as the exclusive bargaining agent for an amalgamated unit consisting of
2,500 non-management lawyers employed at the DOJ and some one hundred other lawyers from
various federal departments and agencies who were previously represented by the Professional
Institute Public Service of Canada.37
The AJC’s bargaining unit represents the single largest group of public sector lawyers in
Canada who are unionized and collectively bargain.

An estimated ten thousand lawyers

employed by municipal, provincial, and federal governments comprise the Canadian public
sector bar, which means that roughly one-quarter of all Canadian government lawyers work in
the service of the federal Crown.38 Despite their numbers and significance, DOJ lawyers are
federal public servants whose encounters with unionization and first contract negotiations have
not yet been explored. An empirical study such as this one is therefore justified in order to
understand their experience with both events.

1.3

Study Purpose & Research Question
This dissertation aims to expand knowledge about Canadian lawyer unionism by studying

non-management DOJ lawyers joining the ranks of organized professional labour. Unionization
is understood as the process by which a group of workers elect an employee representative
(which a labour board legally certifies and empowers) to negotiate terms and conditions of
employment with an employer. The two research questions guiding this inquiry are: (1) what led
DOJ lawyers to unionize with the AJC? and (2) what was the AJC’s experience in negotiating a
first collective agreement? Through analysis and interpretation of the data available to answer
these questions, I have created a descriptive theory in the form of an account that covers the
36
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transition of DOJ lawyers between individual employment and labour relations regimes, and the
process of the AJC legitimizing the collective bargaining relationship through a negotiated first
labour agreement. The nature of the investigation allows for at least three key study objectives
and proposes that the best research practice is to conduct the project as a case study.

1.4

Study Objectives

1.4.1 Unionization among Professionals
The academic and union investigation of neo–liberal deregulation of Western economies
and labour markets also explores the decline of union density and prospects for regeneration.39
Professional employees are often drawn to unions after determining that working in
organizations under rigid administrations, and lacking the ability to influence management
prejudices their occupational interests.40

Studies have looked at this issue to explore, for

example, why associations representing American professors adopted collective bargaining, or to
test and predict union-voting intentions of pharmacists and doctors in response to a top-down
model of corporate bureaucracy that undermines professional values, autonomy, and work
standards.
Hutcheson’s historiography determined that, during the 1970s, faculty transformed
chapters of the Association of University Professors into bargaining agents to defend against
university administration interfering with their academic freedom, to increase faculty
participation in governance, and to improve members’ economic status.41 In 1999, the American
Pharmaceutical Association amended its policy to support pharmacists joining unions, while the
American Medical Association also passed a resolution endorsing unions by forming a
bargaining unit for physicians. McHugh and Bodah’s nationwide survey findings of pharmacists
39

J. B. Rose & G.N. Chaison, “Unionism in Canada and the United States in the 21st Century: The Prospects for
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the Twenty First Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004) 179 at 180.
40
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41
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determined positive union voting intentions based on beliefs of union instrumentality enhancing
professional development, controlling workload, and improving quality of patient care.42 In
another study, McHugh and his colleagues found receptivity among corporately employed staff
pharmacists towards voting for a union due to increased workloads, lack of voice over practice
conditions, and existing union presence in the industry.43 Similarly, when young physicians
were surveyed for their assessment of unionism, a sample of 359 respondents (43 percent of 835)
reported support for unionization, which they believed could countervail the profit-driven
management of health care that lowered levels of patient care, autonomy, incomes, and job
satisfaction.44 Thompson and Salmon’s mixed methods study found that recouping losses in
power and authority were reasons why public hospital employee physicians would join a union
and pursue collective bargaining.45

Organizing campaigns of professionals seldom develop from the exact same
circumstances. The workplace environment established by an organization greatly influences the
propensity to unionize.

Kuhn’s study of unionized engineers showed that the conditions

prompting one group of employees over another to support a union will vary within a firm and
from firm to firm.46 This finding suggests that a potential inquiry into a group of professionals
unionizing at a single employer should be highly contextualized with findings that bear cautious
generalizations. Moreover, preference for union representation clearly varies between members
of different occupations47 and between public and private sector employees.48

A study

investigating the relatively recent unionization of a group of federal public servants should
consider Savage and Webber’s finding that Canadian federal government austerity is responsible

42
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for deteriorating work conditions and encroachments on professional autonomy, which is
drawing professional public servants and unions closer together.49 This drift did not occur in a
vacuum and it underscores the truism that no bureaucracy is ever greater than the sum of its
parts; larger federal government retrenchment can impact any of its departments, even the DOJ.

On the other hand, the type and quality of legal practice the DOJ offers its lawyers yields
intrinsic rewards of employment that are less reproducible at other outfits. Most DOJ lawyers
work in modern offices located in the downtown business cores of major Canadian cities. As the
DOJ represents the federal government in its legal affairs, its top litigators are often implicated in
cases of national importance, which demands from them the highest level of advocacy before all
levels of provincial courts, and sometimes, the Supreme Court of Canada. Regardless of the
work performed by DOJ counsel, as civil servants they enjoy the fringe benefits of
comprehensive group insurance, various leaves and paid vacation, typically less demanding work
schedules than expected from associates in large law firms, and coverage under the Public
Service Superannuation Act,50 which governs an enviable pension retirement program.

Decent benefits supplement the federal government paying its workers a fair market
wage.51

However, salaried professionals report earning less than their self-employed

counterparts and this financial strain represents a major source of discontent.52 As is the case
with lawyers, beginning a career with the federal government offers improved job experience
and career satisfaction in comparison to lawyering in private practice.53 Over time, though,
noticeable discrepancies grow in the wage earning potential between lawyers employed in the
public and private sectors. As of summer 2009, and prior to DOJ lawyers obtaining a first
collective agreement, their salaries were comparable to the national average paid by the lower
rung of middle-tier law firms (which typically consist of ten to thirty-five lawyers) at up to the
49
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ten years in practice mark.54 Sensational instances of lawyers fixated with profit raise unease
among regulators and academics over declining professionalism, but to tar government lawyers
with like cynicism would be a gross mischaracterization.55 A more accurate reflection of the
prestige of government lawyers is to assess them as falling on a spectrum of affluence between
that of a solo and law firm practitioner.56

Law is considered a learned and free profession, and its practitioners are thought to shun
group orientation because of an incompatibility with professional values and social status
ideology.57

While Taylor and Bain confirm that the way unionism ever gets started in a

workplace remains unclear, the general aversion of lawyers towards unions adds another layer of
complexity that blurs the phenomenon this study wishes to investigate.58 A nuanced analysis,
therefore, should clarify whether feelings of dissatisfaction among DOJ lawyers stemmed from
poor employment conditions, from a general malaise over a lack of influence in the setting of the
employment contract, or, from some other factor that helped create the right environment for the
AJC’s popularization. The first study objective aims to demystify how unionism occurred
among DOJ lawyers by identifying the context for them supporting the AJC, and it relates to the
first research question. In order to accomplish this, a detailing of the AJC’s origin and the
change in labour legislation allowing for its legalization as a bargaining agent will be addressed.

1.4.2 Collective Bargaining in the Federal Public Service
DOJ lawyers represent the first new group of employees in the federal public service to
attain a bargaining agent within the last two decades. 59 Twenty years ago, the Chrétien-led
Liberals introduced their February 1995 federal budget, with its details for implementing the next
54
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steps in Program Review, a bold initiative for axing roughly $17 billion in public service
expenditures over three years and eliminating 45,000 bureaucratic positions.60 Program Review
continued the government’s plans during the early to mid-1990s of downsizing operations,
restructuring the service role of the state, and aggressively containing massive debt and
spending. A balanced budget for 1997-1998 signalled that the federal government had returned
to fiscal stability, but it did so in part by freezing the wages of civil servants and suspending
collective bargaining with their unions.

Ultimately, the federal government’s plans for

revitalizing strained labour-management relations after a tumultuous decade came to a head in
2003 with the Public Service Modernization Act.61 The statute introduced the PSLRA and its
revamp of the legal framework governing the federal public sector.
After the PSLRB certified the AJC as a bargaining agent, the union’s tireless president,
Patrick Jetté’s cautious declaration that “bargaining will take months” proved highly optimistic.62
In actuality, the protracted battle the AJC undertook to sign a first collective agreement tested the
union’s mettle in negotiating wage and workplace improvements and unfolded on several fronts.
At the bargaining table, impasse set in during negotiations between the AJC’s negotiating team
and delegates from the Treasury Board Secretary who represented the employer, the Treasury
Board of Canada. In the public arena, on 13 May 2008, the AJC staged a public rally in front of
DOJ headquarters in Ottawa to expedite the selection of a chair for first contract arbitration.
Within political circles, Jetté campaigned before the House of Commons Standing Committee on
Finance against repressive legislation, particularly, the Expenditure Restraint Act,63 which
imposed a five-year, retroactive, public sector wide wage restraint plan that froze the maximum
salary increases the AJC could attain from collective bargaining or arbitration at roughly the rate
of inflation. During contract arbitration, the AJC pursued numerous contract articles covering
terms and conditions of employment that were not resolved during negotiations or meditation to
conclude a first collective agreement with the Treasury Board. Before the Federal Court of
Canada, the AJC defended a judicial review of the arbitral ruling. Finally, at the Ontario
60
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Superior Court of Justice, the AJC partially won its Charter challenge to the ERA only to have its
hard-fought victory overruled by the Court of Appeal, and later, the Supreme Court of Canada
confirming the disposition.64 In light of this remarkable course of events, the second research
objective of this thesis is to detail the anatomy of impasse in negotiations between the AJC and
the Treasury Board Secretariat and the process of resolution. The analysis aims to understand
the AJC’s struggles, triumphs, and evolution in obtaining a first labour contract particular to the
needs of a pluralistic bargaining unit membership and addresses the second research question.

1.4.3 Department of Justice Canada and its Lawyers as Research Subjects
It is inconceivable to think of the administration of justice in Canada without the DOJ.
The DOJ is one of over two hundred departments, agencies and Crown corporations that
collectively comprise the federal government.

The department enjoys a seminal place in

Canadian history. On 1 July 1867, the British North America Act, 1867 came into force, and
with it, Confederation was complete. The new dominion of Canada was established under
Cabinet-parliamentary rule with the governments of Canada and the provinces of Ontario,
Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick dividing legislative powers over matters national and
local in nature. Governance for the Crown in right of Canada required a legal representative to
counsel the state on the law of the new land. So, on 22 May 1868, the First Session of
Parliament of the Dominion of Canada created the DOJ by adopting its enabling legislation, the
Department of Justice Act.65 The DOJ’s purpose was to centralize the provision of legal services
to the federal government and its departments.66 It has since remained as the policy architect for
successive governments instituting and maintaining Canada as a rule of law nation.

The

constitutionally entrenched Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms coming into force on 17
April 198267 ushered a fundamental change in the extent of the DOJ’s advisement and litigation
services and marked a watershed in the modern history of the department.
64
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Jurists have studied the Charter imposing novel service obligations on the DOJ.68 Kelly,
a political scientist, assessed the DOJ’s maturation within state bureaucracy by analyzing the
department’s supervision over Charter matters and its transformation into an executive support
agency that sits in the centre of government.69 His examination of the DOJ’s bureaucratic
activism shed invaluable light on the inner workings of the department’s Executive, Charter, and
Charter Litigation Committees. The federal government regularly appealing decisions to the
Supreme Court of Canada spurred Hennigar, another political scientist, to study patterns of
strategic behaviour regarding appeals, and yield more insight about officiating at the DOJ.70
These studies assess stakeholder practices at the department, but, despite their valuable findings,
their assessments cast staff lawyers as an adjunct to the operations under review.

Revisionist perspectives are developing on DOJ lawyers, positioning them as a discrete
workforce with an important identity and role. A growing appreciation for the distinctiveness
associated with lawyering for the federal Crown is encouraging researchers to unravel the
bureaucratic anonymity of DOJ counsel. Former Deputy Minister of Justice John Tait argues
that government lawyers have a duty to keep their employer bound to good governance
obligations as they are guardians of the rule of public law and aides to the Minister of Justice.71
Wilner urges DOJ lawyers to serve as virtuous practitioners ascribing to the highest standards of
professional and ethical lawyering, which are inherent values necessary when lawyering for
Canada.72 MacNair used the insight developed from her many years of practice at the DOJ to fill

a gap in research on government lawyers by writing several articles that focus on: the work
profiles of the DOJ’s Crown prosecutors, civil litigators, legislative drafters, legal advisors, and

68
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policy counsel;73 outlining the system of ethical standards and obligations governing legislative
drafters74 and federal Crown prosecutors;75 arguing for the public interest as an objective legal
standard in the professional ethics of Crown prosecutors;76 and canvassing the interaction
between public sector lawyers and solicitor-client privilege.77

The courts have found that

government lawyers are duty-bound by provincial law society Rules of Professional Conduct to
conscientiously observe legal ethics in daily practice, while academics have wisely pointed out
that unlike their colleagues in the private sector, public sector lawyers are subjected to public
service codes of conduct that oblige them, as civil servants, to maintain public trust and integrity
in government as a condition of employment.78 It is fitting that as DOJ lawyers attract greater
attention due to practice responsibilities associated with representing their client, they should be
further distinguished in the legal and labour studies literature as professionals attempting to
democratize their workplace through collective bargaining. A third objective of this thesis is to
foment interest in DOJ lawyers as a research population by showing that unionization under the
AJC has increased the level of employee voice available to them.

1.5

Research Design: Case Study
The nature of the social phenomena being explored often informs the particular research

framework used to structure and conduct an inquiry.79

When the inquiry involves an

organization, a case study methodology is typically suggested.80 In fact, Yin proposes the case
study as the ideal research approach for analyzing the complexity of an event within an
organization.81 The case study is a valued strategy for teasing out the interactions between the

73
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circumstances and processes that drive employee behaviours.82

This project’s thesis, for

example, encourages structuring the inquiry as a case study since it seeks a detailed account
covering the who, what, where, and when of a phenomenon, which Clardy proposes offers a
sound rubric for investigating change within an organization.83

A case study is also the

appropriate method for this project since the intrinsic aspect of the thesis seeks knowledge about
DOJ lawyers that makes its findings difficult to generalize to other workplaces.84 In addition, the
idiographic aspect of the study directs attention to uncovering and describing the complexities
that drive the outcomes at a single organization, which so happens to have the repute of being
Canada’s largest law firm.85

1.6

Study Organization and Significance to Audiences
So far, this chapter has addressed the three questions associated with introducing a

dissertation: (1) what is the purpose of the research? (2) what is the context of the research? (3)
how will the research be conducted?86

It now turns to outlining the study’s remaining

organization. The literature review presented in chapter 2 maps and synthesizes the academic
study of lawyer unionization to yield research issues that are relevant to this inquiry and that are
used to explore the research questions. Chapter 3 elaborates on the reasons for structuring the
research design as a case study, as well as touching on the methodological synergism between
socio-legal and qualitative research that finds its way into the structure of this project. The
chapter’s discussion also focuses on data collection and analysis procedures along with the
criteria used for improving the quality of study findings.

With the background chapters setting the study’s foundation in place, I use chapters 4, 5,
and 6 to directly address the research questions. Chapter 4 explains DOJ lawyers’ exclusion
82

J. Hartley, “Case Study Research” in C. Cassell & G. Symon, eds., Essential Guide to Qualitative Methods in
Organizational Research (London: Sage Publications, 2004) 323 at 325.
83
A. Clardy, Studying Your Workforce: Applied Research Methods and Tools for the Training and Development
Practitioner (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1997) at 100.
84
D.R. Hancock & B. Algozzine, Doing Case Study Research: A Practical Guide for Beginning Researchers (New
York: Teachers College Press, 2006) at 32.
85
C.C. Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley & Los
Angeles: UCLA Press, 1987) at 55.
86
S.W. Wall & J.L. Burrow, “Elements of an Introductory Chapter” in E.I. Farmer & J.W. Rojewski, eds., Research
Pathways: Writing Professional Papers, Theses and Dissertations in Workforce Education (Lanham: University
Press of America, 2001) 57 at 58.

18

from the PSSRA and outlines management’s structuring of the individual employment
relationship in the absence of a bargaining agent up and until 1990. This fourth chapter also
introduces the Legal Officers’ Advisory Committee, (LOAC), which was the AJC’s forerunner.
Chapter 5 provides a historical analysis of events leading to LOAC’s transformation into the AJC
that are traced to June 1990, when a significant development in DOJ compensation policy
occurred: lawyers employed at the Toronto Regional Office received an exclusive wage premium
known as the “Toronto differential”.

The chapter describes how redressing the Toronto

differential helped LOAC generate popular employee support for initially forming the AJC as a
professional employee association, and, later, successfully campaigning for recognition as an
employee organization once the PSLRA allowed for unionization. Chapter 6 presents the AJC’s
efforts at completing a first collective agreement and the process of resolution after impasse in
negotiations set in, and the ERA cut off the free determination of salaries. Chapter 7 importantly
concludes the study by analyzing the findings from the previous chapters in order assess how the
study’s objectives were met and to consider some of the study’s implications.87 All together, I
develop an argument that considers how DOJ lawyers’ desire for workplace representation and
improved wages, executive level support from the Deputy Minister of Justice, Morris Rosenberg,
and introduction of the PSLRA aided the creation and development of the AJC into a vehicle that
facilitated the unionization process. At the same time, I propose that the AJC negotiated a first
collective agreement with an employer who engaged in hard bargaining that lead to deadlocked
negotiations, but was conduct, nonetheless, the courts concluded afforded the AJC a meaningful
process of collective bargaining prior to the ERA’s enactment.

In short, this dissertation offers insight, analysis, and discussion that should interest a
varied readership. The significance of its findings for DOJ lawyers is in the practical insight into
the DOJ as an employer, a history on the union that now serves as their representative at work,
and how the first collective agreement that governed their employment came to be.

For

researchers of professional labour movements, particularly among lawyers, the study offers a
look into the procedures and strategies involved in reaching a first labour contract and the
techniques used by a union’s leadership to build and maintain group cohesion during difficult
negotiations with a steadfast employer. Finally, the AJC’s recourse to Charter litigation to
87
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counteract legislated interference in the collective bargaining process attempts to use novel
Supreme Court of Canada precedent to secure judicial remedies, which should be of interest to
all labour scholars who follow unions’ attempts to protect and expand the legal rights of their
members.

20

C H A P T E R 2: Literature Review

2.1

Introduction
In chapter 1, I argued that legal services providers are proliferating in Canada, but it is

important to note that the arena most influenced by their expansion is the private sector market,
which consists of individuals and businesses. The consumers of other legal services, such as
federal, provincial, and municipal governments, which comprise a limited public sector base, are
less affected. Governments have most of their legal needs met by staff lawyers who are trained
as specialists in discrete areas of law and whose practices are guided by an ethos of public
service. One unique facet of government lawyering (and not performed in private practice) is
advising parliamentarians on new laws and drafting regulations and legislation. Bloomquist
posits that government lawyers face greater challenges than private sector counsel for
incorporating vital virtues into their practice. He reasons that since their work is open to public
scrutiny and exposure to media, government lawyers must juggle serving multiple constituents,
for which, they are inadequately paid and overextended in their duties.88 These two points
represent some of the many findings jurists have made by exploring the dichotomy that separates
public from private practice when studying: the specialized training of government counsel;89
their importance to government;90 the nuances of federal government lawyering that entail
distinct career patterns;91 ethical duties upon transfer between public and private sector
employers;92 client representation;93 policy influence;94 ethics;95 and the special professional
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responsibilities of federal prosecutors96 and civil litigators.97 Despite these important studies,
scholarly work focussing on government lawyers remains a niche area that is primarily
concerned with practice issues, and as such, stands underdeveloped in comparison to studies on
lawyers in the private sector.
The disparity in research output between the two groups of practitioners can be traced to
at least the 1980s, when Canadian lawyers remained foreign to the research of jurists and
sociologists.98 There are two appraisals that summarized the output of scholarship at that time:
one on the level of knowledge on government lawyers in particular (by White), and another on
the Canadian legal profession in general (by Stager and Arthurs). White’s evaluation found that,
“almost nothing has been written about government lawyers in this country,”99 while Stager and
Arthurs noted how little is actually known about the legal profession in Canada.100 Afterwards,
93
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when investigators studied the legal profession in greater detail, their works demonstrated the
fact that the experiences and issues of practitioners in the much larger, more visible, and higher
profile private sector were more amenable to research and bore greater relevance to broader
intellectual currents than those circulating around lawyers employed by government. We can
appreciate these inquiries for developing a scholarship on the identity of private sector
practitioners, their role in law firms, practice ideals and individual achievements which educates
on: professional ethics,101 gender102 and racial equality in the profession103 as well as the ethnic
diversification of the bar,104 and popular conceptions of lawyers.105

However, researchers

excluding public sector lawyers from their general purview results in the same sorts of
shortcomings identified on studies of American government lawyers when applied to the
Canadian milieu. The identified limitations are various and include the following critiques: little
research exists on government lawyers (other than public defenders and prosecutors);106
government lawyers are not subjects of sustained empirical investigation;107 few studies observe
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the work processes of government legal bureaucracies;108 the specific practice issues facing
federal government lawyers invites greater attention;109 and their roles are typically
misunderstood.110

MacNair, Hutchinson, and Dodek each found that there is insufficient

knowledge and understanding about government lawyering in Canada, which, given the above
cited limitations of existing research, should stir little amazement.111

Today’s researchers,

therefore, have an important and overdue task ahead of them in raising the study of government
lawyers to a refined discipline within studies of the Canadian legal profession.

The exclusion of government lawyers from mainstream studies on the legal profession
does not mean that a dearth of theory or research exists on lawyers unionizing. In this instance, a
review of relevant literature calls for an interdisciplinary and integrative design112 that draws on
studies from the disciplines of law and the social sciences. The bifurcated format provides a
natural organization for this chapter. The first section maps and synthesizes the legal scholarship
addressing the introduction of unionization and collective bargaining to the legal profession and
its impact on the practice of law.

Since American jurists detailing the law of attorney

unionization are responsible for an initial phase of research, this will be discussed under the
theme of lawyer unions as legal construct. Following this, the review considers the academic
legal research on the interaction between collective bargaining and professional ethics and
responsibility. The first half of the review ends with a summary of the most current writing
appearing in the law journals today, which argues that salaried lawyers should pursue collective
bargaining to oppose worsening employment conditions.
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The second part of the literature review canvasses the social scientific literature on
professional unionization, particularly sociology’s subfield of interest in the professions. The
review identifies two arguments—professional proletarianization and process actor—that
consider bureaucracy can be a catalyst (or one of many) for sparking collective action by
professionals aimed at remedying underlying sources of work dissatisfaction. Finally, the review
analyzes Campbell’s study of Nova Scotia prosecutors turning to collective bargaining as an
example of the theorization behind provincial government lawyers following the lead of other
organized counsel in the public sector. The format of this chapter is to first analyze findings
from the studies and then to discuss the key concepts arising from the review. The concepts
identified from the evaluation help shape the research issues that offer a focal point for collecting
and discussing data by which this study’s central research questions are investigated.113

2.2

Part I: Doctrinal Legal Scholarship and Lawyer Unionization

2.2.1 Lawyer Unions as Legal Construct
The unions responsible for organizing growing masses of white-collar employees, whose
proportion of the American workforce in the 1950s rivaled that of blue-collar labourers,114 would
eventually force the National Labor Relations Board115 to determine whether lawyers had the
right to be represented by a labour organization. The 1948 case of Lumberman’s Mutual
Casualty Co. represented the first such instance of the NLRB granting attorneys separate
bargaining unit recognition and protection under the NLRA as professional employees.116 As
public sector employees (including public sector attorneys) were excluded from NLRA coverage,
113
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U.S. federal government attorneys waited until 17 January 1962 for President John F. Kennedy
to sign Executive Order 10988 into law before they could collectively bargain through employee
organizations. These two advances in labour law led the authors of a seminal 1971 law review
article, “The Unionization of Attorneys”, to reason that, with enshrined laws in place, there
should be a frank discussion of the legal and ethical issues related to in-house corporate and
government lawyers joining unions.117 This initial study was significant for demonstrating a
stock mode of analysis regarding the statutory laws and jurisprudence covering attorney
unionization and the ethical implications of lawyers’ membership in a union.

The authors

determined that the majority of lawyers employed in a single-client relationship enjoyed
protection under the NLRA, but the right was illusory if the American Bar Association (ABA), (a
national body of lawyers responsible for monitoring the profession and accrediting law schools),
determined that union involvement violated rules of professional conduct. Four opinions issued
by the ABA under its past Canons of Professional Ethics demonstrated a gradual shift from
opposition to reluctant observance of collectivized lawyers. These opinions set the background
for the ABA’s newly promulgated, but not yet interpreted, Ethical Consideration 5-13
(Consideration 5-13) of the new Code of Professional Responsibility, which addressed lawyer
membership in an organization of employees. The authors argued that the ABA’s concerns over
potential ethical violations triggered by lawyers joining unions (whose ranks extended beyond
attorneys) and the withdrawal of legal representation in the event of strikes and work stoppages,
should not trump interpretations of Consideration 5-13 that would chill first amendment rights of
freedom of association.

On 4 May 1977, the United File Room Clerks and Messengers made American labour
law history by having the NLRB overturn a previously dismissed petition to represent clerical
employees at a law firm in Boston, Massachusetts. In Foley, Hoag & Eliot,118 the NLRB under
section 14(c) of the NLRA asserted jurisdiction for the first time over private law firms provided
that they met appropriate jurisdictional standards. On 27 May 1977, the NLRB’s ruling in
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Wayne County Neighbourhood Services,119 confirmed that non-management, staff lawyers of
affiliates of the Legal Services Corporation (publicly funded, non-profit legal services provider
for the indigent) were professional employees within the meaning of the NLRA and could form
or join unions. The NLRB’s assertion of jurisdiction over law firms and legal service clinics
created a golden opportunity for the labour movement to seize and make significant inroads
among different types of law workers. Speculation on unions infiltrating the legal profession
raised an open issue canvassed by several jurists: under the NLRA, would the NLRB consider
private law firm associates as professional employees capable of forming bargaining units?

One faction of commentators determined that the NLRB would interpret NLRA
jurisprudence to extend coverage to lawyers throughout the profession. One author, Norton, saw
a “green light for future lawyer unionization” based on the NLRB likely finding that private
sector lawyers were professional employees under the NLRA because of unclear distinctions in
responsibilities between professional and managerial job categories and given the ABA’s
acceptance (in 1975) of lawyers belonging to unions.120 Additionally, Norton noted that lawyers
should only be excluded from bargaining units where loyalty to an employer interfered with an
attorney’s effective participation in union activities. Finally, Norton traced the ABA’s reversal
of position towards attorney unionization through a series of its opinions leading to Informal
Opinion 1325, which interpreted the Code of Professional Responsibility to contain no
disciplinary rule prohibiting the membership of lawyers in either unions or associations. In
another, like-minded evaluation, Starrett remarked that the, “time of unionized law firm has
arrived”.121 He determined the ABA’s ambiguity to lawyer representation by a union, along with
the Supreme Court’s position on the legal profession, created a likelihood that lawyers employed
by law firms would be allowed to organize; however, he believed that associates of small to
moderate-sized establishments were uninterested in unions.122 The study had an applied goal of
119
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alerting counsel to the practical unionization issues of the right to work doctrine, organizational
solicitation, strikes, and the confidentiality of attorneys as necessary considerations in the event
of union organizing at a law firm.

Other studies tested Foley against existing labour jurisprudence in order to discover
whether labour law was heading in a direction that supported employees of private law firms
unionizing. Vairo asked whether the NLRB possessed the constitutional authority to assert
jurisdiction over private law firms and, just as importantly, whether it should exercise that
authority.123 The author determined that the purposes of the NLRA were not thwarted by the
NLRB asserting jurisdiction because, one, law firms exert a substantial effect on commerce and,
second, that employer arguments proposing possible breaches of attorney client privilege or
conflict of interests should not preclude law firm employees from statutory coverage on
confidentiality grounds (except possibly for lawyers employed at firms with a substantial labour
practice). Vairo identified emergent legal issues surrounding appropriate bargaining units for
associate attorneys, paralegals and clerical staff. In another study, Stavitsky also believed that a
looming issue before the NLRB was the need to define and organize appropriate bargaining units
within a private law firm.124

He raised ethical concerns associated with lawyers forming

bargaining units and addressed them by cautioning attorneys to avoid conflicts of interests
between client and union and to prevent divulging confidential information. Stavitsky remarked
that, “beyond a consideration of jurisdictional issues and the formation of an appropriate
bargaining unit, there is little left to be discussed”.125 The observation highlighted that prospects
for future research rested with new developments such as bargaining issues, employer unfair
labour practices and union countermeasures.

The article’s other focus, a finding that

jurisdictional standards regarding the unionization of lawyers were resolved, was drawn from
analyzing the NLRB’s reasoning in Wayne County and developments from other cases as well as
advisory opinions on unionized lawyers employed by quasi-governmental legal service agencies.

123

G.M. Vairo, “Note: The Unionization of Law Firms” (1978) 46:5 Fordham Law Review 1008 at 1010.
B.J. Stavitsky, “Lawyer Unionization in Quasi-Governmental Public and Private Sectors” (1980) 17:1 California
Western Law Review 55 at 55.
125
Ibid. at 72.
124

28

By contrast, in their assessments of NLRA’s jurisprudence on professional workers and
collective bargaining, another group of jurists argued against unionization spreading within the
private bar. Ackels doubted that law firm associates would gain coverage under the NLRA as
representing the firm, binding the firm in court and contributing to firm policy and rules anointed
them with qualities of management.126 Ackels determined also that law firm associates were
confidential employees because of the right of confidentiality owed to firm clients, and
highlighted that grievances and arbitrations involving unionized counsel may result in the
impermissible release of employer records with client information obtained through the solicitorclient relationship. Sloan was another jurist who expressed reservations towards the NLRB
recognizing bargaining units that were comprised solely of law firm associates because their job
responsibilities arguably made them supervisors.127

Secondly, she uncovered a potential

limitation on the NLRB’s jurisdiction after reviewing the muddled doctrine of labour law preemption (along with the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility) to reveal that, where unfair
labour practices of the employer form part of an attorney grievance, the matter is whether the
conduct is characterized as local in nature, and beyond NLRB authority.128

The short-term projections cast by jurists on the future of union organizing in the legal
profession were verified by a 1981 BNA monograph that assessed post-Foley and Wayne County
legal and legislative developments, elections, strikes, and union organizing at private law firms,
legal services agencies, and within the public sector.129 The monograph reported empirical
evidence via court document analysis and interviews with union organizers and labour lawyers.
Findings revealed that from June 1977 to May 1980, no elections involving law firms under the
jurisdiction of the NLBR took place, but that forty-one elections were conducted at legal service
agencies.130 Legal staff was represented at several law firms by the employer voluntarily
recognizing bargaining agents. Interview findings with union organizers uncovered that the
issues of wages, working conditions, and job security involved in organizing private law firm
secretaries, clerks, and paralegals were no different than those reported by other office
126
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workers.131 Moreover, at legal services clinics, lawyers formed unions, not because they were
seen a way to improve wages, but to assert greater say in the operation of programs for indigent
clients.132 Lawyers employed by the federal government were found to organize into large
professional units that were agency wide. The monograph conjectured that a critical variable in
the extent of future unionization would be the responsiveness of a law firm modernizing its
personnel practices.133

Coincidentally, Lewis, labour counsel to law firms and one of the

interviewees for BNA investigators wrote his own commentary, arguing that the union
movement was a continuing threat for law firms with “staggering” consequences in the event of
organizing success.134 He proposed a preventative, anti-union employee relations strategy for
law firm administrators to stave off unions.

2.2.2

The Ethics of Lawyer Union Membership
Another research topic identified from the law articles involves the interplay between

union membership and professional ethics. Professional ethics are protocols of behaviour for
members of the legal profession that are embodied through rules of professional conduct. They
prescribe minimum standards of care that guide practitioner discretion in the appropriate
representation of clients, the responsible provision of services and management of a law practice,
and the fulfillment of obligations to the profession, the courts, and the public.

Lawyers

demonstrate an affinity for professionalism135 and their professionalism has been measured by
making services available to people.136

There are few ethical issues that expose a unionized lawyer to greater self-reflection than
effecting strike action while still respecting an individual obligation to uphold professional
responsibilities. Strikes forcefully aim to secure some fundamental benefit from an employer
after collective bargaining and conciliation fails. The presumption is that professionals should
not strike because it is unbecoming of service values. Lawyers take strikes very seriously
because strikes can interfere with the functioning of courts and undermine public trust in the
131
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administration of justice. On a more intimate scale, lawyers withdrawing services that unfairly
cause a denial of service may result in complaints to a law society by former clients who allege
misconduct. Consequently, jurists have keenly followed the way that lawyers have reconciled
professional ethics with participation in strike activity.

Because of their disruptive nature, lawyer strikes seldom happen, and when they do, the
variables responsible for their genesis and outcome make for a rich topic of investigation. In
October 1982, criminal defense attorneys of the New York Legal Aid Society went on strike for
ten weeks over low pay and prohibitive case loads. Arthur critiqued Ethical Opinion 82-75,
(Opinion) an advisory statement issued by the Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Committee), which commented on the
ethical implications of a hypothetical strike.137 The Opinion addressed silence from the ABA’s
Code of Professional Responsibility (ABA’s Code) on the ethical responsibility of lawyers
considering strike action, but Arthur believed that it misleadingly communicated that strikes
were unethical. Arthur critiqued the Opinion’s lack of specificity and found inconsistencies in
the Opinion’s application of several disciplinary rules of the ABA’s Code regarding client
neglect and attorney withdrawal from representation in its conclusion on when lawyers can
ethically strike. He advocated the Committee reverse its position. A review of the ABA’s Code
and the recently proposed ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct found that the strike by
legal aid staff attorneys to improve the quality of client representation was permissible and
ethically appropriate.

Arthur proposed modifying the ABA Model Rules of Professional

Conduct to sanction and clarify the right of attorneys to strike.
As Arthur’s review of the striking lawyers demonstrated, legal services were withdrawn
in the interim so that the longer term consequences of continued practice under taxing work
conditions could be addressed. Concerns for the integrity of the judicial system under the banner
of minimum standards of competent representation motivated other legal aid criminal defense
lawyers to boycott providing their services as well.

In 1983, roughly one hundred court-

appointed private criminal defense lawyers practicing in the District of Columbia banded under
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the Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association (SCTLA) and withdrew their services over poor
pay and burdensome caseloads. Lawyers continued representing indigent clients under retainer,
but refused to accept new cases. Within two weeks, the boycott forced the District of Columbia
City to introduce legislation increasing wages. Klein detailed the judicial history and outcome of
the Commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) initiating an anti-trust suit against
the SCTLA claiming they illegally fixed prices and that their boycott constituted unfair methods
of competition under the Federal Trade Commission Act.138 On final appeal by the FTC to the
United States Supreme Court, a majority decision ruled that the boycott violated anti-trust
laws.139 Klein found that the ruling thwarted lawyers from using organized labour’s tactics.

2.2.3 Current Applications: Unions Saving Lawyers
When Midwood and Vitacco rekindled the subject of American lawyers unionizing, their
article mixed old and new insights to create a modern treatment of the topic.140 Like previous
works, along with consideration of ABA Committee Opinions on lawyers and unions, they
analyzed the case law regarding lawyers qualifying as professional employees under the NLRA
based on distinctions between supervisory and managerial exceptions. Where Midwood and
Vitacco’s analysis tread new ground was in its singling out of legal aid lawyers, private courtappointed counsel, and staff attorneys in public defender’s offices that were facing low wages,
long hours, and difficult working conditions. The article proposed collective bargaining as a way
to remedy the plight of these lawyers and allow them to meet their ethical obligations. The paper
outlined how unionized lawyers could strike for workplace justice and offered proposals for
modifying labour law in order to square collective bargaining with professional responsibilities.

In 2003, when sixteen associates at the Phoenix, Arizona, law firm of Parker Stanbury
voted to unionize under the Teamsters, they became the first group to have succeeded among
private sector lawyers in America.141 A first contract was never completed as the Los Angeles
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based owners of the branch office specializing in pre-paid legal services folded the operation.142
To date, it appears that organizing success at Parker Stanbury, much like Foley, has not propelled
other lawyers to follow suit.

Despite few examples, Chin believed that America’s Great

Recession of 2008 created the climate for law firm associates to begin unionizing en masse.143
Like Midwood and Vitacco, Chin tied lawyers organizing to the larger, white-collar unionization
movement in America. Her article’s analysis addressed NLRA case law allowing lawyers to
unionize, and countered employer objections that associates bore confidential or managerial
employee qualities, or should otherwise be prohibited from collectively bargaining due to ethical
and professional responsibilities. Chin’s article updated NLRB jurisprudence regarding
supervisory employee exclusions since Midwood and Vitacco’s review of the topic was
conducted a decade earlier, but it differed in its outlining of the process for forming a private
attorney’s union and addressing of the practical concerns of doing so.
Looking at large law firms, Mortazavi’s analysis of attorney unionization argued that
American “Big Law” profit-inducing practices spoil the personal and professional well-being of
associate lawyers. Her portrayal of law firm human resources management presented exploited
associates satisfying Stakhanovite-type commitments which impeded them from satisfying key
ethical and professional responsibilities established under ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. Sector-wide unionization as the “thin edge of the wedge” that stirs a paradigm shift in
firm culture and institutional practice was presented as the “most effective remaining alternative”
open to private sector associates critical of dominant work patterns that diminish ethics from the
practice of law.144 Mortazavi’s argument implied that unionization can occur when management
directives overrule the independent discretion of practitioners on how to practice, how much to
practice, and under which conditions to practice. Her review of NLRA case law, administrative
jurisprudence, and ABA rules of ethics confirmed that no legal or ethical restrictions bar
unionization. Nonetheless, Mortazavi’s prescription carries weight insofar as being assimilated
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as the appropriate action by enough lawyers in one firm who faced the same employment
conditions as those typified in the article, wanted to defend their professional standing, and were
permanent associates.

2.3

Part II: Empirical and Theoretical Approaches to Lawyer Unionization

2.3.1 Professionals and Bureaucracies
From the 1930s and onwards, the wide-scale growth of the professional and semiprofessional workforces to carry out the larger economic activities of state and private
organizations in the fields of commerce, science and technology, and education was necessary
before such new occupations were exposed to unions and collective bargaining.145 Collective
bargaining by professionals is a relatively modern development in Canada. For example, in
December 1966, the Government of Canada struck the Woods Task Force on Labour Relations
to identify and review the pressing issues impacting the country’s system of industrial relations.
Studies exploring professional workers and collective bargaining under the direction of the
Woods Task Force noted the lack of reliable information and statistical data for their work. 146
Around the same time of the Woods Task Force, federal and provincial governments instituted
access to collective bargaining for their workers whose success with negotiated settlements stood
to promote white-collar organizing in the private sector.147 The liberalization of attitudes and
labour laws encouraged engineers, teachers, social workers, and nurses (employed in the
provincial and para-public sectors) to demand and attain collective bargaining rights. This
change in turn, created a critical mass of semi-professional and professional workers for
researchers to investigate their gains as labour collectives.148
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Thompson observed a marked shift in professionals turning to collective bargaining
during the 1960s and 1970s.

In the Industrial Relations literature, he proposed a binary

explanation to account for their motivations.149

Thompson identified defensive reasons:

professionals were organizing themselves in order to prevent their inclusion in a bargaining unit
of non-professionals. American engineers unionized during the 1930s, for example, to prevent
being lumped with less essential production workers.150

By contrast, there were offensive

considerations involved as professionals wanted to secure their own economic or social goals
through bargaining.

Thompson’s offensive rationale identifies collective bargaining as a

measure used by employed professionals when real or perceived working conditions challenge
their autonomy, pride in work, and finances.151 Bonds between salaried professionals and ideals
of professionalism unravel in workplaces where rewards and challenges do not comport with
expectations, and dissatisfaction with conditions of employment increases. When identifying the
core challenge to professional values, theorists propose bureaucratization of work as a factor.152
The issue of whether an underlying source of dissatisfaction (and what it represents) is indeed
attributable to bureaucratization differentiates two evaluative models: the professional
proletarianization thesis and process actor approach. The main difference between the two
concepts is the emphasis each places on either the social structures or the rational, independent
actions that account for behaviours within a workplace. As both views bear relevance to lawyers
unionizing, the next few sections will take a closer look at them.

2.3.2 The Proletarianization of Professionals Thesis
During the 1970s, new sociological studies on the professions emerged. After four
decades of prominence in Anglo-American sociology, the paradigm of studying and
differentiating professions from other occupations based on attributes of ethics, autonomy,
independence, occupational community, higher education and professional socialization among
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other markers waned.153 Neo-Weberian scholars countered this trait-based model by introducing
a monopoly approach that classified the professions as occupations seeking to establish,
maintain, and control a labour market for their expert services.154 With the uptake of interest in
the professions, another group of social scientists, post-industrial theorists dubbed the
functionalists, proposed their own theory of knowledge-based workers.155 This school of thought
argued that Western nations were evolving from manufacturing based economies into service
and information societies and that the resulting structural changes ushered in rapid technological
growth powered by knowledge. The emerging new economy’s reliance on the industrialization
of technical expertise would privilege and reward professionals with substantial workplace
advancements and social capital.156 Yet, there was a third, alternative perspective to emerge
during this time: Marxian political economists adapted and applied the proletarianization thesis
to stamp their own perspective on the future of employed professionals.

Proletarianization involves converging structural processes that divest increasing
populations from control over the means of production.157 Proletarianization theorists postulate
that professionals are no different than any other wage labourer intertwined in capitalist relations
of production. When surplus professionals (who are not self-employed) must sell their labour to
an employer instead of offering their services directly to the public, they become proletarians. 158
Professional

proletarianization

theorists

identify

bureaucratization

as

the

driver

of

proletarianization in workplaces where dependent employment has stripped professionals of the
inherent rewards of their calling.159 As a condition of salaried employment, professionals must
153
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accept subtle, but intrusive forms of management authority that is designed to direct work
processes. Within organizations, professional autonomy is restricted by: supervisory hierarchy,
detailed divisions of labour and documented job responsibilities, evaluations and promotions
determining career advancement, and mandatory use of guidelines and policy manuals that
reduce independent discretion. All of these constraints seek task rationalization and requisite
standards of efficiency.160

In these environments, professionals can experience technical

proletarianization which entails management implementing and maintaining standardized
operating procedures through administrative systems that wrest autonomy.161 Derber suggests
that bureaucratization more likely exposes professionals to ideological proletarianization which
begins with management determining the division of labour and ends with a loss of control over
the ends and uses of one’s work.162 While professionals may draw good salary and exercise
some discretion over completing tasks, these benefits are relative to an employer extracting
maximum profit from their labour.

Hence, many of them face the prospect of enduring

disenchantment with work or reclaim their professionalism through acts of protest.163 Derber
found that the professional proletarianization thesis sparked two streams of initial research: first,
studies of job attitudes and discontent of professionals with employment, and second, studies of
dissent and unionization by professionals.164 Works using proletarianization theory as a medium
to study workplace change in American medical and legal practice illustrate the second prong of
research. They are discussed individually in each of the next two sections below.

2.3.2.a Doctors
Initially, in the early 1970s, American doctors sporadically unionized because
government encroachment and restrictions on practice autonomy greatly dissatisfied them.165

160

Ibid. at 18.
M. Oppenheimer, “The Proletarianization of the Professional” in P. Halmos, ed., The Sociological Review
Monograph 20: Professionalization and Social Change (Hanley Stoke on Trent: J. H. Brooks Printers, Ltd., 1975)
213 at 214.
162
C. Derber, “Managing Professionals: Ideological Proletarianization and Post-Industrial Labor” (1983) 12:3
Theory and Society 309 at 316
163
J.R. Pulskamp, “Proletarianization of Professional Work and Changed Workplace Relationships” in E. P.
Durrenberger & J. Marti, eds., Labor In Cross-Cultural Perspective (Lanham: Altamira Press, 2006) 175 at 175.
164
“The Proletarianization of the Professional Essay”, supra note 159 at 21.
165
“Doctors Drawn to Unions by Abuses in Health Care System, Conference Told” Health Law Reporter 8:1624 (10
July 1999), online: Bloomberg BNA <http:// http://healthlawrc.bna.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/hlrc/#> (date
accessed: 12 January 2010).
161

37

American physicians intensified union organizing thereafter as the delivery of medical services
became corporatized and doctors lost independence and control over patient treatment and
care.166 Proletarianization theorists argued that corporatized and profit-driven American health
care threatened to approximate the medical labour process akin to the traditional industrial
proletariat and subordinate it to capitalist interests.167 McKinlay and Arches identified that the
for-profit hospital, university medical and community health centres, and the health maintenance
organizations were responsible for institutionalizing health care and displacing opportunities for
practitioner self-employment.168

Within these organizations, employed physicians face a

bureaucratization of work, loss of discretion over tools of labour, declining salaries, and forced
specialization.

A cycle of dependent employment is seemingly assured by practitioner

oversupply, as well as by prohibitive start-up and steep overhead costs associated with running a
practice. Researchers of physician unionization have made two significant conclusions about
collective bargaining: one, physicians join unions and collectively bargain in response to
physician fee squeezing, to uphold practice autonomy, and to preserve individual professional
judgment;169 and two, collective bargaining is used to address workplace concerns associated
with physician-specific issues and patient care concerns.170

2.3.2.b Lawyers
Academic consideration of proletarianization extending to lawyers coincided at the time
when the American legal profession was undergoing exponential population growth and there
was a growing concentration of employed lawyers in law firms, government and businesses.171
Spangler and Lehman explored the work processes of salaried lawyers in bureaucratized
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workplaces of large law firms, corporations, government, and legal aid services agencies.172
They sourced findings from available ethnographies to describe the scope of technological and
bureaucratic influence over lawyers and whether they realized traditional rewards of professional
work. Their analysis identified varying degrees of labour control and subordination offset by
patterns of accommodation. Unionization was proposed as a possible countermeasure that could
help lawyers curb management’s attempts at de-skilling and hastening of work processes.173

Spangler conducted further research on the work experiences of employed lawyers to
determine the extent of ideological, technological and bureaucratic control at each of four
worksites previously canvassed in her study with Lehman.174 Her book’s chapter on legal
service advocates offered a critical empirical complement and expansion of the doctrinal
scholarship identified earlier in this literature review that studied the unionization of community
law clinics. Findings from interviews conducted with respondents from three non-profit Legal
Services Corporation agency affiliates offered some of the first ethnographic revelations about
unionized staff lawyers and their bargaining agents struggling among unit members and
management over workplace organization, bureaucratic control, and influence. At the time, with
scant empirical insight on why lawyers unionize, the following excerpt presents a stimulating
argument:
A more plausible interpretation of unionization among lawyers would emphasize that
professionals join unions not because they are part of a new ruling class, but because they
are sometimes made to feel very much like the traditional working class. In the three
Legal Services offices reported in this study, unionization drives were sparked by low
salaries, poor working conditions, and managerial arbitrariness. And in all three settings,
the staffs were willing, however reluctantly to abandon many of the challenges to
managerial prerogatives in return for the most traditional of working class gains—a
reasonable wage settlement. Clearly, then, the social location of lawyer unionism
suggests that this particular form of collective action arises when lawyers most resemble
other workers and least resemble an emerging elite.175
Spangler based her findings on confrontational managerial relations and poor pay showing that
regardless of the occupation involved, workers see common benefits in collective bargaining.
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The current work conditions of law firm associates, in-house counsel, government and
legal service attorneys, and law professors was reviewed by Crain who argued that lawyers
occupying these salaried positions do not control the ideological ends to which their employer
directs their work, and, therefore, have lost their professional autonomy. 176 She proposed that
employed professionals dissatisfied with current declines in status should unionize and
collectively bargain to resist employers further commodifying their labour. Crain noted that this
required labour law to support them by not holding professionals to be within supervisory and
managerial exclusions. Interestingly, her proposal involved sociological concepts informing
legal standards as to whether management profit-maximizing techniques and policies reduce
professional autonomy and control over technical aspects of work. She found that American
government attorneys practiced law in the most starkly bureaucratized work settings.
Particularly, government lawyers experience ideological and technical control because of their
minutely detailed job descriptions, ranking systems that determine salary, relatively routine
promotions based on seniority, forced specialization and highly technical work.177 Overall, with
class privilege and professional competence jeopardized by high degrees of bureaucratization
and scientific management, lawyers like other disgruntled professionals under attack, are
theorized to unionize.178 However, Crain’s argument is not verified by either qualitative or
quantitative evaluation, which thereby leaves her conclusion as a testable proposition.

2.3.2.c Summary
Of course, as with any framing concept, proletarianization theory has attracted its fair
share of critics. Some critics doubt that professionals can be proletarianized if they exert control
over subordinates and remain a credentialed workforce.179 Other pundits believe that being
proletarianized involves absorbing working class values and attitudes that professionals will
spurn.180 Some argue certain instances of professionals unionizing are exceptions that prove the

176

Crain, supra note 21 at 577.
Ibid. at 576.
178
Ibid. at 596.
179
V. Navarro, “Professional Dominance or Proletarianization? Neither” (1988) 66: Supplement 2 The Milbank
Quarterly 57 at 70-71.
180
Burdys, supra note 169 at 99.
177

40

rule and are therefore misleading examples of deprofessionalization181 or that certain professions
are only in an initial stage of proletarianization.182 Still other detractors acknowledge that
theories involving bureaucracies may be stimulating on paper but require empirical support.183
In the area of law, several jurists question the proletarianization process because it discounts
lawyers’ abilities to adapt and modify work conditions.184
These observers’ criticisms inform that proletarianization theory stimulates healthy
debate and provides an analytical perspective on the working conditions of professionals in
organizations.

For example, lawyers have been incorporated within a class analysis that

concludes young associates at large law firms form a professional proletariat within a stratified
hierarchy of Toronto lawyers.185 Rosen suggested that the professional proletarianization debate
could be expanded by studying whether market conditions are altering the career patterns of
lawyers and subjecting them to the alienating effects of work. 186 Still, in another contemporary
example, Bagust used Derber’s ideological proletarianization argument as an epistemological
tool to interpret the perceptions of corporate law firm associates practicing in neo-liberal-leaning
Australia.187 The qualitative study used data from fifty semi-structured interviews conducted
with partners and past and present associates of ten law firms regarding work practices. While
corporate law firms historically rose in prominence because of their association with high-status
clients, these same corporate entities are now rewriting existing service bargains and causing law
firms to adjust to the new rules of business. Bagust found that in a thoroughly commercialized
181
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and competitive high-end, legal services marketplace, law firms must promote and deliver
efficient services to sustain current client bases and the high levels of profitable billable hours
that associates generate. Downward pressures fall squarely on the shoulders of associates who
reported that their professionalism is being compromised by having to advertise the firm. A
greater threat to associates’ autonomy, however, was in meeting client objectives, which
threatened the goals and purposes of lawyering. Bagust argued that the flow-through effect of
strict agency between firm client and counsel compromised the independence of practitioners,
and could jeopardize their careers in the event that unethical behaviour was needed to maintain
customers.188

Overall, the study maintained a persuasive argument for ideological

proletarianization conceptualizing how lawyers lose some of their professional identity.

2.4

Professionals Unionizing as Process Actors
In 1980, Abel reviewed the literature on the sociology of lawyers and acclaimed Larson’s

work as a breakthrough in the sociology of professions, which was poised to influence “all
writing about professionals for many years”.189 Larson developed a thesis of the “professional
project” a concept inspired by the neo-Weberian sociological tradition and generated to contrast
the trait model of studying professions. The professional project characterized a profession as an
occupation that masters and standardizes a knowledge product, creates a market for its services,
and then enlists the state to preserve it through professional licensure.190 If successful, the spoils
of the professional project—social standing and economic rewards—accrue to occupations
capable of a maintaining a collective process of upward mobility for its members who reinforce
and perpetuate conditions. True to his words, Abel adapted and applied the market control thesis
to American lawyers.191 Abel’s success with using this theory in many of his studies has been
such that Marshall remarks the approach, “has dominated the contemporary literature on the
legal profession” and “has become the dominant paradigm for examining lawyers”.192 Abel’s
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writings allow inquiry into how much and in what way the heyday of the legal profession (lasting
until around the mid-to-late 20th century) will continue in the future.

The legal profession, like other occupations in capitalist society, strives to control the
market for its goods and services.193 According to Abel, the success or failure of a professional
project of market control in law involves: maintaining a scarcity of legal providers (regulating
the production of producers), asserting control over production of legal services (regulating the
production by producers) through national and state bar associations, and stimulating demand for
services.194 As the legal profession’s grip on market control loosens, however, classic legal
professionalism weakens and changes in the division of labour and work organization of lawyers
follow.195 Evidence of the American legal profession splintering into disparate and unequal
sectors, less interested, or even capable of maintaining market control, is demonstrated by lawyer
employment growing in areas outside of the traditional sole-proprietorship and law firm
paradigm.

For example, Abel reviewed the working conditions of perennially dependent

American government lawyers, arguing that they were noticeably underpaid in comparison to
private sector lawyers and that these practitioners often leave their jobs for better opportunities
elsewhere.196 Accordingly, the structure and rewards of government employment shapes lawyers
with interests and concerns distinct from practitioners in other, more lucrative employment
arrangements. Government lawyers are middling beneficiaries of the professional project who
should be expected to influence more immediate spheres of economic interests. Providing their
services to the government shields them from the larger market, and so their attempts at
improving employment rewards unfold at the level of their employer. Kritzer argues that Abel’s
analysis reveals just how the motivational basis of upholding a professional project involves
preserving the economic self-interest of individual practitioners.197
193
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Abel’s study was a historical analysis of the macro-level social organization of the legal
profession. In outlining the parameters of his work, he averred that explanation was not its
focus, nor did it look at the daily work of lawyers.198 Moreover, Abel excluded the exploration
of lawyer unionism by positioning it as a suggested alternative organizational form among
multiple options available to practitioners.199 The neo-Weberian-inspired premise that argues
employed professionals will attempt to influence the organizations where they work at as part of
an occupational group’s continuing struggle for institutional recognition helped Harrison develop
and apply a processual approach to explain unionization among professionals.200 The processual
approach concerns itself with the capacities of entire professions and sub-groups within them to
improve realms of control that unfold at the levels of the organization, work process, politics,
and institution.201 The approach anticipates that subgroups within a profession have different
prerogatives, and that various stakeholders take different kinds of actions to protect their
interests.202 In the case of employed professionals unionizing, this outcome may occur when
elements such as: legislative and judicial decisions, social norms concerning unionization,
recruiting strategies of non-professional unions, collective bargaining patterns among nonprofessional service occupations, and leadership orchestrating worker mobilization create an
opportunity for workers to act and improve their influence over economic, strategic, and
operational control.203

The processual model differs from proletarianization theory by

prioritizing contextual, organizational, and interactional factors that propel union activity, rather
than bureaucratization invariably threatening professional control, which depends on the power
relationships between members of a workforce and administrators.204

2.5

Nova Scotia Crown Attorneys and Collective Bargaining
Campbell’s study on collective bargaining by Nova Scotia Crown prosecutors is the most
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relevant research into public sector lawyer unionization in Canada. 205 Campbell explored Crown
lawyers adopting collective bargaining as a usurpationary strategy aimed at securing greater
control over work that exposed one element of a dual form of closure with the other component
being that lawyers exclude non-licensed practitioners as members of a self-regulated profession.
The study illustrated that collective bargaining was an expedient solution for a faltering
professional project associated with dependant employment, while showing prosecutors as a
unique occupational community capable of sustaining an ideology of professionalism and
collective action.206

Campbell explained that Crown attorneys resorted to collective bargaining due to
historical and political evolution in employment relations with the province of Nova Scotia. By
introducing a Public Prosecution Service that reigned in control over the prosecutorial labour
process and developed it as an organization under ineffective management, the province created
a hostile working environment.207 Frustration among prosecutors grew as they felt marginalized
by diminishing professionalism, low pay, wage roll-backs and freezes, lack of offices with
appropriate amenities and administrative support, arbitrary promotions, and the growing
complexity of Charter prosecutions.208

Their dissatisfaction reached a tipping point after

demands to the provincial Attorney General for improved working conditions went ignored.
Frustrated prosecutors mobilized through their agent, the Nova Scotia Crown Attorney’s
Association (NSCAA), and staged a provocative, two-day illegal strike in June 1998, calling for
a salary setting process.209

A subsequent inquiry into the Provincial Prosecution Service

included a recommendation that prosecutors receive collective bargaining rights. 210 Campbell
determined that the actions of Nova Scotia Crown attorneys leading to the acquisition of
collective bargaining rights showed them as a group who were neither de-professionalized nor
proletarianized, but as workers who had adopted working class militancy to achieve their
goals.211
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2.6

Synopsis of Research Literature on Lawyer Unionization

2.6.1 Doctrinal Legal Literature and Lawyer Unionization
American legal scholarship has produced a substantial literature on the law of lawyer
unionization. The methodology of these studies involves jurists analyzing modifications in
labour law doctrine and the practice and professional responsibility issues linked to lawyers’
collectively bargaining. The output of these studies can be characterized as a literature written
for lawyers by academic lawyers. Doctrinal studies on lawyer unionization are steeped in
technical and prescriptive analysis and this, ultimately, narrows the scope of inquiry and
findings. Consider Rubenstein’s brief article on attorney labour unions published in 2007.212
The article canvassed the familiar discussion of employers opposing attorney unionization on the
basis of confidential employee, supervisor or managerial employee exclusion, or, in the
alternative, potential concerns with unionized attorneys breaching ethical standards. As the
article indicates with, “surprisingly little NLRB precedent with regard to attorneys”213 jurists are
hard pressed to add fresh insight to the subject without new case law. This project proposes that
a better use of information yielded from a labour relations board certifying a bargaining agent for
a unit of lawyers is to study events leading to that act and its implications (than have, as a study’s
main goal, an interpretation of a decision as evidence of new directions in jurisprudence
governing professional unionization).

The most current studies on attorney unionization published in the law reviews contrast
the older literature by advocating for lawyers stationed on the margins of the profession to
unionize. Challenging the terms and conditions of employment that interfere with legal aid and
large law firm practitioners’ regard for responsible client representation and ethical legal practice
as the basis for jurists’ reasoning, however, does not seem to aid the understanding of DOJ
lawyers’ interest in collective bargaining. The premise is important, however, for identifying
professional ethics as a relevant issue in the determination of whether lawyers should enjoy the
right to unionize, bargain collectively, and strike. Professionalism propagates a common culture
that shapes the behaviour of practitioners.214 For example, professionals are influenced by
212

M. H. Rubinstein, “Attorney Labor Unions” New York State Bar Association Journal (January 2007) 23 at 23.
Ibid. at 27.
214
W. J. Goode, “Community Within a Community: the Professions” (1957) 22:2 American Sociological Review
194 at 195.
213

46

attitudinal markers that reinforce the perception that unionization and professionalism are
mutually exclusive.215 It remains contested in the literature whether unionization as a blue-collar
phenomenon is compatible with professionalism and if collective bargaining can account for the
distinct traits of professional work.216 Yet, examples of collective agreements suggest organized
professionals seek contractual provisions that advance professional standards.217 Ambiguity
caused by researchers debating the issue creates an empirical question that this study explores
through inquiry into DOJ lawyers’ experience with practicing law under a collective agreement.
Insight from respondents will provide important (and previously missing) perspective on how
DOJ lawyers view belonging to a union while maintaining professional values and ethics, which
is relevant to the issue of decreasing departmental resources and increasing practice volumes
inciting the AJC to consider job action.

2.6.2 Social Scientific Literature and Lawyer Unionization
Conflict theories that assume the autonomy and ideals held by employed professionals
clash with the demands of an organization offer a logical starting point for considering how
dissatisfied professionals react to workplace conditions detrimental to their interests. 218 While
the professional proletarianization thesis offers a pattern of thinking for unionism among
government lawyers, the question remains whether concepts from the theory apply to events at
the DOJ. This is another key empirical question explored in this project through interviews with
DOJ lawyers that seek their perception of whether and to what extent collective bargaining was
seen as offering a solution to poor working conditions reducing practitioner autonomy and
technical control over legal practice.
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Gorman and Sandefur identify that in the current literature on professional and expert
work, researchers are explaining collective group actions by focussing on the processes and
social actors that produce outcomes.219

The process analysis approach concedes that

professionals unionizing may be a response to bureaucratic employment, but views it as one of
many different options a workforce may choose as they strive to achieve greater influence at
work. Process researchers query whether bureaucratic threats to professional control alone can
account for the attractiveness of unionization to improve wages and working conditions. This
outlook unveils another issue for research that investigates whether DOJ lawyers were attracted
to collective bargaining as a means to advance wages and benefits. Asking respondents to reflect
on these considerations will provide insight as to whether economic issues—in addition to other
contextual and interactional factors—helped the AJC rally around a common cause as part of its
development into a champion for the interests of its members.

A review of Campbell’s study revealed two gaps this dissertation intends to fill. First,
unlike the NSCAA, which was voluntarily recognized as bargaining agent for prosecutors, the
PSRLA required the AJC to conduct an organizing campaign of DOJ lawyers and prove majority
support in order for it to become certified by the PSLRB. This fact creates the opportunity to
study that organizing drive and explore the reasons why the majority of DOJ lawyers supported
it. This may, in turn, provide evidence whether the proletarianization model or processual model
better frames the events under study. Second, Campbell’s exploration of Crown prosecutors
negotiating a collective bargain was limited to the efforts of NSCAA bargaining team negotiators
dealing with the challenges of disclosure, establishing positions, and strategically revealing
information briefs (which was related to the strengthening of an occupational community
amongst prosecutors).220 The initial framework agreement that allowed for the Province of Nova
Scotia and Crown prosecutors to negotiate pay was not amicably resolved and had to be settled
by binding arbitration.221

While Campbell’s assessment of contract negotiations offers an

important perspective, an inconclusive picture still remains of how negotiators representing a
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bargaining unit of lawyers prepare for, handle, and analyze the experience of first contract
negotiations ending in stalemate. The process of DOJ lawyers negotiating a first collective
agreement took a different path that also resulted in arbitration, but ended through Charter
litigation. The AJC’s first contract bargaining negotiations and its outcomes are therefore treated
as subjects of interest in and of themselves.

2.7

Conclusion
To conclude, the research literature suggested that the motivations for DOJ lawyers

unionizing can be seen as a defense against ideological proletarianization or as a workforce
interested in improving its position within the DOJ. It also indicated that to gain improved pay
and work conditions collective bargaining is necessary.

The review demonstrated that

professional ethics and responsibility are a consideration when lawyers unionize and collectively
bargain and that further research on the topic is necessary to address differing viewpoints raised
by the extant literature. It is therefore appropriate to develop both these areas into topics that are
explored in this project through interviews with respondents and in document analysis. As for
bargaining agents negotiating a first collective agreement governing lawyers, the available
literature reported little about the experience, thus directing an emergent design using initial data
for generating research parameters. A grounded approach will allow for an understanding of the
situation from documentary and interview data. Now that the background literature that informs
this study has been explored, the next chapter will deal with the practicalities of generating a
research design.
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C H A P T E R 3: Research Design

3.1

Introduction
To analyze and discuss the complexities of DOJ lawyers unionizing and the AJC

negotiating a first collective agreement, it is important to develop a strong and clear research
design. The first step of the process, and before discussing the mechanics of conducting the
study, involves identifying how a doctoral dissertation in law that seeks empirical understanding
of a workplace phenomenon relates to academic legal scholarship. The early twentieth century
American legal realist movement may have petered out during the interwar period, but not before
introducing an appreciation for empiricism and the techniques of social science to the study of
law. Heise credits empirical scholarship gradually becoming rooted in the academy during the
mid-1950s through to the 1970s with: (1) University of Chicago Law School producing the
groundbreaking Chicago Jury Project; (2) Walter E. Meyer Research Institute of Law supporting
research; (3) generous foundational funding reaching a critical mass; and (4) development of the
Law and Society Association.222 It is not until the turn of the twenty-first century, however, that
Diamond and Mueller pinpoint legal scholars popularizing empiricism through their research.223
Currently, within the Anglo-Commonwealth legal academy, enthusiasm for empirical
scholarship continues to steadily grow.

This evolution signals important progress because

academics producing greater volumes of empirical work strengthen the field’s vitality.

In the United Kingdom, the demand for empirical studies to inform policy making and
evaluate policy implementation may outstrip producer capacities.224 The Nuffield Inquiry on
British Empirical Research recommends increasing the supply of empirically trained legal
scholars to replenish scores of retiring faculty.225 The study proposes to bolster the empirical
222
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studies knowledge of early to mid-career academics through dedicated funding streams,
fellowships, professional mentorships, and promoting greater collaboration and improving
teaching relationships between law and social science departments.226

This institutional

recognition of applied and theoretical empirical legal scholarship attests to its value as a prized
intellectual property.

The Nuffield study informs what the influential Consultative Group on Research and
Education in Law foreshadows when it examined Canadian law schools in the early 1980s.227
Law and Learning recommends shoring up law as a scholarly discipline by developing
fundamental legal research, which involves studying law as a social phenomenon using empirical
and interdisciplinary methods. Law and Learning positioned graduate law programmes at the
hub of the initiative, as fostering a pluralistic intellectual environment would instill future
scholars with diverse research interests. The vast majority of faculty members unfamiliar with
fundamental research practices, however, left the leadership overseeing the endeavour unclear in
their direction. Macdonald, assessing two decades of Law and Learning’s legacy, finds that
scholars do not produce enough fundamental research.228 Backhouse confronts the field’s inertia
by urging professors and graduate students to conduct more interdisciplinary work.229 Her
clarion call reprises graduate students’ role as participants in Law and Learning’s plan for
sophisticated legal scholarship.

Graduate law students who lack social or natural sciences

training, however, may not be keen on conducting an empirical dissertation as minimal
experience breeds doubts over producing a valid study, which, in turn, stunts initiative. Good
empirical research is distinguished by an investigator revealing how observations are collected
and analyzed so that conclusions reasonably follow from data, while poor empirical research
overlooks these principles.230 For graduate students unskilled in empirical research, law school
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journals do not necessarily help make the training easier as they publish articles demonstrating
both good and bad examples of empirical work.231

This chapter offers a framework for empirical training by articulating the procedures
involved in collecting and analyzing the data used to answer the study’s research questions. The
chapter categorizes the various research methods of legal scholarship and then describes how the
study falls within the socio-legal rubric. The nature of this investigation invokes the case study
because, as Rowley observes, employing the format calls for some evidence of mastery in its
use.232 This comment alerts us to the fact that readers frown upon case studies that neglect sound
research design.233 Case studies are crafted using a range of data from many sources. After data
is collected, it must be analyzed and reported. As the task is the investigator’s responsibility and
requires some assurance of trustworthiness, Caelli, Ray and Mill’s four-point design for
demonstrating the credibility of findings is applied to the study. Taking up this credibility
framework, which consumes a considerable portion of the chapter’s discussion, also attends to
Luck, Jackson and Usher encouraging investigators to manage the reliability and researcher bias
associated with case study research by clarifying their theoretical and philosophical positions,
logic of thinking and assurance of rigour.234 Finally, the chapter concludes by outlining the
limitations of the study and then summarizing the key points regarding the construction of a
research design.

3.2

The Four Approaches to Legal Scholarship
When enough scholars share common perspective on studying law they create an

intellectual community. Learned groups differ from one another because the proponents of each
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subscribe to different epistemologies that instruct specific conceptions about law.

Each

consortium maintains differing intellectual priorities, research agendas, and a body of
representative literature that affords prospective adherents models with which to align their
research. The main methodologies used in dissertations of law and associated with leading
schools of legal philosophy are: doctrinal, historical, comparative, and socio-legal.235

Doctrinal scholarship represents the study of law as a self-contained and professional
discipline. The researcher views court decisions, statutes, and legislation as sources of legal
rules that provide data for evaluation. Their analysis may involve identifying or explaining a
new area of law or trends in an existing one. Legal doctrine is often critiqued, and normative
prescriptions for judges or policy makers on how to reform an unsatisfactory law can encompass
a study.236 Doctrinal studies represent the leading form of academic legal research conducted.
The bench and bar use doctrinal literature for their practice, while the professoriate relies on it
for their teaching.
Legal history involves examining past events, laws, institutions, lawyers and judges.237
The methodology involves describing how legal landscapes once existed as crucial to our
understanding of the ways modernization shapes and transforms the legal culture of a society.
Law and Learning defines historical methods as, “tracing the history of a particular development
within the law and possibly as well its relationship to the history of society”. 238 The legal
historian uses primary sources such as court records, legislation and government documents that
are relevant to the period and topic under study.
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While it is neither new nor novel comparative legal scholarship is currently in vogue and
is enjoying a considerable upsurge in visible practice.

Given that globalization exerts

tremendous pressure on the growing integration of foreign and domestic laws, the structuring of
international legal norms, and the creation of new regulatory frameworks that overlap countries,
comparative legal scholarship looks at the ways law develops and works in one national legal
systems in comparison or contrast to another.239 It is a preferred methodology for evaluating
how disparate jurisdictions react to similar legal issues confronting them.

Socio-legal approaches round out the methodological taxonomy. This last approach
studies people’s interactions and intersections with law and legal institutions. The socio-legal
scholar views law as a social construct and studies its workings through theoretical perspectives,
interdisciplinary approaches, and methods of the social sciences, economics, the humanities and
other non-law disciplines. In this methodology, research questions are posed and answered in
terms of law as a phenomenon with analysis directed towards evaluating, predicting, and
understanding legal doctrine or building theory.

This study involves an inquiry about lawyers forming an association to represent their
workplace interests through collective bargaining. Once formed, their union engages with the
employer and judicial institutions where each interaction adds another level of depth and
complexity for analysis. Understanding the developments responsible for outcomes requires data
collection methods that allow for historical and contemporary assessments. Of the four
methodologies defined above, the socio-legal research strategy is most appropriate for this study
because it offers access to the tools of the social sciences that can capture and expose the
multiple perspectives of lawyers interacting with collective bargaining.

3.3

Socio-legal Paradigm: Law as Social Research
Jurists and social scientists produce empirical knowledge about law and their scholarship

is pragmatic.
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problem”.240 This includes legal scholarship.241 Academics pursue specific research problems
because the questions raised by their examination can expose a gap in knowledge of some
practical or theoretical condition.242

Conducting a study to address a deficiency builds

understanding that may otherwise remain obscured. A study that explores, describes, or explains
law as a phenomenon affecting individuals represents social research.243

Steinus and her

colleagues propose that the fundamental goal of all social research is to detail a conceptually
adequate description of a historically specific topic.244

Within this definition then, social

research is the objectively organized and systematic pursuit of knowledge about reality through
data and theory,245 whereas data is empirical evidence or information gathered according to a
procedure and protocol,246 and theory constitutes, “the systematic set of interrelated statements
intending to explain some aspect of social life”.247 Theory helps an investigator communicate
discoveries about their project and compare and apply study findings to what the literature
reports or what occurs in actual practice.

The type of theory generated depends on the

investigator’s underlying philosophy which manifests itself through a positivist, interpretive, or
critical positioning.248
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A research design within the positivist tradition, for example, tests or develops theory
using hypotheses.249 Positivist research works deductively to discover causal relationships as the
basis of generalized knowledge.250 Objective knowledge is produced by translating data into
quantifiable variables, through statistics as proxies for population parameters, and by purposely
controlling for external variations.251

An interpretive approach, alternatively, represents a

phenomenological tradition of exploring human behaviour and experience from the perspective
of the audience under investigation.252 Inductive research understands and describes a group,
institution, situation, or event to develop theory from written, observed or imaged data.253 When
the study’s goal is to critique power structures that oppress people, however, a critical
positioning works best.

Critical theorists’ research looks at lived experiences and human

interactions within society.

Critical theory involves ethnographic and historical studies of

organizational processes and structures aimed at confronting an injustice of a particular
community.254 Such studies educate audiences about hidden interests and contradictions by
critiquing oppressive power relations and the critical theory that supports the purpose is built
either deductively or inductively.255

The literature review in chapter 2 shows that public sector lawyer unionism, and the
process and outcome of lawyers collectively bargaining, are topics in need of greater
understanding. To this purpose, descriptive theory building in the interpretivist tradition, as
249
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outlined above, is appropriate.256 The qualitative approach is the methodological compliment for
interpretivism as its methods represent a naturalistic research strategy that can document a causal
process within an individual case and the ways people make sense of it.257 Qualitative research
is better comprehended by its unifying features rather than by any standard definition.258
Academic disciplines conceive qualitative research differently as well as do practitioners
working within the same field. For example, jurists must determine which form of qualitative
research suits their intellectual preference and reflects their work. Dobinson and Johns argue
that doctrinal research is qualitative because, in addition to understanding social context and
interpretation, it is non-numerical and involves the process of selecting and weighing materials in
light of hierarchy and authority.259 Webley’s understanding of the method partially echoes that
of Dobinson and Johns’ as the case-based approach of studying law through precedent is a form
of qualitative research.

She acknowledges, however, that qualitative legal research also

encompasses an orthodox form.

This mode involves capturing and categorizing social

phenomena and their meaning using direct observation, in-depth interviews, and document
analysis.260

3.4

Qualitative Methods: The Case Study
As it has been established, this study’s qualitative orientation is empirical, and a

qualitative study can conducted in one of five ways: (1) Biography; (2) Phenomenology; (3)
Grounded Theory; (4) Ethnography; or (5) Case Study.261 The selection of the most appropriate
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mode depends on the research question and the phenomenon under investigation.262 In the
instance of this research, the case study offers the most effective structure for handling:
(1)

A research area that is newer and less developed, and an examination of the
phenomenon under investigation requires an understanding of context;263

(2)

Actual practices, including the details of significant activities that may be unusual
or infrequent;264

(3)

A research question that has a what, how, and why component;265

(4)

The study’s call for the concentration on the description of social processes and
an explanation of their dynamics.266

The criteria for using a case study match up with the aims of this project. First, union organizing
drives among Canadian public sector lawyers occur infrequently. Second, the study’s central
research questions involve a “what” component. Third, the perceptions, meanings and attitudes
to unionizing and working under a collective bargain agreement are variables that are not easily
quantifiable. Fourth, as case studies describe and explain events within context, the behaviours
involved in the collective bargaining process are to be understood holistically. All of these stated
factors pointed towards designing and conducting this inquiry as a qualitative case study.

Tellis advises that if the uniqueness of a phenomenon disallows for comparison with
another case then a single-case design should be chosen, as it is in this project.267 A single-case
design will be embedded when a phenomenon under investigation is complex.

The larger

subject (i.e. unionization) is looked at in terms of units with each part being studied individually.
The results from each unit of analysis are then drawn together to yield an overall picture of the
262
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subject.268 This case study is embedded and broken down into two parts with each component
corresponding to a research question: one unit of analysis consists of what instigated DOJ
lawyers to unionize under the AJC, and the other involves the AJC concluding a first collective
agreement. Each unit invites particular understanding and reporting which are developed as the
subjects of chapters 5 and 6 respectively.

3.5

Case Study Assessment Standards

3.5.1

Generic Qualitative Case Study
Yin, Stake, Merriam, and Perry, among other methodologists offer helpful strategies for

designing and conducting case study research.269 Their guidance offers a necessary orientation
for jurists who want to conduct a case study but better know the term as part of their
pedagogy.270 Jurists, like the novice researchers from other disciplines, must confront a body of
literature on case study methodology that is contradictory and confusing at first blush.271
Appleton proposes that if an investigator adopts a particular author’s case study strategy it should
align with their philosophical and methodological stance.272

This suggestion makes sense

because positivist and interpretive philosophies each articulate the process and assess the
outcome of inquiry differently.273

Qualitative case studies produce research that requires

appropriate assessment standards which suit the design of this project.274

The interdisciplinary orientation of this dissertation situated the evaluation criteria in
need of specific framing. Merriam’s discussion on the characteristics of generic qualitative case
study offers an approach that accounts for the vagaries of interdisciplinary synthesis. She
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describes a basic or generic qualitative study as one that seeks, “to discover and understand a
phenomenon, a process, or the perspectives and worldviews of the people involved”.275 Findings
consist of a mix of description and analysis of an event,276 and the generic qualitative approach
can work in conjunction with the case study.277 Caelli, Ray and Mill use credibility as a
benchmark for validating a generic qualitative research. A case study seeking credibility as
outlined by the generic qualitative format should address four factors: (1) theoretical positioning
of the researcher; (2) methodology and methods; (3) rigour; and (4) analytic lens.

3.5.2 Theoretical Positioning
Theoretical positioning invites reflexivity from the researcher as to the motivation,
assumptions and history that are instigating and influencing their study.278 Acknowledging a
researcher’s position to the research group and data helps identify their entry point to the
inquiry.279

Any study capable sustaining an investigator’s prolonged efforts must strongly

capture their notice at the outset. My own interest was piqued after inadvertently discovering the
PSLRB decision on the AJC’s certification application. The importance of reading this ruling
was magnified by my understanding as a lawyer that unionism was unheard of amongst my
private bar colleagues. As I found out about lawyers unionizing after the fact (and through print,
not direct experience) it shaped my identity as a researcher: I came to the subject as an outsider.

I commenced the study with minimal knowledge of the DOJ and its workforce. Limited
understanding fed my curiosity as a researcher and as a lawyer interested in the practice of law
on behalf of the federal government. Having litigated one judicial review against counsel from
the DOJ provided a focussed, albeit limited perspective of their work. I further learned about my
subject while conducting research in the field, and it was there that my legal training helped me
gather relevant data. When I was conversing in court hallways and interviewing respondents, my
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familiarity with the lingua franca of practicing law helped me greatly in building an initial
rapport with the individuals involved.

3.5.3 Methodology and Methods
Achieving congruence between methodology and methods requires that researchers
understand and convey the differences between these two fundamentals of social research.280
Evans and Gruba distinguish the concepts by defining the former term as a philosophical
underpinning taken towards a study while the latter represents steps taken to answer the research
question.281 Once the researcher identifies an empirical dimension to a study, he or she can then
direct attention to the ways in which data is collected and analyzed. Obtaining evidence from
miscellaneous sources is the hallmark of case study methods, and Cunningham explains that
tapping multiple data streams is necessary as the investigator has no control over the research
setting of a case.282 Various sources are used, therefore, because each contributes evidence
independently of, or in corroboration with, the other.

Whether the researcher’s choice of

techniques was appropriate to obtain data is also important because it offers a partial measure of
study quality.283

Typically, case study evidence comes from archival records, documents,

interviews, direct observation, participant observation, and physical artefacts.284

For this

particular study, interviews, documents, and participant observation were consulted and
employed.

3.5.4 Interviews
3.5.4.a Ethics
An interview involves two people participating in a focussed, mutual conversation. An
interview seeks to learn the perspective of others, so the interviewer must take care to minimize
any risks associated with interviewees sharing their thoughts. Before I could conduct interviews
for this study, my project first had to clear an ethics review. The process is overseen by the
280
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Office of Research Ethics at York University (“ORE”), which looks to preserve the safety,
welfare and dignity of research participants. The ORE expects that investigators adhere to
university guidelines for ethical research. I was required to complete a Human Participants
Review Sub-Committee tutorial on the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for
Research Involving Humans. I also submitted a proposal and requisite protocol forms before
ORE issued their certificate of ethics approval (#STU 2010-095).285

3.5.4.b Semi-Structured Interviews
The semi-structured interview format was used to organize interview questions. Semistructured interviews involve the interviewer identifying themes of interest and generating
questions prior to speaking with respondents. Each of the five qualitative research modes puts
interview data to different use.

Gubrium and Holstein’s taxonomy of qualitative research

assisted in clarifying whether the final interview protocols fulfilled the objectives of this
inquiry.286 Elliott, reviewing Gubrium and Holstein’s work explains the naturalist approach
recognizes the social world provides an external reality, observable and describable by the
researcher.287 This allows for interview questions focusing on who, what, where, when, how,
and the why behind the subject of investigation, which is what Clardy proposes the language
should be when investigating developments in an organization.288

There were two primary interview protocols produced: one was for DOJ lawyers and the
other for AJC personnel. A pilot interview protocol for DOJ lawyers was circulated to a solicitor
and a small, general practice law clerk for feedback on the relevancy of interview questions.
Afterwards, the interview protocol was submitted for consultation on syntax to a member of
York University’s Writing Centre. Another edit to the protocols came after losing a potential
respondent. A DOJ lawyer initially expressed interest in being interviewed, but later declined
citing time constraints. Their withdrawal alerted me to respect the fact that many respondents
have tight schedules. Both interview protocols were then scrutinized for superfluous background
285
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questions, such as what law school respondents attended, and duplicative questions were
consolidated in order to shorten the time commitment. They were revised in anticipation of
interviews lasting between forty to sixty minutes in length. Polished interview protocols were
sent to a strategic informant aligned with the AJC. The importance of recruiting a key contact
from an organization under study is well documented.289 The reviewer analyzed interview
questions and provided suggestions on content. Their insight was particularly helpful in linking
DOJ lawyers unionizing with legislative amendments. Several questions on union organizing
were amended to be less directional.

3.5.4.c Accessing and Interviewing Respondents
Locating study respondents takes work, and recruiting lawyers can be especially tricky.
Danet et al., report their funded observational study on lawyers and clients being scuttled
because the investigators could not negotiate access to solicitor-client interactions.290 Bumatay,
citing Lund, notes government lawyers may hesitate being interviewed because multiple
pressures deter them from speaking candidly with researchers.291 It is quite possible that several
of the people I contacted for participation in the study considered this rationale when
overlooking the request. Respondents agreeing to an interview were primarily secured using the
tactics of purposeful and snowball sampling.

Their recruitment was informed with the

contextualized-consequentialist ethics model in mind. The philosophy requires the researcher
develop relationships of respect and trust that are non-coercive and not based on deception.292

Obtaining a list of lawyers employed by the DOJ is an undemanding task. A search of
commercially published lawyer listings and on-line provincial law society member directories
yields their contact information.

A “shot in the dark” mass mailing campaign undercuts
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conventional wisdom on recruiting elite respondents and was disregarded. Initial respondents
were therefore solicited based on their advanced educational standing or service to the broader
legal community which suggested an increased predilection for study participation.

Court

transcripts and AJC news bulletins identifying noteworthy people associated with the union were
other resources consulted for spotting potential respondents. This particular enlisting technique
underlies purposeful sampling which suggests interviewing specific individuals who will most
likely broaden the theoretical explanation.293

Snowball sampling occurred with a few

interviewees who recommended the names of their colleagues who might be interested in the
study. Two interviews came about spontaneously during fieldwork.

By learning a little about potential respondents, I was able to better tailor their letters of
study invitation. A customized letter creates space for introducing the study, the researcher,
study voluntariness and anonymity, and noting the significance of contributing to the study.294 In
short, the letters sent were meant to encourage participation. When counsel is tasked with
concluding a business transaction or preparing argument for trial, time is a commodity that is
understandably guarded. An hour spent partaking in the study was an hour of lost productivity
needing to be recouped later in the day for my participants. As well, counsel’s hourly diem
dwarfs the $50 honorarium offered for study involvement, thus the decision to be interviewed
was ultimately based on the respondent’s interest. Mailed letters were followed up by e-mails.
A respondent positively replying opened the door for an interview to be scheduled. Interviews
were conducted by phone in all cases except for one where the respondent preferred an in-person
interview. I went to Ottawa to meet with them. Of course, travelling to various cities across
Canada for interviews would be a time-consuming and expensive endeavour. Under these
circumstances, telephone interviews were acceptable.295

Twenty-three interviews were conducted. They are divided among eleven current and
three former DOJ lawyers, seven AJC negotiating team members, and two senior AJC
administrators. One standard interview protocol was used for rank-and-file DOJ lawyers and
293
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another for AJC personnel to assure some comparability between answers provided by
respondents from each of the two pools.296 Questions for DOJ lawyers covered issues of ethics,
bureaucracy or economic factors behind the decision to unionize, the AJC’s organizing campaign
and delay in negotiating a first contract.

Questions for union representatives focussed on

involvement with the AJC, the AJC conducting an organizing campaign, and first contract
negotiations.297 Two interview protocols were tailored for specific individuals whose unique
experiences required some modification in questions. As interviewing progressed, questions to
the DOJ lawyer protocol were adjusted to improve procedure and tease out new data emerging
from previous interviews.

Before interviews started, respondents were reminded of the voluntariness and
confidentiality of study participation. They were asked whether they wished the interview be
audio taped or transcribed by hand. If respondents declined being recorded, then notes were
taken and later typed up. Audio taped interviews were produced in mp3 format and sent to a
professional transcriptionist for processing. The distribution between audio-taped and hand
transcripts was roughly proportional. Respondents are acknowledged in the analysis by a lawyer
or AJC negotiating team member designation and a number. Respondent privacy requires data
not disclose an interviewee’s identity.

3.5.5 Unobtrusive Measures
For additional data collection, this project employed unobtrusive measures. Unobtrusive
measures involve inconspicuous data collection methods. Webb et al., explain that unobtrusive
sources in the form of physical traces, archives, and observation are used to supplement or crossvalidate interviews and questionnaires.298 Unobtrusive measures are necessary components of a
case study as researchers should turn to discrete observation or examination of records as a first
means for collecting case study data.299 Unobtrusive data for this study involved judicial,
government, institutional and mass media records as well as direct observations.
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3.5.5.a Primary Documents
Archival records consist of historical and contemporary primary and secondary
documents which are a staple of case study evidence, and, in fact, can be used as principal
data.300 Primary documents are original and contemporaneous first-hand recordings of events,
whereas secondary documents provide an interpretation of a primary event. The value of both
types of documents is in their capture, dissemination or evaluation of social or historical matters
that a researcher could not personally observe or analyze. In this study, primary documents were
obtained from York University’s Scott Library government collections, court and labour board
registrars, Access to Information requests, and the AJC’s website.

3.5.5.b Court and Public Service Labour Relations Board Records
The use of court records as data in this study requires greater elaboration as to their
definition and accessibility.

The open court principle presumes that legal hearings and

documents that contain information about proceedings are available to the public.301 Court
documents involve: statements of claim and defence, application records, motion records, court
transcripts, affidavits, factums of law, written submissions, exhibits, and judgments. Obtaining
paperwork related to the matters of Babcock et al., v. Attorney General (Canada),302 Federal
Law Officers of the Crown v. Treasury Board of Canada; Association of Justice Counsel v.
Treasury Board of Canada; Treasury Board of Canada v. Professional Institute of the Public
Service of Canada,303 and AJC v. Canada (A.G.)304 involved visiting the Supreme Court in
Vancouver, the PSLRB in Ottawa, and the Superior Court of Justice in Toronto. Court registrars
in the jurisdiction wherein the proceedings originate maintain copies of court documents. Files
were indexed by their style of cause which is distinguished by a court file number, and the title
of proceedings that are drawn from the names of the plaintiff and the defendant. Records are
released to the public only for on-premise viewing and their form and content is unknown prior
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to an inspection. The AJC’s website posted documents related to the arbitration over the first
collective agreement305 and judicial review by the Federal Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney
General) v. Association of Justice Counsel.306

For those researched for this project, each case file yielded different amounts of data and
reflected various time periods. Three boxes of court records were available from Babcock. The
suit commenced in May 1996 and the decision was released in April 2005. The case involved
lawyers from the DOJ’s Vancouver Regional Office suing their employer for breach of
employment contract over not receiving a salary increase awarded to lawyers employed at the
Toronto Regional Office. A court clerk advised me that in 2008, much of the file’s physical
contents became inaccessible to the public, except for remnants the registrar preserved for use in
another case. Available materials included statements of claims and examination for discoveries
of seven deponents conducted between 1998 and 2004. Affidavits sworn in support of motions
contained sundry internal records of the DOJ from 1990 to 2002 that were appended to
supplement the facts being deposed. The documents involved consolidated terms and conditions
of employment for non-management lawyers, salary setting policies, correspondences, DOJ
news releases and records of senior committee meetings, and salary studies.

One of the

affidavits in the file, sworn by Joan McCoy, appears to have been the one resulting in an appeal
before the Supreme Court of Canada regarding Cabinet confidences and whether the document
was exempt from disclosure.307 Another key affidavit contained documents produced by former
Deputy Minister of Justice Morris Rosenberg, which revealed important information about the
AJC’s creation as a professional association. Additional materials were twenty-four days of
transcripts out of a forty-six day trial produced by the testimony of office managers of the DOJ’s
Vancouver Regional Office, past human resources staff from DOJ headquarters, Lois Lehman,
the AJC’s first president, and Morris Rosenberg.

The FLOC, AJC v TBC was a sizeable record. Court documents detail the history and
process the PSLRB took to confer bargaining agent status on the AJC. Correspondences from
305
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the PSLRB, exhibits entered on consent by parties to the proceeding, the litigants’ factums, and
the Book of Documents of the Federal Law Officers of the Crown, a rival employee association
seeking certification of DOJ lawyers employed in Toronto, offer insight into the AJC’s early
history. Staff at the PSLRB informed me that exhibits raised in evidence during hearings are
destroyed two years after a matter is heard. They noted that, in tribunal proceedings, transcripts
are not recorded.
The court registrar’s copy of the AJC v. Canada (A.G.) file involving the AJC’s Charter
challenge offered less content in comparison to the other court files. It contained the Application
Record of the AJC and supporting documents, motion scheduling confirmations, as well as
affidavits of service.

Documents not included with pleadings and those associated with

subsequent appeals to the Ontario Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada were found on
the AJC’s website. Material from this file contained information I understood was difficult to
get. My strategic union informant told me that neither employer nor union negotiate in public, so
AJC personnel might be hesitant to disclose sensitive information about confidential discussions.
Charter litigation, however, forced union and management-side deponents to outline in their
affidavits the history of first contract negotiations, resolved collective bargaining terms, those
mired in dispute, and reasons for impasse. Hence, I was able to glean the information contained
in these affidavits, as well as data from the briefs prepared for first contract arbitration, without
having to press respondents directly on the topic during interviews.

3.5.5.c Access to Information Requests
The Access to Information Act308 makes information in records held by Canadian
government institutions available to the public. Anyone can request a record by completing and
filing an Access to Information request with the department holding the documents. A nominal
application fee covers up to five hours of search and preparation time and photocopy fees. The
cost of additional searching beyond the initial review period is $10 per hour. 309 Five Access to
Information requests were sent to the DOJ for documents of interest I identified from court
transcripts and other records. One Access to Information request was sent to both the Treasury
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Board Secretariat and Privy Council Office respectively. While many documents were enquired
about, only a few were actually produced.310 Written decisions from the Access to Information
and Privacy Coordinator noted if the results of a search yielded no records. Alternatively, replies
cited that information is exempt from release pursuant to section 19.1 of the Access to
Information Act as it includes disclosure of information related to personal privacy. Whalen
finds that solicitor-client privilege and its application to records of the Department of Justice
forecloses many records to historical research.311

3.5.5.d Association of Justice Counsel
The AJC’s website is the primary means by which the union communicates with its
membership across Canada. As an information portal, the website supplies information on union
basics such as membership structure, union representation and member services. It functions as
a newswire by posting periodic bulletins and updates on union business and activities. The most
valuable data sources that are provided on the website and were used for the study consisted of
updates on collective bargaining negotiations, court documents, and pictures of AJC events.

3.5.5.e Direct Observation
Direct observations were conducted of DOJ counsel participating in continuing legal
education, of DOJ offices, and of federal prosecutors practicing criminal law. The risk of a
researcher’s presence jeopardizing solicitor-client confidentiality rendered my observations of
lawyers working on the premises of DOJ offices simply untenable. As well, sitting in on
negotiations between employer and union bargaining teams was not feasible. Instead, I attended
a full-day annual conference offered by Osgoode Hall Law School Professional Development on
Crown liability and two workshops organized by the Ontario Bar Association on ethics and
professionalism for government lawyers.312

During fieldwork in Ottawa, I visited the

headquarters of the DOJ, and received a private guided tour. Offices in Saskatoon, Edmonton,
310
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Vancouver and Toronto were also visited. These are restricted, contemporary worksites that are
located in impressive downtown buildings. Seeing these places helped me appreciate part of the
environment in which DOJ lawyers work.

I attended an afternoon of Charter litigation at the Superior Court of Justice in Toronto
between the AJC and the Attorney General of Canada.

I spent one week observing and

informally interviewing seven federal Crown attorneys between two Greater Toronto Area
courthouses.

The experience provided first-hand insight on prosecutorial work.

Before

discussions started, I told lawyers about the study, the anonymity received by speaking with me,
and their consent to participate. They were asked about the intersection between professional
ethics and union membership. In almost all instances, counsel was pleased to talk with me.
Observations and answers were recorded by hand in a field note log.

3.5.6 Document and Interview Data Analysis
Data analysis involves interpreting collected information through an analytical cycle.
Jorgensen explains the process as the disassembly of research material into components that are
then reassembled and reconstructed to illustrate classes, processes or wholes.313 Once arranged,
facts form an explanatory or descriptive theory that responds to a research question or problem.
In case study applications, direct interpretation of data invokes a similar process. Stake notes
that direct interpretation involves concentrating on an instance, pulling it apart and then putting it
back together more meaningfully.314 Direct interpretation was applied to employer, union and
court documents in order to identify facts about human resource and salary policies at the DOJ,
and to build the story about the founding of the AJC, its certification as a bargaining agent, its
experience with first contract negotiations, and its involvement with Charter litigation.

My analysis of interview data incorporates Kvale and Brikman’s bricolage format, which
involves mixing different analytic techniques and concepts and applying them to interview data.
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Interpretations from this method are meant to generate rich descriptions.315 As Leavy notes,
interviews are tools for eliciting people’s subjective experiences and personal accounts.316
Excerpts from interview transcripts are reproduced to speak for themselves and are incorporated
into the discussion to complement other sources in describing events. Thematic content analysis
was reserved for analyzing interview data regarding legal ethics and collective agreement
bargaining.317 Using this technique, I manually reviewed transcripts for noteworthy responses
and then reduced them into short, themed phrases. Phrases from the initial coding framework
were collected, reviewed and grouped into overlapping categories that reflected patterns and
similarities across concepts, and offered a guide for reading the transcripts for evidence to
support my textual interpretations.

3.5.7 Rigour
Efforts to promote quality of dissertation findings involved data triangulation and
compliance with best practice guidelines for case studies. Tellis states that case study is known
as a triangulated research strategy.318 Stake expands on this point by presenting triangulation as
a quality assurance tactic.319 Yin agrees that the study’s construct validity improves through
triangulation, as corroborating evidence can counteract researcher bias in collection and analysis
of data.320 When possible, then, I triangulated a point of information from documents and
transcripts by cross-checking it against more than one source.

A second measure of quality assurance involves the researcher using critical appraisal
guidelines to determine how well a case study informs about a subject. Myers proposes that
developing an answer involves the assessment of the case study against several features. The
table below sets out the way this study addressed each standard set out by Myers’ taxonomy:
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Criteria

Application in Study

The case must be interesting

First instance of DOJ lawyers unionizing.

The case must display sufficient evidence

Multiple data sources to enhance data
credibility.
Case study covers period before and after
founding of the AJC to completion of first
collective bargain.
Research issues expand scope of inquiry to
consider alternative explanations for lawyer
unionization.
Narrative style, complemented by data vignettes
that describe lawyers unionizing and negotiating
a collective agreement.
Research literature on Canadian lawyer
unionization is underdeveloped.

The case should be complete

The case study must consider alternative
perspectives
The case study should be written in an
engaging manner
The case study should contribute to
knowledge.321
3.5.8 Analytic Lens

Caelli, Ray, and Mill refer to analytic lens as the methodological and interpretive
presuppositions a researcher brings to bear on the data.322

In other words, it is how the

researcher engages data in light of their underlying assumed theoretical beliefs, which in the case
of a socio-legal-interpretive study, can be approached through the disciplinary tradition of Law
and Society or New Legal Realism scholarship. Law and Society as an interdisciplinary, and
empirical approach to studying how law works and what it does, focuses on the legal profession
as a social institution and its interactions with the public.323

Researchers working in this

paradigm carry out diverse fieldwork projects such as: studying relations between divorce
lawyers and their clients,324 conducting case studies of lawyers working in franchise law firms325
and of cause lawyering in Seattle, Washington,326 and interviewing a cohort of lawyers in British

321

Myers, supra note 248 at 83.
Caelli, Ray & Mill, supra note 278 at 17.
323
S.S. Sibley, “Law and Society Movement” in H.M. Kritzer, ed., Legal Systems of the World: A Political, Social
and Cultural Encyclopedia Volume II: E-L (Santa Barbara: ABC Clio, 2002) 860 at 860.
324
A. Sarat & W.L. Felsteiner, Divorce Lawyers & Their Clients: Power and Meaning in the Legal Process (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
325
J. Van Hoy, “Selling and Processing Law: Legal Work at Franchise Law Firms” (1995) 29:4 Law & Society
Review 703.
326
S. Scheingold, “The Struggle to Politicize Legal Practice: A Case Study of Left-Activist Lawyering in Seattle” in
A. Sarat & S. Scheingold, eds., Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1998) at 118.
322

72

Columbia, Canada about the impact of gender on practice.327 Law and Society scholarship
diversifies studies of lawyers away from monolithic roles in the administration of courts to
showing them working as professionals whose aspirations for the practice of law are shaped by
their worksites. Law’s impact on lawyers, either as individuals or as a group, creates experiences
amenable to investigation328 and outcomes are studied empirically.329

Two recent jurisprudential movements gaining momentum are responsible for stirring
interest in empirical scholarship: the Empirical Legal Scholarship (ELS) group and the New
Legal Realism (NLR) group.

Chambliss informs that social-science trained law school

professors created the ELS association to improve the quality of empirical legal scholarship.330
ELS research provides an accurate and objective representation of law and legal doctrine using
quantitative research methods. The methodology adopts a, “model-based approach that seeks a
positive theory of law or legal institution and then tests that theory using quantitative techniques
developed from the social science”.331

By contrast, the NLR, the other emerging and

contemporary circle of legal scholars, seek sound synthesis between law and social science
through theory and empiricism to build stronger understandings of law and the formulation of
legal policy.332 NLR does not prioritize an overriding method paradigm for conducting research.
Quantitative and qualitative approaches are used either independently or in tandem depending on
the nature of the research question.333 In this way, NLR practitioners emphasize the role of study
questions in determining research methods which shows evidence of a well-planned project.334
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NLR builds on its predecessor, Law and Society, with a few additional nuances. NLR
aims to produce social scientific inquiry without reproducing the politics of its investigator.335
Its epistemology is one of pragmatism that links practice to theory through social context and
real world action as sources of meaning and truth.336 Legal phenomena are studied from either a
“top-down” or “bottom-up” perspective. The “bottom up” or “contextualist” vein of NLR
stresses how law works in practice on everyday people as well as for elites and professionals by
investigating behaviour in social context.337

Assessments are made about law affecting

people,338 as well as institutions, as they offer a backdrop for understanding how law works in
practice and at ground level.339 Contextualist studies of lawyers produce understanding about
causes and remedies for unethical litigation practices in large firm litigation,340 yield narratives
about diversity in law firms,341 and inquire about the roles and responsibilities of Bar
Associations in law reform.342

The NLR research orientation, more than that of Law and Society or ELS, informed my
assumptions about conducting an interpretive, socio-legal study. Sensitivity to methodology is a
key component of NLR research in bridging effective translations between law and social
science and addressing concerns over quality. By contrast, judging a Law and Society study as
Friedman suggests, on the basis of its utility and theoretical value within a particular sphere may
be problematic when integrating case study methods, as this format is criticized as a weak form
of scientific inquiry itself.343 NLR’s focus on respectful translations between differences in
empirical method and legal theory offered this project the leeway to collect and analyze data
using case study techniques. Moreover, during interviews, several respondents noted that they
appreciated knowing when the study was published, so they could read a copy of it. These
335
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observations suggested that DOJ lawyers and AJC union members are a readership likely
interested with the study and NLR research is produced for a broad audience with the goal of
making empirical knowledge accessible.344

3.6

Limitation of Study
This dissertation bears several limitations regarding the perspective of the data and its

availability. Describing union organizing invariable prioritizes the findings developed from the
experience of employees and their representatives, which narrows an understanding of the
employer’s perspective. Employer insight is contained to DOJ internal documents, reactions
tangentially raised and filtered by union materials, and court documents that advocate
management’s legal interests. Interviews with DOJ managers and employer bargaining team
members were not conducted.

Interpreting past events depends on available and trustworthy information. Marginal
success with Access to Information requests limited the extent of documents internal to the DOJ
to those collected from court records. With the passage of time, court registrars should not be
presumed to house a complete file, as this project discovered. Findings raised by this study are
restricted, then, by the scope of documents obtained and people interviewed. Nonetheless, the
court documents used in the study should be considered as yielding reliable information.
Documents placed into production during a proceeding are meant to prove some fact and are
presumed truthful in content. Furthermore, lawyers are ethically obligated not to mislead a court
with false evidence. Testimonial proof is reliable to the extent a witness can accurately recall
their memory and perceptions and witnesses are sworn to tell truth under punishment of perjury
for flouting their oath. Court transcripts accurately render testimony and court reporters affirm
that they transcribe audio taped proceedings to the best of their abilities. They must also certify
transcripts as evidence of the official trial record.

Critique that case study findings cannot be generalized to other settings should be seen as
a misunderstanding rather than an inadequacy of the method.345 Some methodologists maintain

344

T. Mitchell & E. Mertz, “The Empirical Turn in the Legal Academy: A New Legal Realist Perspective” Law &
Society Newsletter (2006) 4 at 4.

75

single-observation case studies that produce causal stories with a view to encouraging legal
reform but do not follow principles of causal and inductive reasoning are flawed.346 However, as
Stake writes, single case studies excel at focussing on a local situation rather than proposing how
it represents other cases more broadly.347 Due to the idiographic nature of a single case study, it
is not assumed similar circumstances exist in another context. Corrothers observes that it is
extremely difficult if not impossible to generalize about collective bargaining for employed
professionals.348 For this project it is true that: DOJ lawyers work for the largest employer of
public sector lawyers in Canada; the collective bargaining regime and law governing the federal
public services is particularized to that workforce; and, collective bargaining disputes amongst
collectivized lawyers typically do not result in Charter litigation. Thus, this case study intends
to create a critical narrative that both explains and describes and while carrying theoretical
import.349 Conclusions drawn from case study findings can then be generalized to theory and
recommendations for further research can also be proposed.350

3.7

Conclusion
The chapter’s discussion of a research design anchors the methodological framework of

the study. To borrow Gibbert and Ruigrok’s phrasing, this chapter sought to “talk the walk” by
illustrating the logic and purpose of adopting a particular research design for this project. 351 The
task involved reviewing the various approaches available for carrying out academic legal
research and determining that an empirical-interpretive study in the qualitative case study mode
was the most appropriate selection. A framework for evaluating the case study’s credibility was
provided with reference to the generic qualitative orientation. The chapter covered the issue of
345
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credibility by canvassing the motivation behind the study, appreciating the distinction between
methodology and methods, addressing rigour, and noting the project’s analytic lens.

The

necessary background is now set for chapter 4 which presents non-unionized staff relations
governing DOJ lawyers as a historical antecedent to collective bargaining.

That discussion

follows next.
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C H A P T E R 4: Administrating the Individual Employment
Relationship at Canada’s Largest Law Firm
4.1

Introduction
A union collectively represents all employees in a bargaining unit as the sole agent for

negotiating terms and conditions of employment with the employer. For an unrepresented
workforce, the employer determines the employment contract by incorporating industry
precedents and observing minimum employment standards. In 1967, the PSSRA implemented a
system of individual employment relations that sanctioned the Treasury Board to establish rates
of pay and conditions of work governing DOJ lawyers as a group of professionals excluded from
labour legislation. This long-standing arrangement is a starting point for contextualizing lawyer
interest in a formal employee representative with collective bargaining rights. The purpose of
this chapter, then, is to discuss the DOJ’s emergence as a supplier of comprehensive legal
services to the federal government from the late 1960s and onwards, and to describe the
employment policies governing the lawyers who provided them up to a critical juncture in the
department’s compensation policy: lawyers at the department’s Toronto Regional Office
receiving an exclusive salary increase in 1990, known as the “Toronto differential”.

In terms of structure, the chapter will start by explaining the PSSRA’s ban on DOJ
lawyers from joining bargaining units, which will then be followed by a description of the Royal
Commission on Government Organization’s (RCGO) role in making the DOJ into Canada’s
original, national law firm. The next portion of the chapter outlines the department’s place in the
mosaic of federal government administration as the DOJ Act352 entrusts the Minister of Justice
with the functions of the department, and is followed by discussing the framework that
determined the conditions of employment for DOJ lawyers. The third portion of the chapter
introduces the origin and purpose of the Legal Officers’ Advisory Committee (LOAC), which
was a consultative intermediary between management and non-management DOJ lawyers.353
The discussion closes by analyzing the findings that emerge from the retrospective and largely
descriptive material presented in this chapter.
352
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4.2

DOJ Lawyer Exclusion under the PSSRA: Legislative and Judicial Rationale
The introduction of legislated collective bargaining rights for federal public servants has

a rich gestation period, evolving over a half-century of employment relations between the
Government of Canada and its public servants.354 A thumbnail sketch takes us to an Order in
Council of May 1944 when the National Joint Council (NJC) was established. The NJC was an
advisory forum that allowed civil servant employee associations to address labour issues with
employer representatives and advance policy recommendations for government consideration.
The employee associations’ initial optimism for the advisement process gradually faded,
however, after finding their influence was trivial: significant terms and conditions of
employment such as pay were non-negotiable and joint proposals carried non-binding weight.
The result of staff associations demanding improved joint consultation led in September 1957 to
the creation of a Pay Research Bureau under the direction of the Civil Service Commission to
recommend pay increases on behalf of civil servants to the government. In reality, though, Pay
Research Bureau input was ignored and the state continued to unilaterally set wages for
government employees.355

A turning point for federal civil servants attaining collective bargaining rights proved to
be legislation that failed to remedy the mischief it was intended to cure. The Civil Service Act of
1961 granted employee associations the ability to consult with the Minister of Finance over pay
and between the Minister of Finance and the Civil Service Commission regarding the terms and
conditions of employment.

Unfortunately, the bifurcated system proved cumbersome, the

employee organizations still lacked genuine negotiating powers, and the government remained
the arbiter over rates of pay.356 It was the mounting frustration with employer paternalism that
propelled the staff associations to exploit the political turmoil that overthrew the minority
Progressive Conservative government led by John Diefenbaker. They demanded collective
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bargaining rights from any political party willing to curry their favour. 357 Before the federal
elections of 1963, Civil Service Federation president Claude Edwards sought each of the
campaigning parties’ position on collective bargaining. The tactic was a decisive one as Lester
Pearson, leader of the Liberal Party and Official Opposition, heeded the call and endorsed
collective bargaining and arbitration for public servants as an election platform.358
Pearson’s newly elected minority Liberals honoured their pledge to the electorate and in
August 1963, the government appointed Arnold Heeney to head a Preparatory Committee on
Collective Bargaining in the Public Service. The Preparatory Committee was to make provisions
for the introduction of collective bargaining and arbitration into the federal public service, as
well as to consider reforms for systems of classification and pay. In July 1965, the Preparatory
Committee published its report, which included the draft labour relations legislation as a
touchstone for realizing study recommendations, and the blue print for the most significant
overhaul of employer-employee relations in the history of the federal public service. The report
proclaimed collective bargaining and arbitration as a dispute settlement mechanism for all
employees of the federal government, including almost all professional and scientific staff.
There was little reason to exclude professional workers as they were found to enjoy a productive
history of organization and considerable participation in the development of processes of
consultation regarding pay and terms and conditions of employment.359

The Preparatory

Committee recommended excluding DOJ lawyers from bargaining units, though, fearing that
their membership could provoke a conflict of interest.360 Those individuals who exercised a
significant amount of responsibility for managing employees or who were involved in a role that
may be considered as confidential to management were the workers whose membership in a
union were deemed as potentially prejudiced in their duties. 361 A tidbit of legislative history on
the exclusion of DOJ lawyers is provided by then Secretary of the Treasury Board, George
Davidson’s testimony before the Parliamentary Committee when he articulated that proposed
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legislation did not contemplate coverage for a workforce identified under a managerial
exclusion:
The Legal Officers of the Department of Justice are called upon from time to time to
provide the government, the employer, with advice and counsel in a great variety of
matters that could be related to this legislation, and consequently, it is considered that
they should be regarded as persons employed in a managerial capacity, with all that
implies for their position under this legislation.362
Davidson’s observation implied that the best interests of the employer required that DOJ lawyers
provide clients with advice not tainted by mixed allegiances or employee sympathies, which
could spoil its quality and impair government decisions about labour relations.

On 20 February 1967, when the House of Commons assented to the PSSRA, Public
Service Employment Act,363 and An Act to Amend the Financial Administration Act,364 a legal
framework for collective bargaining in the federal public service was created.
governed staffing hires, deployments and lay-offs.

The PSEA

The Financial Administration Act

amendments confirmed the evolution of Treasury Board as representative of the Crown for the
management and employment concerns of the federal public service.365

The Preparatory

Committee recommendations regarding who was an employee for the purposes of collective
bargaining were observed by legislative drafters of the PSSRA. Section 2 defined an employee
as a person employed in the public service; it was also subject to several exceptions, one of
which was a person employed in a managerial or confidential capacity. For greater clarity, the
PSSRA plainly spelled out that a legal officer in the Department of Justice occupied a managerial
or confidential position. Other persons defined within this non-employee class were those in a
position: of confidentiality to a number of specified officials; with executive duties in developing
and administrating government programs; involved in personnel administration, the process of
collective bargaining, or handling grievances; of confidentiality to another employed in a
managerial or confidential capacity; and any other role the Public Service Staff Relations Board
(PSSRB) designated.

Nevertheless, DOJ lawyers were still entitled to grievance and
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adjudication procedures under legislation. Two years after PSSRA’s passage, over 95 percent of
eligible federal civil servants unionized.

On 31 March 1969, the PSSRB certified the

Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada (PIPSC) as the bargaining agent for a unit
of sixty-four employees holding law positions in departments and agencies outside of the DOJ.366
In an annexed schedule to the decision there was an agreement between the Treasury Board and
PIPSC that designated DOJ legal officers and senior management as confidential and
management employees.
The PSSRA definition of a “managerial and confidential employee” was a legal standard
for excluding federal civil service lawyers from bargaining units. During the PSSRA’s time, the
National Energy Board, Canadian Human Rights Commission, Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Commission, and the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada all
requested hearings asking that the PSSRB determine whether their lawyers conducted
confidential or managerial work.367

By contrast, PIPSC’s applications inquired whether

positions held by lawyers working as editors at the Supreme Court of Canada and Immigration
and Refugee Board lawyers remained managerial or confidential.368

However, it was the

PIPSC’s appeal of the PSSRB’s decision in Cuddihy and Norton369 to the Federal Court of
Appeal that elicited the judicial reasoning on DOJ lawyers being excluded from collective
bargaining.
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The case originated with the Canadian Transport Commission serving the PIPSC with an
application asking the PSSRB to designate two legal officers as managerial or confidential
persons. The Commission believed the lawyers were confidential to a superior who themselves
were employed in a managerial or confidential capacity. The PSSRB adjudicated the application
by looking at the duties and responsibilities incumbent on counsel. The legal analysis addressed
situations where a person employed in a managerial or confidential capacity delegates a
significant portion of their duties to another that calls for their skill, judgment, trust and
confidence. The observation supported the PSSRB concluding that when legal counsel advises
management responsible for developing and administrating government programs they too are
considered confidential employees.

PIPSC then asked the PSSRB reconsider its decision pursuant to section 25 of the
PSSRA. Their plea was denied, and so a judicial review of the Board’s ruling to the Federal
Court of Canada ensued. On 15 December 1972, the court issued its decision.370 Chief Justice
Wilbur Jackett speaking for Thurlow J. and Bastin D.J. reviewed the evidence considered by the
PSSRB and confirmed that its judgment was sound. The court disposed of the matter by
assuring itself of the correctness of findings regarding the confidential nature of counsel’s work.
In doing so, his lordship opined on the Board’s reasoning in the context of lawyering for the
federal government:
When a portion of the government service has a legal adviser, in the nature of things, his
services are provided on a confidential basis, and, when it has a legal branch, the
responsibility of the director of that branch is to provide such services, and to discharge
that responsibility he must have the help of lawyers whose services must be provided to
him or as directed by him on a confidential basis. If such a lawyer is not in a confidential
position in relations to the director of his branch, or as the statute puts is, “confidential”
to the director, I have difficulty to conceive, on the basis of my experience, of any person
in the Public Service who is “confidential to” any other person in the Public Service.371
These confidential characteristics led Jackett to conclude, “This is, undoubtedly, why legal
officers of the Department of Justice were excluded as a class”.372

Jacket’s comment

acknowledged that the provision of legal advice requires the candid and free exchange of
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information between parties.

Solicitor-client privilege facilitates this exchange and courts

generally uphold it as a rule of law. The Chief Justice’s observations about the advisory services
provided by DOJ lawyers at the time, therefore, appear to be grounded in fact. He could draw
his insight from a highly successful legal career with the DOJ, having started work there in
January 1939, developing a tax specialty, and ultimately serving as the eighth Deputy Minister of
Justice from 1957 to 1960.373 Around the time of Jackett’s tenure as Deputy Minister of Justice,
the Legal Branch of the DOJ was divided into Civil Litigation, Taxation, Criminal Law, Civil
Law, Legislation, Advisory, and Departmental Service practice sections.374 Lawyers in the
Departmental Services section regularly acted as counsel for nine government departments
providing most, if not all, of their legal services.375 The Civil Law Section addressed matters
pertaining to Quebec’s Civil Code. When departments, boards, commissions, and agencies
required legal opinions lawyers from any section with relevant expertise provided them.376
Opinions that did not fall within the specialty of section solicitors were handled by an Advisory
unit. During the twelve months ending May 1961, the sections produced an average of 107
opinions per month.377 Thus, the many aspects of providing legal advice to client departments
consumed the bulk of the department’s lawyers’ work and defined their roles as counsel to
management.378

4.3

Royal Commission on Government Organization and Re-Organization of the
Federal Civil Service: Impact on the Department of Justice
On 16 September 1960, the Diefenbaker Progressive Conservative government

authorized Order in Council P.C. 1960-1269 and established the RCGO. The Commission,
headed by prominent businessman J. Grant Glassco, investigated and reported on the
organization and processes of federal government departments and agencies. Under broad terms
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of reference, its purpose was to improve public service delivery by recommending measures for
the introduction of efficiency and economy into government operations.379 Checks and balances
were needed to contain bureaucratic overlap and spending, improve management of departments
and agencies, and streamline the machinery of government. First published in September 1962,
the Commission’s findings and recommendations stretched over five volumes in what is
colloquially referred to as the Glassco Report.
A survey of the federal government’s legal needs, who met them and how well, turned
the investigators’ attention to the DOJ. Project Group auditors discovered that departments and
agencies retained their own lawyers, and more significantly, that the DOJ was understaffed and
its practice of farming out work to other firms and agents created inefficiencies in the system.
Within the DOJ, some practitioners became intertwined with management in policy making
decisions while other counsel went underutilized. In both instances, lawyers drifted from their
intended roles.

The report noted that DOJ lawyers expressed feelings of reduced career

prospects and that the department had a problem recruiting and retaining experienced lawyers.380
Recommendations for solving this bureaucratic malaise involved forming an integrated legal
service and opening branch offices throughout Canada.381 The modernization plan put forward
by the Glassco Report helped raise the department out of relative obscurity and overturned its
modest operations.

Given the obvious need for reform, DOJ senior management moved to implement the
first of Glassco’s proposals. In 1965, Alban Garon, the former Director of the Legal Division in
the Department of Public Works was appointed to oversee the centralization of legal services in
the DOJ.382 Commercially-orientated and independent agencies (the Judge Advocate General’s
office at National Defence, External Affairs, Pension Advocates at Veteran’s Affairs and Royal
Canadian Mounted Police) were excluded from the consolidation exercise.

Undoubtedly,

Garon’s diplomacy skills as the Director of Departmental Legal Services were taxed by selling
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Deputy Ministers on the benefits of the department’s reprisal as the state’s exclusive legal
representative.383

A new administrative model and operational mandate necessitated closer ties between the
DOJ and the federal departments and agencies it intended to serve. A network of regional
offices stood to reinforce headquarters’ operations and fulfill the second of the Glassco Report’s
edicts for the DOJ. Improved efficiencies and policies were put in place by in-sourcing work
previously referred to private firms and by delegating better supervised agents. DOJ branches
were opened in Montreal (1965), Toronto and Yellowknife (1966), Vancouver (1967), Winnipeg
(1969), Halifax and Whitehorse (1970), Edmonton (1972), and Saskatoon (1974). Expansion
into these cities firmly established the DOJ’s presence in Quebec, Ontario, British Columbia, as
well as the Atlantic, Northern, and Prairie regions. The expansion also aided in diversifying the
department’s work as lawyers employed at the regional offices conducted criminal, tax, civil,
immigration, and administrative law litigation on behalf of the Crown.

While policy

development, legislative services, and the departmental legal service units remained concentrated
within the Ottawa area, the new regional branches influenced the department’s local labour needs
and compartmentalized lawyers into geographically discrete practice specialties.

Patterning the DOJ as a primary legal service provider continued after the Glassco
Report.384

The Government Organization Act, 1966385 passed to implement, and later

consolidate, Glassco’s recommendations transferred the DOJ’s handling of Parole Service,
Combines Investigation, Bankruptcy Administration, Royal Canadian Mounted Police and
Superintendence of Jails to other departments.386 Department resources were therefore freed
from administrating extraneous programs in order to focus on core competencies. The DOJ
experienced unprecedented personnel boom. From the mid-1870s to 1939, departmental staff
was an inconspicuous lot that consisted of two lawyers and a few clerks inherited from the office
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of the Attorney General of Upper Canada.387 In 1965, the DOJ employed about sixty lawyers.388
From 1966 to 1970, as the Glassco Report reform plan took shape, the DOJ absorbed one
hundred departmental and agency lawyers from the broader federal public service. By 1972, of
the roughly 280 staff lawyers, over 120 worked in departmental legal service units to provide
counsel to government departments and agencies.389

In April 1974, the influx of lawyers from external government departments and agencies
required the Department to implement further organizational reforms.

Duties of senior

management were clarified and new senior positions created390 and the department continued to
establish new legal service units to serve additional government departments and agencies. The
department became more active in law reform activities after its Legal Research and Planning
Branch opened to conduct policy-oriented studies. Lawyers advised on reforming Canadian
divorce law, reviewed criminal law provisions, and prepared Access to Information and Privacy
Acts.391 In 1982, as a further refinement to operations, a corporate management system for the
DOJ was implemented.392 A Human Rights Law Section was opened to assist the department
oversee the Charter and handle the corresponding growth in litigation. By 1984, the number of
lawyers employed at the DOJ rose to 686 lawyers; by 1991 roughly 735 lawyers were
employed.393

Thus, the full impact of Glassco Report reforms, as well as having to steward a

national justice system influenced by changing societal norms in Canada during the late 20th
century, expanded the department’s lawyer labour force and broadened their practice
responsibilities to eclipse those of a once modest complement of legal advisors.
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4.4

DOJ Lawyers within the Bureaucracy

4.4.1 The Minister of Justice’s Role
Canada is a constitutional monarchy where formal executive authority is vested in the
Crown, which is embodied in Queen Elizabeth II. As of 1 October 2010, she is represented in
Canada by the 28th Governor General since Confederation, David Johnston. While executive
state functions are Crown prerogatives, it is the Prime Minister working with Cabinet, an
executive committee of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, which is responsible for
introducing most legislation in the House of Commons.394 The Prime Minister staffs Cabinet
with Ministers who are elected members of the majority party, as well as department heads.
Section 2(1) of the DOJ Act appoints the Minister of Justice to preside over the DOJ.

Section 2(2) of the DOJ Act specifies that the Minister of Justice, by virtue of holding
office, is also the Attorney General of Canada. This dual role embodies the diversity of solicitor
and barrister practice necessary for the Minister to discharge a wide scope of statutory
obligations. Sections 4 and 5 of the DOJ Act respectively detail the separate functions of the
Minister of Justice and Attorney General. The Justice Minister advises on the administration of
national justice, supervises statutes covering areas of law assigned to the federal government
under the constitutional division of powers, and examines the content of all proposed regulations
and bills to ensure their compliance with the Charter. The Attorney General acts as chief legal
advisor to the heads of departments and agencies, and represents the Crown in all legal action
brought for or against the federal government. The DOJ Act defines the Minister’s duties and
therefore also conditions the need of lawyers for its operations.

To note the obvious, the Minister of Justice and Attorney General cannot personally
execute all of her or his duties.395 The work of the Minister is delegated to the bureaucracy
assigned to the DOJ. The Prime Minister appoints the department’s most senior bureaucrat: the
Deputy Minister of Justice and Deputy Attorney General of Justice. Section 24(2)(c) of the
Interpretation Act396 permits the Deputy to assume any powers, duties or functions conferred on
the Minister of Justice and Attorney General. The Deputy Minister serves the Minister by
394
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advising them on policy development and providing organizational leadership to the department.
Section 3.3 of the DOJ Act provides for two Associate Deputy Ministers who complement the
pinnacle of executive command. Senior management is further distributed through a network of
chief public servants including Assistant Deputy Ministers, Assistant Deputy Attorneys General,
Chief Legislative Counsel, and Regional Director Generals, all of whom report to the Deputy
Minister (who in turn accounts to the Minister). In this arrangement, lawyers conduct the full
range of the department’s day-to-day legal services.

The Treasury Board is a Cabinet committee of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada and
employer of personnel at departments and organizations grouped within the core federal public
administration, which includes the DOJ. Treasury Board has expansive personnel management
authority pursuant to section 7(1) of the Financial Administration Act.397 Section 11.1(1) of the
FAA elaborates its powers to cover personnel requirements and allocation of human resources,
classification of positions and employees, rates of pay, hours of work, leave and other terms and
conditions of employment as necessary for the effective management of staff. The Treasury
Board Secretariat (TBS) conducts Treasury Board’s work by providing administrative services
and support and monitoring departmental compliance with employer policies. The Deputy
Minister of Justice is accountable to TBS for the DOJ following Treasury Board’s employment
programs and standards. The Deputy Minister was assisted by department’s Human Resources
Directorate (HRD). As noted in the 1989 Guide to the Organization of the Department of
Justice, the HRD was also responsible for (among other duties) administrating the department’s
personnel management, supervising programs in staff relations, and interpreting legislation,
regulations, policies, and collective agreements.398

4.4.2 Employment of DOJ Lawyers
The practice of the DOJ was to issue new lawyers letters of employment that confirmed
the position hired for, its salary, length of term, and that Treasury Board fixed the terms and
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conditions of employment.399

Treasury Board’s “Consolidated Terms of Conditions and

Employment Law Group” outlined employer rules regarding work hours, holidays, pay
entitlement, leaves and discipline. Separate versions covered non-management and management
lawyer groups.

Treasury Board unilaterally set rates of pay for DOJ lawyers through a

classification standard that established the relative worth of jobs in the public service as a basis
for determining compensation. Lawyers belonged to the Law (LA) Occupational Group which
was a subdivision of the Professional and Scientific occupational category. Positions assigned to
this group were those involving the application of a comprehensive knowledge of law and its
practice in performing legal work. Classifying a position within the Law Group involved both a
job analysis and evaluation component.400 A description was used to understand the purpose and
function of a job which was referred to as a collection of duties assigned and performed by an
employee. A job was evaluated by comparing its duties relative to levels of responsibility within
an occupational group and in relation to other classified position descriptions.401

Furthermore, each occupational group received a classification standard and pay plan.
Treasury Board administered payment of DOJ lawyers in accordance with the “Salary
Administration Policy – Law Group – Department of Justice and other excluded legal officers”
(SAP). SAP was contained as a chapter in the Personnel Management Manual (PMM). The
PMM, carried on as the Treasury Board Manual, was a compendium of service-wide
employment policies and guidelines issued by Treasury Board and updated through circulars,
information notices and amendments.402

SAP outlined six classification levels for lawyers

divided into LA-1, LA-2A, LA-2B, LA-3A, LA-3B and LA-3C rankings. Jobs were assigned to
various grades based on the required functions, complexity and skills of a position. Each
occupational level had a specific salary range that consisted of minimum and maximum pay rates
commensurate to a practitioner’s experience.
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Categories moved upwards to reflect increasing degrees of specialization. LA-1, for
example, was an entry level designation. Lawyers typically spent four years of practice before
reaching LA-2A standing, which was reserved for skilled lawyers practicing under minimal
supervision. Level LA-2B represented first stage management though senior, non-management
specialist practitioners populated this and higher stages. Promotion to these stages was merit
based, and required a minimum of eight years of experience from the bar.403 Lawyers at the LA3 stage were expected to manage an organization providing legal services. As noted in Lehman
v. Canada, the HRD annually screened DOJ lawyers for inclusion on an eligibility list for
promotion.404 However, composition of the LA-2B and higher group was capped at 30 percent
of the lawyer workforce.

Section 6 of the SAP instituted a performance pay system. Periodic in-range increases
allowed for progression through a salary range. A lawyer’s assessed level of job performance
determined the rate of increase as a percentage of the individual’s salary. Lawyers at LA-2A
levels and higher received an additional bonus provided their performance evaluations were
ranked as superior or outstanding, their salary reached the maximum of the pay band, and the
annual payroll budget allowed for the expense. The Treasury Board wage policy encouraged
lawyers to be rewarded for outstanding individual contributions to the department.
An overview of the Treasury Board’s administration of DOJ lawyers’ salaries would not
be complete without an understanding of how pay rates were determined. Management lawyer
salaries were benchmarked to executive group levels within the greater federal public service.
The Treasury Board received recommendations for changes to salary and terms and conditions of
employment from the Advisory Committee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation which
reviewed annual findings of the Advisory Group on Executive Compensation in the Public
Service.

Law Group non-management and management pay scales were set to maintain

relativity with one another. The Treasury Board set salary ranges for non-management lawyers
based on an average rate derived from the earning level of lawyers in the public and private
practice from across Canada. Good fringe benefits and pension plan factored in the overall
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compensation cost. Lawyers received the same pay rates regardless of the location of their
employment. Provincial Crown salaries provided a natural comparator for Law Group wages
because of the similarity of work performed by the two workforces. Salaries paid to DOJ
lawyers typically matched or exceeded those received by lawyers employed by provincial
governments. Section 4 of the SAP allowed Treasury Board to periodically adjust these wages.
HRD monitored wage competitiveness by reviewing surveys from the Pay Research Bureau of
the PSSRB and compensation trends in the broader legal labour market. Staff recruitment and
retention difficulties, inflation, or simply an economic adjustment were considered in justifying
an annual increase to lawyer salaries.

In the era prior to collective bargaining for DOJ lawyers, proposals to Treasury Board for
amending Law Group compensation proceeded at the discretion of the Deputy Minister working
through the department’s Executive Committee. The Executive Committee, a plenary session of
about twenty senior managers, addressed significant management issues by recommending to the
Deputy Minister a course of action. It was one of many advisory panels tasked with handling
some specific facet of departmental policy, practice or operational issue. DOJ and HRD senior
management liaised with their counterparts at TBS in preparing salary submissions.

TBS

measured the feasibility of Law Group wage submissions when reviewing the request. For
example, analysts from the Senior Level Retention and Compensation Group, Classification and
Excluded Groups Division of the Human Resources Branch assessed external comparability and
affordability of Law Group wage proposals based on similar sources of data used by HRD. The
contents of formal submission sought authority from Treasury Board Ministers to adjust salary
ranges for specific levels within the Law Group. Approved rates had effective dates that
generally lasted in short-term yearly spans and they remained in place until revisited by
subsequent submission.

4.5

Legal Officers’ Advisory Committee (“LOAC”)
In the early 1980s, Bill Halprin a Crown Prosecutor in the Vancouver Regional Office,

proposed Justlaw.

Halprin and like-minded colleagues became proactive about their

employment situation after government anti-inflation measures capped salaries. They formed

92

Justlaw as an employee association to represent the interests of lawyers.405 The usual business of
setting up an organization took place: a cast of founding directors was named, some people
signed up while others refused, meetings took place, and funds were collected. The movement
spread east by recruiting members in other regional offices. A reasonable salary increase to
lawyers’ salaries dissipated the fledgling organization and curtailed its further growth.406 Don
Christie, Associate Deputy Minister of Justice and overseer of regional offices at the time,
doubted lawyers could form an association, aware that legislation would render any further
efforts as an ill-conceived spectacle.407 In such belief, he informed Halprin of his serious
reservations who clearly understood the subtext of the message.

Justlaw was an upstart to the established Management Advisory Committee (MAC).
MAC was a forum between representatives of legal officers and management. Representatives
met with their office constituents to discuss developments and concerns over salary, working
conditions and the terms and conditions of employment, which they later relayed at meetings
with management.408

MAC was disbanded after Deputy Minister of Justice Roger Tassé

determined the organization needed new direction.

Apparently, legal representatives from

Ottawa disavowed management’s positions and sealed MAC’s fate.409 MAC representatives
from different regional offices wrote to Tassé about a revived committee. The drive succeeded
when in early 1982 LOAC, a joint committee of management and lawyer representatives,
started.410
LOAC’s beginnings seem to indicate a departmental culture where management saw the
employment interests of lawyers as secondary to their work.

LOAC offered lawyers a way to

participate in the affairs of the department, and management the mechanism for constructing a
decent working relationship with its lawyers. DOJ annual reports produced throughout the mid-
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1980s revealed LOAC’s early work.411

Since LOAC’s inception, staffing and promotion

processes and policies were regular topics addressed, as were lawyers’ salaries, benefits, and
training. LOAC also advised on official languages policy and on employment equity issues, and
it helped propose new criteria for the performance review system. By 1987, LOAC provided
input on a departmental submission to Treasury Board on terms and conditions of
employment.412

LOAC operated within a committee-consultation model. Its membership consisted of
five management nominees appointed by the Deputy Minister and sixteen non-management
lawyer-representatives.413 The non-management lawyer representatives consisted of voluntary
members elected from each of the regional offices, headquarters and departmental legal service
units. A management chair, appointed by the Deputy Minister, presided over meetings. The cochair was a secretary chosen from non-management lawyer representatives. Recommendations
on employee-employer matters were communicated through at least two management members
of LOAC who reported to the Executive Committee.414 LOAC meetings were held bi-annually
in Ottawa. LOAC representatives convened among themselves, typically by conference call, to
address matters as required.
LOAC’s mandate outlined its roles: to advise management on terms and conditions of
employment, employee-management relations, departmental personnel management systems, the
quality of the work environment, and “to be actively involved in the formulation and
presentation of compensation submissions by inter alia legal officer compensation on the LA
Compensation Committee”.415 Vancouver Regional Office lawyer 1, a former LOAC regional
office representative, explained the group’s work as such:
So we had sort of an association of lawyers bringing forward issues with respect to
primarily employment issues. So rate of pay and terms and conditions of employment
411
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etc... I would’ve described it as a loose association and each regional office had a
representative... I would say a key role, as I thought when I was the LOAC
representative, was a conduit for information. Information from the lawyers, up the line
to management, and information from management down the line to the lawyers.
This respondent identified LOAC’s function as a communication channel. LOAC’s power as an
advocate for lawyers, however, was constrained. Lawyers could talk to supervisors about their
individual work concerns and more intractable disputes were pursued through formal grievances.
LOAC’s influence was primarily in consulting with management and its recommendations
extended as far as management deemed appropriate. Turnover of representatives was common
and their work suffered from inadequate resources and budget.

Without the authority or legal

right to bargain on behalf of lawyers, LOAC strove to act as a voice for employees, but its more
fundamental problem was that it was grossly unequal in power to management, which did not
necessarily have to listen to its proposals on compensation and other terms and conditions of
employment.

4.6

Conclusion
DOJ lawyers designated as confidential and management employees under the PSSRA

were prohibited from forming bargaining units. The Preparatory Committee wanting to prevent
potential conflicts of interest reflected the industrial relations type of thinking of a particular time
and place that applied to the work conducted by a relatively small bureaucracy of lawyers. The
expansion and diversification of operations publicized by the DOJ from at least the early
1970s,416 however, created lawyering roles for its staff that were distinct from advisory
functions. Over time, not all lawyers could be expected to provide labour and employment
advice to clients regarding the PSRRA or determine general organizational policy by sitting on
departmental committees. Management responsibilities consumed no more than a third of the
workforce which left the remaining majority subject to inapt labour provisions regarding
membership in a bargaining unit. As the factual predicate underlying the PSSRA’s blanket
exclusion changed, the rationale for excluding positions occupied by DOJ lawyers from a
bargaining unit lost its force. Unable to bargain collectively, staff lawyers had little say over the
way their work was directed. LOAC was never intended as an employee association, and
previous attempts at the department to establish one unceremoniously petered out. Discussions
416
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between DOJ and TBS on matters of annual compensation or operational problems were
conducted with a view to how best manage staff in support of efficient department operations.

A workplace converting from a non-union to a union form of representation is an instance
of organizational change. Pentland suggests studies can explore such developments by looking
at the connection between antecedent and consequence and describing the events that connect
them.417

The management system designed for directing unrepresented DOJ lawyers

characterizes an initial condition. Outdated legislation and a compensation scheme set by the
employer were elements of that framework incapable of independently sparking a unionization
movement.

They highlight, however, the primary variables capable of interacting and

overlapping with actors intrinsic to the department. For example, LOAC’s non-management
representatives desired greater representative capacities during the mid-1990s when the
centrally-commanded federal public service was being downsized and restrained from wage
increases.

The multi-jurisdictional legal practice of the DOJ inevitably faced operational difficulties
that demanded adaptability from a rigid employment administration. In 1990, a dire recruitment
and retention problem at the Toronto Regional Office forced an unprecedented deviation from
national salary policy in favour of the Treasury Board approving a Toronto differential.

The

department’s failure to rescind the benefit demonstrated the inequities in the management system
by aggravating employee expectations of fair dealing. Employment environments prone to
organizing drives are those where feelings of job dissatisfaction and autocratic leadership
pervade amongst workers,418 which appeared to be the case for the DOJ. The events responsible
for DOJ lawyers finally obtaining the right of collective bargaining are presented in the
following chapter.
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C H A P T E R 5: DOJ Lawyers Become Employees
George Thomson, when he was deputy minister, turned up at Treasury Board and said the
issues of non-management lawyers are not his responsibility. Lawyers at Justice had
been willing to rely on the paternalism of management but not any longer.419
5.1

Introduction
In Canada’s Parliamentary democracy, a political party that wins the most seats in the

House of Commons after an election forms the country’s next federal government. The reigning
government will proceed to pass laws to implement political priorities identified in the Governor
General’s throne speech, which opens every new session of Parliament, or, as part of its
established governance, modify existing laws to chart new public policy. On 6 February 2003,
the majority Liberals instituted a fundamental policy shift in federal public sector labour and
employment relations by introducing Bill C-25, the Public Service Modernization Act, into the
House of Commons.420 Bill C-25 heralded the most significant changes to human resources
management in the federal civil service in over three decades, which directly affected the DOJ.421
Under new labour legislation, the Public Service Labour Relations Act (PSLRA), nonmanagement DOJ lawyers could now unionize. For them to exercise their individual free choice
and realize their newfound privilege, however, required an employee organization to campaign
for recognition and convince a majority of DOJ lawyers that the benefits of pursuing workplace
objectives through a collective outweighed those associated with maintaining the existing,
management-driven system of individual employment relations.
This chapter’s goal is to understand the factors and events responsible for the AJC
conducting a successful organizing campaign of DOJ lawyers. I propose that a majority of DOJ
lawyers’ support for the AJC was attributed to changes in employment relations both internally,
at the DOJ, and externally, in the broader federal public service between 1990 and 2003. My
analysis develops a holistic schema that embeds the unionization process within a historical,
419

M. Bourrie, “Bill makes Justice lawyer union possible” Law Times 14:6 (17 February 2003) 1 at 2.
Bill C-25, An Act to modernize employment and labour relations in the public service and to amend the
Financial Administration Act and the Canadian Centre for Management Development Act and to make
consequential amendments to other acts, 2d Sess., 37th Parl., 2003 [hereafter PSMA].
421
This is because, in addition to establishing the PSLRA, the PSMA would: (1) repeal the existing PSEA and
introduce a new Public Service Employment Act that would regulate appointments to the federal public service; (2)
amend the FAA to appoint deputy heads with human resources management powers; and (3) create a new Canada
School of the Public Service.
420

97

bureaucratic, and legal context that arose from three key institutional developments: (1)
employee dissatisfaction with the employer as a pre-condition for collective action; (2) the Legal
Officers’ Advisory Committee’s (LOAC) development into the AJC based on employee support
to secure formal workplace representation and improve wages through collective bargaining; and
(3) the AJC’s organizing campaign of DOJ lawyers as an extension of its initial mandate for
becoming a professional association.

To mark the start of this series of events, this discussion begins with a close look at the
Treasury Board’s decision in June 1990 to approve a rare deviation in the DOJ’s national salary
plan: a Toronto differential that paid lawyers at the Toronto Regional Office (TRO) more than
lawyers working elsewhere in the department (in order to remedy a staffing crisis exacerbated by
wage gains secured by Ontario government lawyers collectively bargaining).422 The introduction
and prolongation of the Toronto differential is traced to show how a stop-gap measure sustained
by a half-decade of federal government wage-restraint legislation and the department’s inability
to manage employee expectations for extending salary equity helped LOAC’s non-management
representatives structure a mandate for becoming a professional association. The introduction of
the PSMA, with its goal of promoting harmonious labour relations in the federal public service,
allowed the AJC to recruit DOJ lawyers and stand to become be certified by the PSLRB as a
union once the PSLRA came into effect on 1 April 2005. The following discussion will analyze
the AJC’s mobilization of lawyers that defused the organizing entreaties of the Professional
Institute of the Public Service of Canada (PIPSC), but could not appease lawyers employed at the
TRO (who formed their own employee organization as the Federal Law Officers of the Crown,
[FLOC] with the goal of striking out as their own employee organization under the PSLRA).
Ultimately, this chapter traces each of the three key sequences of events in the unionization
process to provide a concise history that argues that lawyers supported the AJC based on its
perceived instrumentality of increasing input in the determination of the employment agreement
through collective bargaining—particularly for wage equity and increase—with Treasury Board.
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5.2

DOJ Law Group National Wage Policy Schism: The Toronto Differential

5.2.1 Background
The Toronto differential was tied to the city’s dynamic legal market, of which the DOJ’s
Toronto operations were a part. During the late 1980s, Toronto, as Ontario’s commercial and
financial capital, enjoyed economic prosperity that was driven by rapid population growth,
booming real estate market, and lead-up to the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement that kept
reputable downtown Toronto law firms’ solicitors busy with commercial transactions, and their
barristers litigating an abundance of court files. Upper-tier law firms were hiring lawyers and
legal secretaries to maintain high service levels and to prepare for expansion into new practice
areas.423 An upbeat legal labour market prompted the management of the DOJ’s TRO to closely
follow developments concerning its roughly sixty-five lawyers, the vast majority of whom
occupied the LA-1 and LA-2A ranks. In fall 1987, management’s attention to staffing increased
after turnover destabilized the DOJ’s flagship regional office.

The TRO was strategically located to supply legal and advisory work to various
government departments operating throughout the populous Greater Toronto and southwestern
Ontario area.

Toronto’s many local tribunals and courthouses, including the province’s

Divisional Court, and the Court of Appeal (where the federal government initiated and defended
all types of legal actions), assured the office had its share of both high profile and mundane
cases. Between 1987 and 1988 the central Toronto office was extremely busy opening some five
thousand new files and closing a similar amount.424 Its lawyers were spread across a General
Counsel group and diverse practice sections, which consisted of Advisory, Commercial and
Property Law, Civil Litigation, Tax Litigation, and Criminal Prosecution.

High volume

operations were sustained through a division of labour between legal support staff (who handled
the administrative duties of a file) and lawyers (who practiced in courts and boardrooms). With
half of the office’s law assistants and clerks quitting, however, lawyers had to make up the
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labour shortfall by working more hours.425 The extra work kept piling on lawyers’ desks and,
compounding the stress, operations were relocated to an upper floor within the historic Dominion
Public Building at the foot of downtown Toronto. The move into reconverted warehouse space
greatly displeased staff as environs were cramped and office procedures were not automated.

In response to office turmoil, between 1987 and 1990, roughly thirty lawyers left for the
private bar or relocated to other DOJ offices.426 Replacing the departures was difficult as heavy
workloads and lack of mentoring, compounded by poor compensation packages that Toronto’s
steep cost of living magnified, produced a revolving door of new personnel.427 New lawyers
lasted only twelve to eighteen month and whereas previous job postings attracted upwards of
forty applicants, the number plummeted to five or six hopefuls.428 This passage, drawn from a
memorandum written by a member of the External Competition Committee to the TRO’s
Director, Ted Thompson, outlined the many factors causing the hiring problem:
As I indicated to you verbally, during the course of our interviews of the candidates who
applied for the position with the Advisory, Commercial and Property Law Section of our
office on January 17, 1990, the candidates all expressed surprise at the low rates of pay
within the federal government...In the advertisement that was posted, the recruitment
rates for the Department of Justice were not included. Given the reaction of all the
candidates on January 17, 1990, if the recruitment rates had been posted, I question how
many candidates would still have applied to the Department of Justice. Even if we are
able to recruit and hire a candidate, it is questionable how long we will be able to keep
that candidate given the significant disparity between the salaries paid by the Department
of Justice and the salaries paid by other law firms not only in downtown Toronto but in
the suburbs.429
Mounting recruitment and retention difficulties demonstrated that the DOJ had more than lost its
lustre as an employer: its TRO was in the throes of a dismal staffing dilemma.
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Lawyers who remained with the department pursued several strategies to strengthen their
demands for better wages and a reason to stay. One approach indicated by Ted Thompson’s
memorandum to the Associate Deputy Minister Litigation, Douglas Rutherford, involved
lawyers documenting their grievances:
The letter to the Deputy of October 5, 1989, signed by many of the Toronto lawyers is
another cry of despair. It is clear they have many misperceptions. Unfortunately, I have
not been able to obtain a concise and consistent statement of our salary policies so that I
am in a position to provide accurate information as to how LA-1 increases will be applied
and calculated. While these issues are being settled, a feeling of abandonment and a
sense that the real problems in Toronto are going unrecognized and the dedicated efforts
by our staff to cope are unappreciated.430
Another approach, expressed by former Toronto Regional Office lawyer 1, was a constitutional
challenge over the PSSRA prohibiting DOJ lawyers from collective bargaining.

The idea

developed during the summer of 1989, inspired by the successes of provincial lawyers employed
by the Ontario Ministry of Attorney General (MAG). After years of provincial government
lawyers working under poor conditions and pay, 431 the Ontario government appointed labour law
professor Paul Weiler to prepare a report with recommendations for establishing compensation
levels and terms and conditions of employment for professional public servants without statutory
entitlement to collective bargaining.432 The January 1988 Weiler Report recommended that the
province’s lawyers have access to collective negotiations over salary and terms of conditions of
employment accompanied by binding arbitration. On 21 July 1989, the lobbying of the Ontario
Crown Attorney’s Association (OCAA) and Association of Law Officers of the Crown (ALOC)
led to the province recognizing both employee associations through the signing of the
Framework Agreement on Collective Bargaining, which affirmed collective bargaining and the
scope of issues to be covered during upcoming negotiations.433 Some of Toronto’s DOJ lawyers
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believed that suing the federal government could jumpstart similar gains, so they each
contributed $50 to fund a retainer for labour lawyer Paul Cavaluzzo to prepare a legal opinion.
On its strength, a statement of claim was issued but the action died soon thereafter. Despite his
prominence in co-ordinating the suit, former TRO lawyer 1 did not bemoan the suit’s demise—
he left the DOJ for private practice.

In January 1990, OCCA, ALOC, and the Province of Ontario achieved a first collective
agreement that gave provincial government lawyers, on average, a 30 percent pay raise over two
years retroactive to January 1989, a new salary classification plan, and the payment of law
society fees.434 The agreement caused the MAG to standout as a cross-town, public sector rival
to the DOJ, which offered a much better employment package and desperately needed
prosecutors to tackle a backlog of cases clogging the courts.435 As the current workforce could
not maintain service levels, any drain of talent to the province imperiled the office’s viability.
Government departments already bemoaned their current representation by the TRO regardless
of the embarrassment caused to the DOJ.

An excerpt from this senior Toronto counsel’s

memorandum to Rutherford portrays the level of frustration expressed by upset clients:
In addition, more and more our departmental clients express concern about whether we
can or will deliver the high quality of legal services that they were receiving in the past.
They are increasingly asking to be represented by the private bar because there is little or
no turn-over in lawyers handling their cases and they have more senior staff and
resources (adequate resources). They do not have to wait long periods of time for
something to be done on their files because there is more than one lawyer handling their
case. They can call up the office and speak to the same lawyer that they have been
dealing with during the course of the proceedings, rather than be told when dealing with
our office, that their lawyer(s) has left the Department, and someone will call them back
later. Later means probably a week to ten days, if they are lucky.436
Proposed solutions in the form of farming out work to Ottawa or even shuttering Toronto’s
operations were debated but rejected for being impractical, short-sighted, and ineffective at
catching up to existing workloads and meeting future demands. Outsourcing excess legal files to
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agents was not a way out either, since staff lawyers still needed to supervise contractors. At this
point, saving Toronto’s operations required measures beyond Thompson’s immediate powers.

On 31 January 1990, DOJ senior managers, consisting of Douglas Rutherford, the
Assistant Deputy Minister – Corporate Management Sector Norman LaBarre, and Human
Resources Directorate (HRD) Director General Sandra Stoddard, attended the Toronto office to
canvass employees for their concerns and alert them to operational problems being addressed.
The mission returned to Ottawa and debriefed Deputy Minister John Tait, who then ordered an
action plan for saving the TRO. As the Law Group compensation package expired on 1 April
1989, the pending HRD proposal to TBS regarding revised terms and conditions of employment,
performance pay, and an adjustment to the national salary range of articling students, LA-1, LA2A and LA-2B lawyers, retroactive to 1 April 1989, would include a non-pensionable,
terminable regional allowance tacked on to the national salary scale (rather than a base salary
increase) and paid solely to lawyers employed at, or reporting to, the TRO.

This “parity

allowance” proposal would adjust salary ranges to match those received by Ontario MAG
lawyers effective 1 January 1990 (with subsequent range adjustments implemented in August
and October).
Non-management LOAC representatives monitored the department’s compensation
proposal through its members’ participation on the LA Compensation Committee. On 12 March
1990, LOAC LA Compensation Committee members convened a conference call with regional
LOAC members to discuss the department’s proposal. LOAC’s non-management chair, Guy
Faggiolo, advised the plenum that a national rate increase could not match the parity allowance.
This was because introducing an across-the-board gain at Ontario MAG rates of $12,000 to
$16,000 would distort relativity between non-management and executive pay scales, which was a
cornerstone of Treasury Board compensation policy.437 Montreal’s LOAC representative and
member of the LA Compensation Committee suggested a competitiveness increase to the
national salary rate that would narrow the difference between the parity allowance for Toronto to
$5000 and make the introduction of the differential less shocking to other lawyers. This salary
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competitiveness measure was advanced through a memorandum to LaBarre to be considered by
the department’s executives during their negotiations with TBS.438

A 15 March 1990 meeting between TBS and DOJ representatives cast a new die for the
department’s draft Law Group compensation submission. TBS rejected the DOJ’s retroactive
start date of 1 April 1989 for national salary rate adjustments, and instead proposed 31 March
1990. Furthermore, approving the DOJ’s regional parity allowance plan as it stood troubled
TBS’s representatives. They did not want regional economics to skew the remuneration of
lawyers. During the steep inflation years of the early 1980s, the DOJ adhered to a single pay
policy despite lawyers in Vancouver, Toronto, and Edmonton calling for a salary raise to match
escalating cost of living expenses. As well, TBS disliked the notion of special treatment for one
set of civil servants while other unionized government departments in Toronto also had their own
recruitment and retention issues. They suspected influential national unions, such as the Public
Service Alliance of Canada, would use the precedent to seek similar concessions in upcoming
collective bargaining negotiations. Thus, TBS recommended a prudent compromise: the TRO
would receive its own salary scale, distinct and separate from the national standard, at rates
comparable to those paid by the MAG. At the LA Compensation meeting of 30 March 1990,
LaBarre relayed to LOAC’s representatives that the parity allowance was being dropped for a
separate Toronto salary scale.

By 20 April 1990, HRD staff finalized the Law Group compensation proposal and
readied it for the signature of the Associate Deputy Minister, Deputy Minister, and Minister of
Justice. Once the TBS received the DOJ’s submission, its staff prepared an aide-memoire to
accompany the proposal and delivered the completed package to the Treasury Board. In decision
number 814117, dated 6 June 1990, Treasury Board ministers approved the DOJ’s request for
establishing a regional salary scale for lawyers employed at the TRO. The Treasury Board
decision overlooked any restructuring of the national salary ranges as TBS withheld that portion
of the submission. Deputy Minister Tait’s memorandum of 11 June 1990 to lawyers explained
the decision to bifurcate the salary submission as follows:
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As a result of discussions with Treasury Board officials concerning our submission, and
given the urgency of the situation regarding the Toronto Regional Office, it was decided
to proceed to the Board with respect to the Toronto rates of pay only, as the consideration
of the salary range changes sought on a national basis would have led to delays in the
approval process. We proceeded on this basis on the understanding that Board officials
would continue to work with us on a priority basis to review the general Law Group
salaries and that an appropriate submission to the Board would be made in that regard as
soon as possible...Consultations with the LA Compensation Committee on this next phase
of negotiations with the Treasury Board will continue, and all efforts will be made to
advise you of the outcome in a timely way.439
The decision naturally heightened lawyers’ interest in learning the eventual margin between the
two salary scales. The suspense ended on 25 July 1990, after Treasury Board ministers approved
the national DOJ Law Group compensation proposal and awarded economic adjustments in the
amount of 0 percent and 3 percent effective 31 March 1990 and 31 March 1991 respectively.
The decision set national salary ranges for lawyers at the LA-2A level roughly $6,000 lower than
the starting range of the Toronto scale and $13,000 less at its upper end.

DOJ senior management’s handling of the Law Group compensation proposal
demonstrated that LOAC’s involvement in the salary determination process was moderated.
After its 7 June 1990 conference call with LaBarre, LOAC’s non-management representatives
understood that the Treasury Board would likely approve the competitiveness increase advanced
by its members on the LA Compensation Committee.

Instead, Treasury Board ministers

approved the same wage increases proposed by the 20 April 1990 Law Group compensation
submission. Moreover, LOAC’s LA Compensation members believed that Treasury Board
would review the national salary proposal in August, only to discover the national salary
submission had proceeded in July.440 LA Compensation Committee members documented the
unease caused by their peripheral involvement as this memorandum written to LaBarre notes:
...Following the Board’s decision to adopt special rates of pay for lawyers in the Toronto
Regional Office, you indicated, in the course of a telephone conversation with the
representatives of the Legal Officers on LOAC, that there was a 90% chance that the
Board would approve the Department’s request for a competitiveness increase for nonToronto LA’s...We asked you whether the Board had any problems with our
Department`s proposed submission. The only problem you mentioned was the Board
439
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officials’ reluctance to make a retroactive rate change. You further indicated that apart
from this, Board officials found our request...reasonable. Needless to say, as we had not
been informed of any other problems with our submission, the Board’s unfavourable
decision, the details of which we are unaware, came as a disagreeable surprise.
In his memorandum of June 11, 1990...John Tait, indicated that... the Department would
continue to work with it on a priority basis to review the general Law group salaries and
an appropriate TB submission would be made as soon as possible. He...sa[id] that
“[c]onsultations with the LA Compensation Committee on this next phase of negotiations
will continue...” No such consultations took place on the content of or strategy pertaining
to this submission nor were the representatives of the Legal Officers given a copy of the
second submission...
We have been instructed by the representatives of the legal officers on LOAC to register
their displeasure with the lack of consultation between management and LA
representatives during this last phase of the salary negotiation process. By not
volunteering timely and relevant information to the LAs’ representatives on the
Compensation Committee the Department was certainly not living up to the spirit of its
own Mission and Values Statement which states that “[t]he Department’s strength comes
from all members of the organization who are committed to working together on the basis
of mutual trust, support, and respect.”
...LOAC representatives recognize that management must be given considerable leeway
in carrying out negotiations, nonetheless, they are of the view that, where these could
lead to results totally different from those sought by the Department and agreed to by the
LAs representatives on the LA Compensation Committee, the latter ought to be advised
beforehand in order to ascertain possible input.441
The Toronto differential, as an exceptional deviation from the SAP’s objective for the
consistent administration of salaries for DOJ lawyers, was a zero-sum and divisive compensation
policy. The longer the two unequal salary scales existed, the more lawyers who did not work at
the TRO could ask their LOAC representatives to inquire about plans DOJ management had for
increasing the national salary scale or for formalizing provisions to allow for allowances to any
office facing labour circumstances like Toronto’s. In the event that lawyers wanted to take a
more proactive stance, there was always the idea floated by Vancouver’s LOAC representative to
revive Justlaw and agitate for an improvement in national salary rates.442 By and large, however,
non-management LOAC representatives preached patience. They saw a silver lining in the
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Treasury Board having to maintain comparability between the Toronto differential and salaries
paid by the Ontario MAG—the national salary scale would have to be adjusted upwards as well.
By contrast, TBS’s preference was for the two salary scales to return to one and it believed that,
with recent Pay Research Bureau data showing that the national benchmark for lawyer salaries at
a plateau due to a national recession and the legal labour market cooling in Toronto, the
convergence would occur sooner than later. However, economic and political factors beyond the
control of either the TBS or the DOJ instigated measures responsible for the Toronto
differential’s immediate perpetuation.

5.2.2 Legislative Deep Freeze
The emerging salary compensation picture at the DOJ was overshadowed by the
recession of the early 1990s, which compounded a fiscal crisis in federal government finances,
and the Conservative (and subsequent Liberal) government’s program of tackling deep budget
deficits. On 26 February 1991, the government’s budget, tabled in the House of Commons,
called for aggressively restraining state debt and expenditures. The budget initiated the period of
federal government restraint and retrenchment lasting from 1991 to 1997, which involved
Ottawa reducing government services, downsizing the federal public service, and freezing public
sector wages. With the enactment of the Public Sector Compensation Act443 (PSCA) on 2
October 1991, the government implemented its budget prerogatives and quelled federal
employee unrest over wage restraints in one fell swoop. Every compensation plan along with
terms and conditions of employment extant in the federal public service as of February 1991 was
extended by twenty-four additional months. The law froze salary ranges of both DOJ national
and Toronto compensation plans for the first year of the Act, but they would rise by 3 percent for
the second annum.
The salaries of DOJ lawyers were directly affected by PSCA’s cost-containing provisions.
The Toronto differential stalled behind the salaries of Ontario MAG lawyers after an increase
raised it by an additional 5.78 percent effective 1 January 1991. On 22 November 1991, TBS’s
Personnel Policy Branch issued a directive suspending in-range salary performance pay and
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bonuses for DOJ lawyers at the LA-2A and higher level for the 1991-1992 appraisal year.444 The
course of PSCA’s cost restrictions required LaBarre’s successor, Mario Dion, to monitor and
liaison with TBS regarding the Toronto differential’s continuance since the Treasury Board
approved the benefit on the understanding of it being periodically reviewed. In October 1992,
Pricewaterhouse Coopers was retained to conduct a study analyzing the city’s short-to-medium
term labour market as a measure for assessing the differential’s longevity. TRO lawyers
responded by forming a committee that denounced the need for the project. Their concerns were
allayed on 2 April 1993 by the passage of the Government Expenditure Restraint Act, 1993 No.
2445 as the Act extended section 5 of the PSCA’s salary range and performance pay moratoriums
for two additional years. The Budget Implementation Act, 1994446 (BIA), the third and final piece
of wage-restraint legislation, extended the legislative freeze on public servant compensation
plans until 31 May 1997.447 The three Acts preserved the Toronto differential over the length of
their legislated terms, which prevented the TBS and DOJ from formally revisiting its necessity.

Legislation artificially sustaining the Toronto differential far beyond the market
conditions that justified it perplexed senior management at the DOJ who wanted a return to a
single national salary plan.

As it stood, the differential flouted the DOJ’s cost–cutting

prerogatives as its operational budget was slashed by 10 percent from 1993 to 1997.448
Continued administration of the Toronto differential hampered employee morale and fanned the
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discontent of other lawyers working in large cities who did not receive the benefit.449 The
lawyers most incensed by the Toronto differential were those employed at the Vancouver
Regional Office. They performed the same work as lawyers in Toronto and also faced soaring
housing and living costs. In May 1995, Vancouver lawyers apprised their Regional Director, Jim
Bissell, of ten criteria that they determined further investigation would support their calls for
higher wages.450 A few months later, they voiced their demands through numerous grievances to
Deputy Minister Thomson, albeit unsuccessfully, claiming financial and geographic
discrimination because of Treasury Board implementing the Toronto differential. These failed
complaints encouraged lawyers to initiate a collection (seeking $100 from each member) to fund
a legal opinion about suing the government and to review of a draft statement of claim. On 31
May 1996, fifty-three Vancouver lawyers sued the Attorney General of Canada, Treasury Board
of Canada, Minister of Justice and Deputy Minister of Justice for damages, claiming that the
Toronto differential breached an express term of their contract of employment and declaring that
the PSSRA’s prohibition on DOJ lawyers organizing to collectively bargain infringed their
Charter right of freedom of association.451 The BIA expiring, along with the market conditions
responsible for the Toronto differential dissipating, therefore offered the DOJ a window of
opportunity to settle some of its finance and personnel issues by revisiting the Toronto
differential. In April 1996, Thomson wrote to the secretary of TBS requesting measures to allow
the DOJ to adjust the Toronto differential. When the DOJ’s HRD followed up with the TBS
about the Toronto salary scale review process they were advised to advance a salary position
based on an objective market analysis.452

Six years of fiscal restraint and downsizing understandably damaged the reputation of the
federal government as an employer. This assessment, noted by the Clerk of the Privy Council,
449
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Jocelyne Bourgon, in her February 1997 Fourth Annual Report to the Prime Minister on the
Public Service of Canada, illustrated the “quiet crisis” brewing in the federal public service
endemic of low morale, job dissatisfaction and flight among civil servants caused by cutbacks.453
Strained labour and employment relations demanded the government launch the ambitious
human resources reform programme of La Relève, which was a wholesale review and multi-year
action plan for revitalizing the federal bureaucracy. At the DOJ, the La Relève: Justice Action
Plan saw the department meeting its future business challenges through a new competency-based
system for all DOJ human resources policies, practices, processes, and systems. The document
outlined the department’s strategy for reforming human resources management and proposed
that its primary challenge was to create an engaged and resourceful workforce within a changing
legal service delivery environment.454

The department faced the immediate issues of

compensation, automatic promotion between LA-1 to LA-2A that was suspended since January
1993, senior promotion, and improved employee recognition that could hinder employee
participation in the department’s larger reform agenda.455 To address these matters, as well as
the changes to the Toronto differential, implementation of performance pay for 1997, and
revising terms and conditions of employment, the report noted a sub-committee of the Human
Resources Committee would investigate and make recommendations to the department’s
Executive Committee.456
Indeed, in April 1997, the DOJ’s Human Resources Committee (HRC) struck an LA
Compensation Subcommittee (LACS) (comprised of managers and three LOAC nonmanagement representatives) to allow for employee representation on the panel. Compensation
policies needed normalizing after the triumvirate of wage restraint Acts caused several anomalies
in the wages of the DOJ Law Group: salary ranges required an economic adjustment without
allowing for retroactive increase; recruiting rates were outdated; LA-2A and LA-2B lawyers
accumulated tenure and their salaries needed repositioning within the salary grid to reflect their
advancement. Furthermore, there were no salary adjustment for lawyers within the LA-2A pay
453
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band, but progression for lawyers at the LA-1 level resulted in “leapfrogging” where, upon a
subordinate’s promotion between levels, they surpassed the salary of their superior despite
having less experience. The HRC was short on resources previously dedicated to researching
lawyers’ compensation as the Research Pay Bureau folded in February 1992, which was
followed by the shuttering of the Law Group Compensation Committee one year later. In spring
1997, Deputy Minister Thomson retained an external consultant, Robert Casault, to serve as a
liaison to the HRC and address the Toronto differential by investigating whether the recruitment
and retention problems justifying the benefit remained, and, if not, options for its discontinuance.
Vancouver lawyers, who advocated for Casault’s work to advance a regional rate scheme that
extended pay increases to offices based on need, elicited a cool response from the department
and exposed the contentiousness of the Toronto differential.

5.2.3 The Differential Remains: Gain to Some, Pain to Others
Robert Casault’s initial report of May 1997 found that the Toronto office’s recruitment
and retention problems had dissipated. He proposed seven options for reducing or eliminating
the Toronto differential, from which LACS members picked four.457 Since members could not
narrow their decision to one selection, they solicited feedback from within the department.
Vancouver lawyers knew of Casault’s findings through their LOAC representative who sat on
the LACS subcommittee, and they critiqued them for not fully assessing the implications of
repealing the Toronto differential without hearing from lawyers most impacted by the decision.
LACS accepted their request to speak with Casault and he was dispatched to Vancouver in midJune 1997 for two days.

His instructions were to obtain information from the office’s

management committee about phasing out the Toronto differential.

Casault attended the

Vancouver office, met with the office director and, management committee, and discussed his
report with LOAC’s representative and other lawyers. He maintained that a regional wage
premium depended on data showing atypical and extended staff loss undermining operations,
and noted that he welcomed material from lawyers that substantiated their assertions. Casault
also conducted fieldwork at the department’s Montreal and Toronto offices. During the Toronto
visit, he canvassed lawyers for their views on entitlement to the differential, heard about
repercussions if it were repealed, and received an endorsement for other offices receiving a
457
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similar allowance on the basis of demonstrated need.

Apparently, the Toronto visit was

important, as Casault’s final study of 31 October 1997 recommended maintaining the Toronto
differential, albeit with the observation that the rate was a source of lingering bad feelings
throughout the department.458

On 7 November 1997, HRC members met in Ottawa to review the Casault report findings
and discuss the Toronto differential’s future. The committee’s agenda expanded after Toronto
and Vancouver Regional Office Directors were allowed to present their office’s positions on the
matter.459 Vancouver’s newly appointed Regional Office Director, Barbara Burns, saw the
intervention as a calling on a manager’s duty to advocate for her staff’s financial interests.460
Burns, accompanied by the Director of Federal Prosecution Services for British Columbia,
Robert Prior, and LOAC’s office representative presented a written submission on recruitment
and retention problems that included stories of lawyers quitting, statistical data on departures,
recent staffing actions, wage comparisons with the Attorney General of British Columbia
(showing a shortfall in salaries at LA-1 and LA-2A levels), and memorandums detailing labour
shortages in various practice sections. The material set the premise for the delegation’s bold
proposal overlooked by Casault: a submission to Treasury Board entailing a temporary, nonpensionable, regional allowance to any office that qualifies on the basis of defined criteria
demonstrating a recruitment and retention difficulty.461 Prospects for expanding regional rate
allowances as a feature of the department’s salary plan were staked on the extent of Vancouver’s
operational difficulties.
While the Toronto differential was in the process of being reviewed, LOAC’s bi-annual
meeting of 23 October 1997 resulted in committee members determining that the other aspects of
the post-legislated restraint Law Group compensation submission should be completed by a
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dedicated and impartial body.462 The resolution compelled Deputy Minister Thomson to ask,
and TBS to permit, the department to retain an expert that would build on the Casault Report
findings and generate recommendations for a fiscally responsible compensation proposal that the
department could use in negotiations with TBS. That expert was Jim Thomas, whose hiring was
announced at the 27 November 1997 HRC meeting.463 This HRC meeting was also notable for
other reasons. On the eve of the meeting, one of LOAC’s non-management representatives
alerted the HRD that the HRC was not considering input from lawyers outside of Toronto and
Vancouver in its decision-making process and that some allowance for additional contributions
should ensue.464 Furthermore, committee members conceded that the available data supported
maintaining the Toronto differential.

They also believed that figures from Vancouver

demonstrated operational problems, but sought more information on which a case for a special
regional rate could be defended. Attendees learned that tinkering with the national salary plan by
introducing regional rates could open a Pandora’s Box of funding reform. The Treasury Board
provided the DOJ an annual budget from which salary expenses of different regional offices
were drawn. Unless the Treasury Board financed proposed regional allowances, the department
would have to source funding internally, and, possibly, by diverting resources from the budgets
of other offices where wages surpassed local comparators.

A proposed regional rate pay system disconcerted lawyers working in Ottawa and
Montreal, who disapproved of geographic differentials and were determined to inform decisionmakers of their opposition. Ottawa lawyers enlisted their regional director to oppose salary gains
for Vancouver.465 Lawyers and notaries at the Quebec Regional Office, with the endorsement of
their regional director and managers, petitioned Treasury Board ministers to deny any
departmental proposal seeking regional allowances by denouncing salary inequity and calling for
an end to existing regional differentials.466 The question remained whether the DOJ’s Executive
462
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Committee deemed regional rates advantageous for Vancouver, while mulling on whether to
eliminate or reduce the amount of the Toronto differential.

Robert Prior advanced the

Vancouver office’s case by giving policy makers sufficient data on its recruitment and retention
difficulties.467

Overall, Thomas, through his dealings with the HRD, meetings with TBS,

consults with Casault, and information provided from Vancouver, had enough material to
consider regional salary rates as part of his recommendations.

At the Executive Committee meeting of 16 January 1998, Thomas presented his initial
analysis on Law Group compensation and proposals for discussion with TBS. He suggested that
the DOJ leverage the gains PIPSC attained through a June 1997 collective bargain covering its
lawyers by requesting the same performance pay increase of 5 percent within salary range, as
well as an economic increase of 2 percent to salary ranges for the 1997 and 1998 fiscal years. He
also supported maintaining the Toronto differential, but economic adjustment to its salary ranges
would be limited to 1 percent, which was half of the gain sought for the national salary scale.
The Toronto differential would enjoy a higher maximum rate at the LA-2A level and above, but
minimum and maximum salary ranges at the LA-1 level would merge into one national rate
along with the minimum salary level for LA-2A group. As for the DOJ’s management lawyers,
economic and performance raises were sought at levels recommended by the Advisory
Committee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation chaired by Lawrence Strong.468
Furthermore, increased national recruiting rates for LA-1 and LA-2A level lawyers, with
variations from the standard on a regional basis for Vancouver and Toronto were encouraged
(rather than a regional rate premium). Regional variations were proposed in the event of
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recruiting and retention difficulties that were not associated with cost of living increases, and to
allow for adjustments to LA-2A lawyer salaries to prevent wage compression.
The DOJ’s executive simply could not adopt a controversial regional rate allowance
proposal for inclusion in a compensation proposal to TBS. Given the hostility towards the
Toronto experience, they noted what Thomas observed was a need for great caution before
introducing another regional rate differential. As well, Thomas’ finding of separation rates
amongst those leaving the Vancouver office for pay reasons at 10 percent for 1997 (and double
the attrition rate for 1994-1995) was crucial since TBS considered this measure as the standard
for assessing the level of personnel loss.469 As the numbers did not suggest Vancouver staffing
problems approximated Toronto’s crisis in 1990, or demonstrate what TBS understood
substantiated a recruitment and retention dilemma, the DOJ placed confidence in lessening that
office’s staffing shortages through pay adjustments that increased salary ranges to parity with
salaries paid by the province of British Columbia. Vancouver lawyers from the LA-1 and LA2A complement who quit represented the majority of the office’s staffing losses and they
typically cited salary non-competitiveness as the reason for their departure (which, the cited
difference of $10,000, is roughly what calculations of the proposed PIPSC economic and
performance increase would raise non-management lawyer salaries).470 Compensation meetings
between representatives from both the DOJ and TBS continued while TBS studied the proposal
before they finally presented a formal submission to the Treasury Board. On 6 June 1998,
Treasury Board ministers approved the DOJ’s Law Group compensation submission based on
Thomas’ report recommendations. Vancouver’s regional rate proposal was short lived, but it
kept pay allowances based on regional differences on the department’s radar.

The department struck an LA Compensation Working Group to deal with other perennial
concerns affecting DOJ lawyers’ terms and conditions of employment such as the Law Group
classification system, performance pay and assessment standards, inter-level progression, and
overtime. The LA Compensation Group’s tasks became encompassed with the work of the
469
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Reference Level Review. Reference Level Review was a collaborative initiative between DOJ
and TBS that assessed the DOJ’s current and future human, technological, and resource funding
requirements. Five areas of operations ranging from government client to federal prosecution
services were evaluated with a view to assist the DOJ meet its priorities. Identified deficiencies
were earmarked and would be remedied by requests to TBS for additional funding. One of the
five modules studied was Law Group compensation and its sub-issues of pay rates, terms and
conditions of employment, benefits, overtime, attrition, and regional premiums.

The Reference Level Review Reports of Spring 1999 marked one of four inquiries
conducted through September 2001 that yielded TBS and DOJ a composite analysis of DOJ Law
Group compensation. The Reference Level study of 20 April 1999 informed that TBS officials
would only consider extending a regional rate allowance to other offices based on solid evidence
showing attrition caused by market variables alone and not by job security or cost of living
factors.471

Subsequent studies demonstrated serious difficulties in any one regional office

qualifying for a Toronto-type wage premium. The LA Compensation Working Group retained
Ruth Matte of Consulting and Audit Canada to study whether compensation trends between 1992
and 1999 prompted recruitment and retention problems at the department. The study found
minimal attrition among DOJ lawyers based on insufficient compensation.472 A June 2001
Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC) study investigated the DOJ’s future recruitment and retention
needs. Recent attrition rates of lawyers were calculated at 5 percent, which allowed the study to
find that the DOJ did not suffer an immediate recruitment and retention crisis, but faced
imminent retirements and a need for more lawyers.473 Finally, TBS commissioned a private
consultancy firm on compensation, to assess the positioning of DOJ lawyer salaries vis-a-vis
corporate, private and public sectors based on year 2000 data.474 Released in September 2001,
the Hay Group’s analysis of provincial Crown labour markets found that, other than for Ontario,
salary ranges for Law Group counsel positions were between 15 to 40 percent higher than similar
positions with differences especially pronounced at senior levels.475
471
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This collection of DOJ Law Group compensation studies allowed Mario Dion to write to
lawyers in late December 2001, and advise them of management’s assessment of their salaries:
Taken together, the Consulting and Audit Canada study and the PriceWaterhouse
Coopers study, which looked at recruitment and retention issues, and the Hay Report,
which examined rates of pay in both the public and private sectors, have provided us with
a comprehensive understanding of the overall and regional recruitment, retention,
compensation and work environment issues that are important to Justice counsel. Based
on the research, we know that recruitment and retention are not a major problem at this
time in the Department and, based on the Hay Report, we also know that salaries are
competitive, with the exception of the Toronto region.476
The message reinforced the Department’s view that its national salary ranges were adequate, and
on the right track towards slowly narrowing the gap between the Toronto differential. 477 No
regional office required special rate amendments to offset staffing shortages, other than a
potential one developing at the TRO due to significant, arbitrated wage gains secured by Ontario
government lawyers.

The brief period of relative wage competitiveness between the Toronto wage scale and
the salaries of the Ontario MAG was caused by the freezing of provincial government lawyers’
salaries from January 1992 to October 2000. The freeze was due to the Ontario New Democrats’
“Social Contract Act,” which was closely followed by the Conservative government’s “Common
Sense Revolution.” As the initial round of collective bargaining between MAG, ALOC, and
OCAA demonstrated, however, extended recesses in upward compensation leading to salary
disparities were compensated for by a generous wage increase. History repeated itself as the
interest arbitration award between the province of Ontario and its lawyers of 26 October 2000,
issued by Chair William Kaplan, dispensed an exceptional 30 percent increase in the annual
476
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salaries of provincial lawyers employed by the MAG retroactive to 1 January 1999 (Kaplan
award).478

MAG salaries spiked an average 20 percent higher at both the minimum and

maximum levels in comparison to each of the Law Group classification levels at the Toronto
salary scale. The difference stood in even starker contrast to the national DOJ salary scale,
which languished between 5 and 15 percent below that of the Toronto differential rates. DOJ
management, having research indicating that national salary rates were competitive, could not
change lawyers’ perception that the Toronto differential was unjust, and could do nothing to
head off more frustration if further increases outpaced comparable gains to the national salary
scale.

As the following sections will show, the Kaplan award emboldened LOAC’s non-

management representatives to proceed with a referendum seeking the approval of DOJ lawyers
for a professional association with one of its directives being to reduce salary disparity between
the national and Toronto salary rates through collective bargaining.

5.3

Reforms at the DOJ

5.3.1 Background to LOAC Becoming a Staff Association
On 1 July 1998, Morris Rosenberg succeeded George Thomson as the Deputy Minister of
Justice of Canada. The timing of his appointment installed him as custodian over the ongoing
human resources reform endeavour underway at the department. Initiated in January 1998 by
Rosenberg’s predecessor, the “Big Conversation” was a department-wide, town hall meeting tour
for staff and senior management to interact with another, take stock and discuss numerous
appreciable shifts in DOJ operations.479

Certain changes, such as the introduction of

timekeeping by lawyers for legal services, were banal. 480 Other innovations, though, were more
structural and sought cost and work process efficiencies through investments in information
management systems and technology, development of service agreements with client
departments, and reorganization of the department into a portfolio management system to
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improve the delivery of legal services.481 The variables responsible for the DOJ’s personnel
expansion throughout the 1990s, however, most affected the day-to-day work of staff.482 The
DOJ’s labour needs expanded partly due to an increase of legal work and advising associated
with government initiatives in Aboriginal and international affairs, partly due to sheer growth in
the volume and complexity of civil, criminal, and Charter litigation, and partly due to client
departments’ demands for services and willingness to pay for staff.483 The DOJ’s growth was
facilitated using a term-work model where staff was hired on a contract basis to handle spikes in
workloads and temporary projects. The employment practice of integrating the department’s
LA-1 population into an inclusive workplace culture would need re-assessment, of course, as 80
percent of lawyers in this complement worked on a term basis.484 Overall, the Justice Forums
were intended for staff to raise their employment concerns and allow management to take their
issues into consideration when considering human resources policies.

Improved employee

relations were part of the new mantra at the department as it strove to become a “workplace of
choice.” LOAC’s non-managerial members also had their rationale for improving the workplace
that centred on their committee becoming a more effective, service-oriented entity.

The period of legislated moratoriums on public sector wage increases may have
suspended the work of the LA Compensation Committee, but the break in responsibilities helped
divert LOAC’s non-management members’ attention to other committee functions. The April
1995 LOAC semi-annual meeting in Ottawa seemed to have marked a change in nonmanagement LOAC representatives’ view towards the committee’s potential. They attended
with a steering committee in the works to evaluate LOAC and its mandate in light of: its non481
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management members’ growing involvement in lawyers’ grievances; their interest in reassessing LOAC’s structure; and their possible participation on the Policy, Operations, and
Human Resources Subcommittees of the department, which were evolving to assume greater
managerial responsibilities.485 Granted, LOAC’s expansion into staff advocacy added more
work for its regional representatives who had neither the added resources nor the permission to
fulfill an employee need, but, the practice of addressing employee performance assessments
particularly startled the department’s HRD. As this passage, taken from the testimony of Lois
Lehmann486 recorded during the Babcock487 trial reveals, the appropriate course of action was to
abstain from employee representation all together:
It was a thrust that management was getting into in the late 90s that resulted in some
difficulty for a couple of people listed above. We had all been representing our
constituents in our own regional offices with respect to potential grievances, complaints,
competition appeals. We’d done that since I started in 1990. That was the other facet—
the individual facet—of the nature of the work we did, we represented. And suddenly
over time, but certainly this makes it clear that management is taking a dim view of that
and saying, well, you’re not—you’re not the employees’ representative, you don’t have
any status, and therefore they can come—they should come directly to us. That was that
kind of attitude probably was something that propelled us to say, well October 1998, it’s
time to move forward into an association so that we can, in fact, provide that
representation.488
The observations raised in this passage encapsulated a sentiment shared by Lehmann’s
colleagues: that LOAC surpassed being a mere transmitter of communications. With the culture
of change unfolding at the DOJ, the appropriate climate was formed for non-management LOAC
members to advance their own agenda.
On 15 September 1998, LOAC’s non-management regional representative hosted an
information session in Ottawa regarding alternate models of employee representation. Several
provincial lawyers’ association presidents were invited to attend and discuss their organizations’
experiences, and, afterwards, LOAC non-management and management representatives gathered
485
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to discuss findings. On 8 October 1998, LOAC non-management representatives followed up
the meeting by sending a memorandum to Rosenberg that formally requested changes to LOAC.
The memorandum expressed their concern about LOAC’s inability to act for the interests of nonmanagement lawyers, senior management not considering the views of non-management LOAC
members, and a request for changing LOAC’s structure by creating two full-time positions
(assisted by secretarial support) to handle employee representation.489 These observations helped
substantiate Rosenberg’s decision to initiate LOAC’s re-evaluation by investigating whether it
was satisfying its objectives as a communication vehicle in light of the DOJ expanding its
personnel and responsibilities.490 In April 1999, Rosenberg commissioned a “Beyond LOAC”
Committee with a mandate of: (1) examining the different models for how the interests of nonmanagement lawyers are better represented; (2) consulting broadly with non-management
lawyers as to their preference for a form of representation; and (3) submitting recommendations
for a new model to him.491

The outcome of the Beyond LOAC project was a formal report produced with the
assistance of labour mediator George Adams, who facilitated consultations between three
management and three non-management LOAC representatives. Committee members met on 6
and 27 April 1999, and for a third session on 25 June 1999. During the Beyond LOAC
consultations, non-management committee members unanimously backed a recommendation for
removing the PSSRA’s prohibitions on DOJ lawyers participating in an employee
organization.492 Management committee members rejected the proposal, citing that collective
bargaining spoiled the development of a professional partnership.493 The framework enshrining
LOAC’s new consultative role then culminated from compromises in negotiations between
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parties regarding the extent formal representation was permissible within the parameters of the
PSSRA. On 19 July 1999, the report was presented to Rosenberg for his consideration.
The Beyond LOAC Report findings were based on a review of LOAC’s functions,
insights from non-management and management on its utility, and their consensus on
recommendations for refurbishing the committee into a vehicle for improving employeeemployer relations. The report detailed LOAC’s many deficiencies. Operationally, LOAC’s biannual meetings with management that lasted for a day and a half were too short and
management-dominated, which prevented meaningful consultation with non-management
members.

Other factors disadvantaged LOAC, such as lack of resources allotted for

representatives’ work, no operating budget, and high turnover of voluntary representatives.
Structurally, LOAC did not participate in any of the DOJ senior decision-making committees. It
had no dealings with TBS, and it lacked a representational framework for redressing employee
issues of salary, workload, and performance evaluations. In short, without significant reform
LOAC was not viable. The Beyond LOAC Report’s three central recommendations attempted to
improve the situation and involved: (1) creating a professional association of non-management
lawyers that represented lawyers in employment relations with the DOJ and Treasury Board; (2)
the DOJ and Treasury Board committing to acknowledge the association as exclusive
representative of non-management lawyers for the purposes of non-management lawyer
representation; and (3) representing lawyers in advancing grievances.494

LOAC’s non-

management members approved the report on the encouragement of their outgoing chair, Tom
McMahon, who suggested that the proposal was a vast improvement over LOAC’s existing
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model and a stepping stone to collective bargaining.495 What remained was gaining the Deputy
Minister’s approval, without which the plans for LOAC’s new future would remain unfulfilled.
Rosenberg accepted the Beyond LOAC Report recommendation that the department provide
$150,000 to defray the costs of studying the association’s creation and allow for staff
consultations to measure popular support for implementing other report recommendations.

LOAC non-management members agreed to a three-person transition team comprised of
their peers Jeff Hutchinson and Beyond LOAC non-management committee members Francisco
Cuoto and Lois Lehmann to spearhead LOAC becoming an association. Lehmann was also
appointed to a full-time, one-year assignment dedicated to coordinating the association’s launch.
Lawyers, however, first needed to be acquainted with the details of the project. Throughout the
autumn of 1999, management and non-management Beyond LOAC committee members visited
DOJ regional and departmental legal service unit offices to consult with staff on Beyond LOAC
report proposals and solicit feedback.496 Audiences generally supported Beyond LOAC nonmanagement members’ goals for creating an employee association that was formally recognized
by and collectively negotiated with the Treasury Board to achieve a national salary equivalent to
the rate paid by the Ontario MAG.497 In June 2000, both casts of Beyond LOAC committee
members reconvened to update each other on steps towards realizing the association. At the
meeting, Beyond LOAC management committee members confirmed that Rosenberg would
implement all Beyond LOAC report recommendations within the DOJ’s authority provided they
had the support of a majority of staff lawyers.498 Those recommendations that affected the
Treasury Board required their consent, and they refused direct negotiations with DOJ lawyers.499
495
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Instead, TBS preferred an agreement outlining its role in meetings between the lawyers’
employee association and DOJ management.500

Another retainer for Ruth Matte Consulting resulted in a report recommending a
consultation system to guide the lawyers’ employee association and the DOJ in discussions with
TBS. The consultant advised creating a compensation council as a system for DOJ management
and its lawyers to reach agreement on pay and terms and conditions of employment. Input from
the council would be informational and used in recommending a position on compensation that
DOJ management would communicate to TBS; however, final recommendations remained
within each of the authorities’ scope of decision-making powers.501

The Beyond LOAC

transition team balked at the inability to negotiate with TBS and abandoned compensation
council discussions. They preferred to finalize the association after the October 2000 Kaplan
award could be used to sell lawyers on the power of collective action, and, once established,
position the association to capitalize on the federal government’s imminent revamp of the legal
framework governing federal public service labour and employment relations.

5.3.2 Labour Reforms in the Broader Federal Public Service
Beyond LOAC Committee Report recommendation #14 acknowledged that nonmanagement DOJ lawyers enjoyed rights of freedom of association and could work to eliminate
their exclusion from the PSSRA. This recommendation gained traction in October 1999, after the
Secretary of the Treasury Board appointed a nine-member advisory group that was chaired by
John Fryer (and so called the Fryer Committee) with an eighteen-month mandate to review the
state of labour relations between Treasury Board and civil service unions.502

The Fryer
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Committee was to diagnose the system of collective bargaining under the PSSRA and assess
whether the labour

management system

effectively served the

tax-paying public.

Recommendations were to help TBS determine whether to propose amendments to the Act.

In May 2000, the Fryer Committee released its initial report.

Committee members

reviewed history, conducted surveys, and heard from key stakeholders to determine that
collective bargaining functioned well during its first decade. They also found that over the next
fifteen years, periods of unilateral government restraint and retrenchment, made possible by the
government’s dual role as employer and legislator undermined collective bargaining.503
Management’s overextension into labour relations under the PSSRA was highly problematic for
the committee, as was: the Act’s exclusion of significant terms of employment from bargaining;
haphazard legislative determination of highly complex bargaining units; a convoluted redress
mechanism; prohibitions on policy grievances; and complex and anachronistic managerial
exclusions.504 In sum, the report concluded that the existing collective bargaining regime in the
federal public service was unsustainable.

Fryer Committee members prepared their second and final report for an audience that
anticipated its arrival. The Liberals won a third federal government and in his reply to the
Throne Speech of 31 January 2001, Prime Minister Chrétien committed the government to
modernizing the public service.505 An additional call to action came in March, with the Clerk of
the Privy Council, Mel Cappe, tabling the Eighth Annual Report to the Prime Minister on the
Public Service of Canada, which called for a fundamental reform of the legislative framework
regulating the staffing process was burdensome and slow, which promoted litigious appeals, and an impractical
administration. Staffing reform was called for, as was transforming managing roles and accountability in human
resources systems. The report observed that collective bargaining needed changes. The Fryer committee’s work
stood to expand the point by identifying whether pressures exerting modernization initiatives in human resources
management administration carried over to the labour relations arena.
503
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governing human resources management.506 On 3 April 2001, Prime Minister Chrétien fulfilled
his commitment by announcing the creation of the Task Force on Modernizing Human
Resources Management in the Federal Public Service (Quail Task Force). Within eighteen
months, the task force chair, Deputy Minister of Public Works and Government Services
Canada, Ranald A. Quail, and an external advisory group were to recommend a contemporary
policy, legislative, and institutional system for managing human resources in the federal civil
service. Proposing new legislation first involved examining current laws, and for that analysis,
the Quail Task Force looked to the work of the Fryer Committee.

The Fryer Committee released its final report on 13 June 2001 (Fryer Report). The Fryer
Committee proposal for more harmonious labour relations was to create a new institutional
framework consisting of: a reformed and modernized PSSRA that would incorporate
recommendations proposed by the Committee; transferring the PSSRA’s administration to the
Canada Industrial Relations Board; reconstituting the PSSRB as the Public Service Rights
Redress Board to adjudicate all grievances; creating a Public Interest Dispute Resolution
Commission to resolve impasses in collective bargaining; and expanding the role and legal
recognition of the National Joint Council.507 The committee suggested three principles to guide
labour management relations in the administration of the new regime: embracing collective
views; recognizing workers enjoy freedom of association to form unions and collectively
bargain; and committing to cooperative solutions.508 Committee members proposed that every
subject that arises in the workplace is a matter for union-management interaction through a
“three-C” model of consultation, co-development and collective bargaining.509

The Fryer

Report’s recommendations, numbers 3, 8, 9, 10, for amending the PSSRA increased the level and
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scope of worker involvement in determining workplace issues and supported the efforts of DOJ
lawyers forming an employee association. Recommendation 3 proposed amending the PSSRA to
allow for consultation between employer and employee representatives in the development of
policies; recommendations 8 and 9 advanced the concept of two-tier collective bargaining and
negotiations of terms and conditions of employment at both the service-wide and departmental
levels. In recommendation 10, the Fryer Committee thought to relax the PSSRA’s employee
exclusions to mirror those of the Canada Labour Code’s less stringent criteria and bar only those
employees from coverage who performed management functions or were employed in a
confidential capacity in matters relating to industrial relations. They reasoned that the PSSRA’s
current exclusions were restrictive, unnecessary, and “inconsistent with the facilitative, enabling
approach” the committee sought.510 The Fryer Report was referred to the Quail Task Force for
its deliberations in a creating a new labour relations framework.511

5.3.3 Formalization of the AJC and First Moves
Set against this backdrop of stirring federal public service labour legislation reform, the
Beyond LOAC transition team prepared for a referendum to determine whether non-management
lawyers supported the creation of a professional association. The Beyond LOAC transition team
used the 2 March 2001 edition of JustInfo (DOJ Intranet newsletter) to announce the Beyond
LOAC intranet site featured a proposal and a discussion brief covering compensation, annual
performance review and employee appraisal, management leave and overtime, promotions,
grievance procedures, lack of regional rate policy, maternity leave, and term employment as
issues bolstering the need for an association to monitor them.512 As previously foreshadowed,
the proposal intended to create a professional association to: act as bargaining agent for nonmanagement DOJ lawyers on all terms and conditions of employment with Treasury Board;
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enlist third-party binding arbitration as a bargaining dispute resolution mechanism; and use a
Rand-type formula for collecting membership dues.513 The Beyond LOAC transition team
returned to each regional and departmental legal service unit office to discuss the proposed
association with audiences. Lawyers supporting a plebiscite encouraged members of the Beyond
LOAC transition team to ready a vote.

This period of tremendous progress also saw the Beyond LOAC transition team contain
internal adversity stemming from the Kaplan award, which caused ninety-five percent of nonmanagement lawyers at the TRO to form the Ontario Justice Lawyers’ Association (OJLA) with
the purpose of achieving wage parity with Ontario government lawyers. 514 In May 2001, OJLA
renamed itself as the Federal Lawyers’ Association of Greater Toronto (FLAG). An immediate
executive decisions facing the FLAG’s Board of Directors was whether to support the AJC’s
referendum while pursuing its own wage campaign.515 The FLAG’s Executive Committee
determined that it could pursue its mandate by working within a national association, and so
asked the membership to vote for the AJC (which they overwhelmingly did).

The Beyond LOAC transition team prepared for the referendum. They secured a voters
list, decided on a balloting process, recruited volunteers to assist with polling, and advised
management of their use of JustInfo.516 In anticipation of the historic vote, the 21 May 2001
edition of JustInfo advertised the Key Points of the Association of Justice Counsel, a summative
proposal for creating a professional association. From the 18th to 27th of June 2001 nonmanagement DOJ lawyers voted in an office-by-office referendum: of the 1,452 votes cast, 1,274
approved of the association.517 From the department’s perspective, mass support for the AJC
occurred because:
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Over the years, lawyers in Justice have come to feel that they have been disadvantaged in
their wages and that the Department has not represented their interests adequately before
the Treasury Board. Employee relations in the Department have consequently eroded.518
AJC executives, Lehmann and Cuoto, however, explained the AJC’s genesis as follows:
Unlike the vast majority of Federal government employees, Justice counsel are denied to
be represented by a union and to engage in collective negotiations, because they are
specifically excluded from the definition of “employee” under the Public Service Staff
Relations Act (PSSRA). They have formed the AJC to represent their interests, as a
result of having no access to the normal system for addressing employee concerns about
terms and conditions of employment and redress process.519
The AJC’s goal for a single national salary plan as the cornerstone of its position on
compensation seemed to have found resonance amongst voters:
Whatever the reasons for imposing economic segregation, eleven years later it is
something that still deeply divides the Department: both counsel and management. In
both the CAC (Ruth Matte Study) focus groups of 2000 and the AJC cross-country
consultations of 2001, this came out as a major topic of frustration.520
The AJC was voted into existence to increase due process in the workplace, restore external
market comparability caused by the salary freezes of the 1990s and to address internal imbalance
from the existence of the Toronto differential.

However, the AJC’s identity as a national

association was brief once FLAG ended its truce.

Its members initiated the break after

concluding that their salaries were uncompetitive, that the department would have to raise the
Toronto differential to prevent another recruitment and retention problem, and that by supporting
the AJC’s goal of national salary range parity with the Ontario MAG, they prejudiced their own
prospects since the evidence from the Hay Report substantiated only their claim to increased
wages.521
In July 2001, the AJC’s interim Governing Council drawn from representatives of each of
the regional and Ottawa area offices, elected Lois Lehmann as president, and filled the positions
518
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of vice-president, secretary, and treasurer. The Deputy Minister assigned Mario Dion to liaison
with the AJC on behalf of the department. The AJC’s leadership held discussions with DOJ
management over TBS recognizing the association and they responded to the Quail Task Force’s
calls for submissions during its consultations (since unions received only a limited opportunity of
addressing the committee or presenting reports up to 31 August 2001).522 On 29 August 2001,
Lehmann wrote to the Quail Task Force and outlined the AJC’s position on DOJ lawyer
exclusion from labour legislation.523 In September, when the AJC’s interim executive met with
Dion and other DOJ officials, they learned: that one of the Beyond LOAC recommendations of
membership on the Deputy Minister’s Executive Council was unrealizable; of TBS’s openness to
the AJC as an interest-based association; and of TBS’s request for DOJ management to oversee
compensation discussions with the AJC.524

Notwithstanding the loss of the Toronto base, the AJC continued its membership drive
throughout the rest of the department in preparation of general elections scheduled from 23 to 25
January 2002, and also to increase its dues base to cover operating costs once departmental
funding ended on 30 June 2002. The AJC’s constitution instructed that, before 31 January 2002,
elections needed to take place to choose representatives for a first permanent Governing Council.
Once council members were elected, they were to select a new executive consisting of a
President, Vice-president, Secretary and Treasurer.525 In the result, Patrick Jetté, succeeded Lois
Lehmann as the AJC’s president. On 28 March 2002, three of the AJC’s four member Executive
Council consisting of Jetté, Vern Brewer and Denyse Côté had their first official meeting with
Dion.526 Discussions covered the AJC’s Executive Council’s responsibility for arranging the
organization’s financial and administrative affairs, a process expected to last six months. To
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allow the AJC’s executives perform their duties, management planned to provide them with
release time and the organization with interim office space until it established its own
headquarters. The parties agreed to meet bi-monthly thereafter to discuss ongoing matters, such
as AJC representation of members in grievances and its efforts before the Quail Task Force to
eliminate the exclusion of DOJ lawyers from legislation. The immediate priority for the AJC’s
executive, however, was to monitor the DOJ’s solution to the wage discrepancy caused by the
Kaplan award after hearing plans that the Toronto differential would be supplemented with an
allowance. Several weeks earlier, on 15 January 2002, the AJC had submitted to the DOJ-TBS
Joint Working Group,527 a compensation proposal that critiqued the methodology and data used
in the Hay Report, and asked for a single national job rate, which would raise the maximum rates
of pay to the equivalent of the Ontario MAG, and a market adjustment increase of 11 percent.528

5.3.4 The Toronto Differential and the AJC’s Pre-Unionization Campaign for Wage Equity
On 23 November 2001, the DOJ-TBS Working Group achieved tentative consensus on
supplementing the Toronto salary scale by an additional 8 percent non-pensionable allowance,
and for allowing an economic adjustment to non-management DOJ lawyer salaries over a three
year term at levels to match those received by lawyers represented by PIPSC.529 The proposal,
however, was not supported by other TBS representatives who opposed the measure as the 2001
PwC study showed the Toronto office was not experiencing a recruitment and retention crisis
(only a potential one) and, therefore, without proof of a severe staffing problem for at least two
years, no hard criteria existed to justify the allowance. TBS also hesitated raising the Toronto
differential because of its effect on wage relativity vis-à-vis other professionals and executives
working in and around Toronto.530

Finally, TBS wanted to avoid increasing the Toronto

differential to prevent any inference that supported allegations identified in the lawsuit by
Vancouver lawyers.
527
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TBS’s position on the Toronto differential delayed the national Law Group salary
compensation proposal from proceeding. On 16 April 2002, Deputy Minister Rosenberg met
with TBS secretary, Frank Claydon, to push for the allowance. Expediting a resolution weighed
heavily on Rosenberg who, after evaluating the Hay Report evidence and the significant wage
disparity caused by the Kaplan award, determined that without the allowance personnel losses
were imminent (even though only a few lawyers left the Toronto office after the decision’s
issuance) and would undermine the DOJ’s mandate in Ontario.531

His support for the

extraordinary payment influenced Claydon to ease established policy and include the Toronto
differential adjustment as part of the Law Group compensation proposal submitted to the
Treasury Board. On 6 June 2002, Rosenberg’s efforts were successful when Treasury Board
ministers approved the DOJ’s salary submission including the Toronto allowance.532 Described
by TBS as the “Toronto Market Competitiveness Allowance” (TMCA), the benefit paid lawyers
in the Toronto office a non-recurring lump sum payment of 8 percent of their base salary as of 31
March 2002. TMCA was open for renewal for the 2002-2003 fiscal year depending on the need
for salary competitiveness with the Ontario MAG.
The TMCA greatly complicated the AJC’s national wage mandate. The granting of the
TMCA legitimized the Hay Report findings, which implicitly dispelled the AJC’s premise for
raising the national salary scale to the level of the Toronto differential (since the role of wages
causing a staffing predicament was localized to only one regional office). TMCA forced the
AJC’s Governing Council members to debate on two separate occasions whether supporting a
regional salary scheme benefitted its constituents533 as the policy fueled the perception of
management favouring the financial well-being of the Toronto office to the exclusion of
531
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others.534 The AJC disliked the TMCA for pitting the financial interests of one group of lawyers
against another and for undermining the AJC’s ability to represent the Toronto office. This latter
point was raised by the AJC’s executive in their 28 February 2003 meeting with Mario Dion and
was addressed by Rosenberg. They received confirmation that the department planned for the
TBS to ask the Treasury Board to renew the allowance since the circumstances responsible for
its introduction did not dissipate within a matter of twelve months.535 In response, the AJC wrote
to the TBS to reiterate its demand for an increased national pay rate at the level of Toronto
differential and to state its opposition to the TMCA by asking for a redistribution of the $2
million expenditure to increase payment of annual performance reviews by 1 percent for lawyers
evaluated at the highest two performance levels.536 Treasury Board ministers denying TMCA’s
renewal for 2003 surprised the DOJ and strained relations between Toronto lawyers and the AJC.
The TMCA’s cessation did not prevent the AJC from continuing to solicit DOJ
management about a return to a single national salary scale at the level of the Toronto
differential. With no legal requirement for the Treasury Board to negotiate with the AJC, its
written advocacy culminated with the AJC’s Submission on Compensation of February 2004,
which was prepared by a study committee and addressed the Law Group compensation plan
expiring on 31 March 2004. Its rhetoric phrased a single national pay scale at the level paid by
the Ontario MAG as a basic principle of AJC compensation policy and as a necessity to address
wage disparity between comparable public sector lawyers based on the principles of interest
arbitration. Private sector lawyers and government appointed judges were identified as relevant
comparators for compensation calculations. The key features of the proposal called for: lockstep progression from LA-1 to LA-2A levels after four years; an annual performance review and
employee assessment increase for 2003-2004; a merger of LA-2A and LA-2B levels to
restructure pay grids in line with Ontario provincial lawyers (as the historically closest wage and
workforce comparator) and to remove arbitrariness in promotions; and adding the same
percentage increase achieved by gains to national salary range to that of the Toronto differential.
The compensation submission did not prevent Treasury Board ministers from approving typical
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economic increases to the non-management Law Group salary ranges of 2.5 percent for 2004 and
of another 2 percent for 2005. However, the compensation submission served another role of
outlining the AJC’s position on wages that it could use to build momentum for its organizing
campaign once new labour legislation became law.

5.4

The AJC’s Campaign for Recognition

5.4.1 Introduction of the PSLRA
The work and eventual recommendations of the Quail Task Force led to Bill C-25, the
PSMA. Rootham observed that the PSMA ignored many of the Fryer Report’s most sweeping
recommendations.537 Fortunately for the AJC, lawmakers followed the Fryer Committee’s
guidance on excluding managerial and confidential employees from labour legislation and
recognized in the PSLRA that all employees under the Act enjoy the freedom to join an employee
organization and participate in its activities.538 On 6 February 2003, President of the TBS and
Member of Parliament responsible for human resources modernization, Lucienne Robillard,
tabled Bill C-25 before the House of Commons. Senior AJC administrator 1 noted that as
various drafts of legislation were completed, the AJC became privy to them and knew that the
statutory prohibition on lawyers unionizing would be removed. The process leading to deexclusion was understood by National Capital Region lawyer 1 as an issue of pragmatism, as she
viewed unionization as a way for Treasury Board to regularize relations with DOJ lawyers. By
contrast, National Capital Region lawyer 2 saw the policy shift as a matter of legality:
I’m sure we had something to do with it, we the lawyers that work inside the department,
inside the cell block we call the “CALS” (Constitution and Administration Law Section).
We have a think tank of these legal brains who analyze the Charter. These people caught
the Charter and we are sure, I’m sure that they had a lot to do with giving advice to
senior managers saying we have a problem here, we discovered something that somehow
we think there’s something wrong with our prohibitions.
On 7 November 2003, the PSMA received Royal Assent.

As a statute intended to be

implemented over stages, the Governor General in Council delayed the establishment and
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coming into effect of the PSLRA and its provisions on bargaining agent certification until 1 April
2005. PSMA’s passage initially allowed the TBS to confirm a relationship with the AJC in
similar fashion to the one enjoyed with the Association of Professional Executives of the Public
Service of Canada, but the probability of competing employee organizations vying to become
certified as bargaining agents forced TBS to rescind the arrangement as of 22 April 2004. 539 A
delayed implementation date allowed many months for interested employee associations and the
DOJ to prepare for the introduction of new labour legislation. DOJ lawyers could also use the
time to consider whether joining a union suited them.

Public sector unions typically conduct organizing drives without employer opposition to
unions, as is common in the private sector.540

Section 48 and 49 of Part 5 of PSLRA’s

transitional provisions set out the certification procedures for DOJ lawyers. DOJ lawyers were
not automatically absorbed into the existing Law Group bargaining unit represented by PIPSC.541
The statutory stipulation mandated that any employee organization applying to the PSLRB to
become certified as a bargaining agent for DOJ lawyers would have to follow the normal course
of procedures and show, in its application, documentary evidence that it enjoyed the support of a
majority of employees within a proposed bargaining unit.542

In this “card check” type
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certification system, the PSLRB recognizes employee organizations who can confirm a
minimum endorsement of “50 percent plus one” among a group of workers.

5.4.2 The Organizing Campaign
Three employee associations vied to represent the DOJ Law Group: FLAG, PIPSC, and
AJC. Each group had their own certification strategy to encourage DOJ lawyers to join. FLAG
reconstituted itself as the Federal Law Officers of the Crown (FLOC) and conducted a
membership drive of lawyers employed at the Toronto office. Over 90 percent of these lawyers
signed up, many of whom opposed inclusion in a national bargaining unit, and assisted the new
organization with a couple of hundred dollars.

On 15 February 2005, FLOC ratified its

constitution.
FLOC’s executive knew that creating a separate bargaining sub-unit from within a larger
occupational Law Group based on the receipt of differential salaries was a difficult case to make.
They prepared for the challenge of setting a legal precedent by retaining the law firm of Paliare
Roland Rosenberg Rothstein LLP and by instructing their counsel to prepare a detailed and
thorough application. Toronto lawyers were prepared to defend their exclusive entitlement to the
differential in court against the AJC as an absolutely vital payment that recognized only their
office operated in a unique labour market, a claim that they believed the Treasury Board would
use to thwart the AJC’s demands for raising the national salary rates to the level of the Ontario
MAG. Ontario Regional Office lawyer 3 explained that the benefit compensated lawyers for
providing exceptional services in a higher-end legal market. He illustrated the point by saying
the calibre of legal work in Toronto attracts a better quality of file handled by a different talent
pool. He views Toronto as the centre of immigration work; it is where advocacy groups
commence their cases; and it is home to big business with resourceful Bay Street lawyers at their
disposal.
The FLOC’s overwhelming popularity in Toronto left PIPSC and AJC to consider
organizing those lawyers employed at the DOJ’s other regional and department legal service unit
offices. PIPSC’s selling point as the preferred union for DOJ lawyers was their history and
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experience in representing other federal government lawyers.543 Despite the sensible message,
PIPSC abandoned its recruitment drive after determining that DOJ lawyers had little interest in
siding with them. This was because, as AJC negotiating team member 2 recalled, the AJC had
surveyed its membership as to who they wanted representing them and found that some 96
percent of those polled voted for “lawyers representing lawyers”.

Other respondents’

observations, communicated during interviews as to why PIPSC stood little chance with their
organizing plans, clarify why the AJC became the logical incumbent for representing DOJ
lawyers. Prairie Regional Office lawyer 1 recalled the AJC winning his membership support.
He backed the AJC because lawyers are professionals with their own special interests, so, for
him, it seemed a natural fit to be represented by an organization of his own people. He did not
recall PIPSC’s campaign materializing in the various offices comprising the Prairie Region. The
absence of another contending employee organization automatically bolstered the AJC’s
viability. Prairie Regional Office lawyer 2 also believed that the AJC understood the important
issues facing lawyers, of which another union would be unfamiliar. She saw this perspective as a
benefit for lawyers once at the bargaining table because a union with better negotiation power is
one that communicates the interests of its members.

As this lawyer did not want to be

commingled in a larger union, it made the AJC the only choice.

Undoubtedly, as a strong national union, PIPSC, had more clout in federal labour
relations than the upstart AJC. Atlantic Region Office lawyer 1 did not doubt that PIPSC offered
quality representation. He realized, though, that he was better off with the AJC for the following
reason:
I thought PIPSC, because of their experience and success with other professions, like the
doctors who got a huge bonus, anyway, I thought they would’ve been able to represent us
quite well. But, I think most people felt we would lose our identity and specialization
within the whole organization.
Other DOJ lawyers also did not see supporting the AJC as involving a trade-off in benefits
between unions, but as a wise choice directed to maintaining an accepted and established
occupational community. National Capital Region lawyer 4 emphasized that being a lawyer
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entails being part of a professional culture, one that a larger union may overlook based on what it
believes is important to the membership:
I think it was definitely a perception that lawyers need to be…and again, this is coming
the perspective of from what I’ve heard from lawyers who were previously represented
by a different association. There was a sense that lawyers needed to be represented by an
association that was familiar with and was looking after lawyer interests, that they
weren’t being lumped together with other professionals in a variety of areas who didn’t
necessarily understand. The person we were talking about before...the fact that lawyers
were subject already to a set of professional obligations, but also other realities about the
work of lawyers and things in the collective agreement about providing robes and things
like that, you know are more easily overlooked when you’re part of a larger association
dealing with a wide variety of employees.
The common belief of these two lawyers was that a specialized bargaining agent restricted to the
DOJ, as well as being a familiar entity, offered a better option than another union despite its
experience representing other lawyers in collective bargaining negotiations with TBS.

Another advantage the AJC possessed, in contrast to the PIPSC, was that it enjoyed an
established membership base comprised of DOJ lawyers. The AJC’s time as a professional
association socialized its members to a common organization with a generally positive
experience, prompting them to continue supporting the AJC and allow it to make good on
securing collective bargaining rights.544

During the certification campaign, current AJC

members maintained their affiliation by signing an application or renewal for membership. They
(and new members) completed a form that authorized the AJC to apply for certification as their
bargaining agent, acknowledging that the AJC was their choice for representation as a bargaining
agent.545 A membership fee of five dollars accompanied the application, which encouraged
broad participation and ensured lawyers signed on their own volition. Voluntary donations from
signees were accepted and used to fund the AJC’s campaign expenses. National Capital Region
lawyer 1 recalled that many lawyers simply dropped off completed membership forms, which
was a tremendous boost.
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As for enlisting undecided lawyers, the AJC engaged in the “low-intensity” organizing
campaign tactics identified by Juravich and Bronfenbrenner of person-to-person contact, large
group meetings, and using union literature.546 The AJC’s network of representatives sitting on
the Governing Council situated key personnel in all regional offices throughout the department,
which allowed them to spread the message of the AJC’s drive. There were also the volunteer
organizers who enrolled new members. National Capital Region lawyer 1 knew of ten or fifteen
“hard core” people involved with organizing lawyers. Recruiters’ experience ranged from easy
to difficult, depending on the audience.

For example, National Capital Region lawyer 1,

solicited lawyers on maternity leaves and achieved good results. National Capital Region lawyer
2 shared his views in candid detail on the importance of demographics when recruiting people:
That was very difficult signing up people. People didn’t want to unionize. People
thought that if they signed up for a union their job was on the line. Some people were
afraid. What we did is we signed up all the “fogie’s,” all the ones that didn’t give a damn
if they put them on the street. They signed. I was one of them. That’s funny because
you’re in a different situation in life. When you’re 25 years old you’ll think about it. But
when you’re in 50’s, if they want to fight we’ll fight it. It’s a very different philosophy.
You’ve been there. You’ve done that. So most young people wouldn’t dare sign. So we
signed up a lot of the old people. Guess what, there’s a lot of older people. They’re the
majority still. So yeah, signing up was not easy, not easy at all and remains difficult
today.
When this same lawyer was asked how the AJC was able to run a successful organizing
campaign, he considered that one’s tenure with the DOJ was a key factor:
The successful drive was caused by the need, by the pain, by the absence of perceived
fairness. Once you’ve been around long enough, maybe five years, then you see it. Then
you say, yeah, this needs to be improved. That was the answer to the problem—
unionization.
The efforts of organizers supplemented President Jetté’s executive campaign of raising the AJC’s
profile to undecided lawyers. Senior AJC administrator 1, a lawyer knowledgeable about the
organizing drive, recognized the importance of Jetté’s work:
We did telephone meetings and informal information sessions—Q & A’s—but I think the
clincher was, after we did that, we got the president to travel across the country from
office to office, do a presentation, indicate what the goals of the union were, highlight the
shortcomings of LOAC, what LOAC had not been able to establish, what we hoped the
546
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union, with the authority and clout of the union could do, that LOAC could not do. And
again, have the president there to answer questions of concern, to canvass the issues that
people felt uncomfortable with and to identify how it would try to resolve conflicts in the
workplace through the union that perhaps had not been successfully done under LOAC.
And that included things like discipline matters, people being placed on probation, risked
being dismissed because of performance issues, heavy-handedness by management on
certain files, those kinds of things, all of which the union could intervene in either to
prepare arguments or to provide for a presentation to somebody who’s being disciplined
and none of those things could properly happen in the LOAC days, because again, there
was no mechanism or structure to address those things.
As a good organizer, Jetté focussed on the traditional issues of grievance procedures and job
security during his meetings, which operated to emphasize the worth of a union to workers.547
The impression of strong leadership channelled through an effective communications
platform, either through print, website, or in-person, raised the perception that the AJC could
satisfy its stated objectives and resonated with the interests of lawyers. The AJC had a strong
communication plan. One of its slogans encouraged lawyers to “Sign up and give us the power
to do more”. In the case of Vancouver Regional Office lawyer 1, the legacy of Treasury Board’s
mismanagement of the Toronto differential raised the AJC’s efficacy in correcting a disliked
policy. Before the AJC’s literature swayed him, this lawyer felt that a union was unnecessary.
The Treasury Board ignoring lawyer demands for addressing the Toronto differential made the
decision all the more easier for him, and other office colleagues, to back the AJC. The AJC may
have lacked a track record of improving wages, but they created a prospect of future success that
outweighed the belief in the Treasury Board reversing its refusal to increase the national salary
rate to the level of Toronto’s. For another Vancouver lawyer, however, supporting the AJC was
about combating the employer in a different forum after the Supreme Court of British Columbia
dismissed the plaintiff lawyers’ case in Babcock:
Well I think so in the sense that if the lawsuit had been successful, then I’m sure there
wouldn’t have been any interest in going to a formal professional association, union type
thing. I think that after the lawsuit was unsuccessful that it was well, what choice do we
have? We have to somehow get to the bargaining table and we didn’t know how to get to
the bargaining table.548
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After roughly eight months of campaigning among non-management DOJ lawyers, the efforts of
the AJC’s cross-country membership drive (with the exception of the Toronto office) netted a
membership of 1,482 lawyers (from a possible 2,500 candidates).549

5.5

Conclusion
This chapter detailed the historical process of LOAC developing from a staff committee

into a professional association to emerging as a front-runner for certification as a union by the
PLSRB. The direction taken by the AJC diverged from the pre-campaign route common in most
workplaces, where either a small group of workers surveys the situation and then enlists a union
to coordinate the organizing campaign, or, a union targets an employer, assesses the level of
employee interest, and then determines whether to launch an organizing drive. 550 For this
reason, the sources of available data were looked at to pinpoint fundamental elements that
accounted for LOAC’s rise as an in-house employee agent capable of assuming a representative
function with respect to both grievances and pay. The Toronto differential was therefore studied
in relation to its origin and eventual catalyst for non-management Beyond LOAC members
generating a popular mandate for becoming a professional association and resolving a source of
employee dissatisfaction at work. When the PSLRA was introduced (the context and details
responsible for DOJ lawyers obtaining recognition under the Act were also presented in this
chapter), the AJC reacted much more like any other prospective union and prepared an
organizing campaign around the core economic issues of pay equity and increase, benefits,
grievances, and promotions that appealed to the interests of various lawyers within the workplace
(who were either existing AJC members or new recruits). These were the advantages lawyers
could potentially receive through collective bargaining if the AJC was certified as their
bargaining agent. Before it was tested on delivering its campaign promises during first contract
negotiations with TBS, though, the AJC first needed to obtain legal status as an employee

defendant from setting rates of pay based on geographical location; for failing to demonstrate unjust enrichment; for
failing to establish that their employment contracts included a term that imposed on Treasury Board an implied duty
to act in good faith; and, finally, for failing to demonstrate that the circumstances of their employment relationship
gave rise to a fiduciary obligation.
549
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organization, so that it could force the employer to the bargaining table. The following chapter
details the outcome of the AJC’s and FLOC’s certification applications before the PSLRB.
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C H A P T E R 6: First Collective Bargain—Long Road Ahead

6.1

Introduction
On 1 April 2005, the Association of Justice Counsel (AJC) and the Federal Law Officers

of the Crown (FLOC) marked the first day of the PSLRA coming into effect by each filing their
Form 1, Application for Certification with the Public Service Labour Relation Board’s (PSLRB)
busy registry office.551 FLOC applied to become certified as the exclusive bargaining agent for a
unit of 315 non-management lawyers and articling students who were employed across Ontario
at the DOJ Toronto, and satellite offices in Brampton, Kitchener, Newmarket and London.
FLOC maintained that its proposed bargaining unit was appropriate as its people shared a
community of interest based on geographical location, litigation emphasis, receipt of the Toronto
differential, and employee wishes, which were demonstrated through the overwhelming evidence
of membership support. By contrast, the AJC vied to become the certified bargaining agent for
all legal officers employed in the DOJ Law Group (except for those who were not employees
within the meaning of subsection 2[1] of the PSLRA) given that all lawyers in its proposed
bargaining unit shared a community of interest and that the unit was consistent with the
occupational group established by the Treasury Board. Registry staff set 11 May 2005 as an
initial closing date for FLOC and AJC to intervene in each others’ matters and as the Treasury
Board’s deadline to reply to both employee organizations’ applications. The date also marked
the minimum time frame the PSLRB allowed the Treasury Board to post copies of the notice to
employees of an application for certification at affected worksites. The notice instructed that
lawyers, who were opposed to the proceedings, to file with the PSLRB a Form 4, Statement of
Opposition.
The Treasury Board replied to FLOC’s application by outlining the unacceptability of its
proposed bargaining unit for excluding other DOJ and the Professional Institute of the Public
Service of Canada (PIPSC) lawyers, which, it argued, disrupted the Law Group occupational
structure. Similarly, the Treasury Board’s response noted that the AJC’s proposed bargaining
unit did not include those lawyers in the bargaining unit represented by PIPSC. Instead, the
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Treasury Board conceded that if the PSLRB established a bargaining unit consisting of DOJ
lawyers, then it should affirm them as part of a single bargaining unit consisting of all employees
of the employer in the Law Group as described in Part I of the Canada Gazette of 27 March
1999.552 This consideration spurred the Treasury Board’s plea for an order revoking the PIPSC’s
certificate as the bargaining agent for the Law Group members outside of the DOJ. Additionally,
it asked the PSLRB for an order declaring that positions in the bargaining unit be excluded for
being managerial and confidential in nature, as pursuant to section 59(1) of the PSLRA. Now
provoked, PIPSC applied for intervener status in the proceedings in order to oppose the Treasury
Board.

With PIPSC’s involvement established, all of the organizations affected by the

certification applications involving DOJ lawyers confirmed their appearances before the PSLRB.
The PSLRB’s case management system moved the multi-party proceeding towards
resolution. On 26 July 2005, both applications for certification, along with the Treasury Board’s
request for a review of the PIPSC’s bargaining unit, were consolidated. On 3 November 2005,
representatives for the parties attended a pre-hearing conference before a Board member so to
learn the order and location of the proceedings. An Amended Notice of Hearing confirmed the
trial dates of November 30th to December 2nd and December 5th to 7th, 2005 at the PSLRB
offices (located on the 7th floor of the C.D. Howe Building in downtown Ottawa). Counsel for
the AJC and FLOC prepared for hearings by requesting, producing, and exchanging books of
documents and exhibits which included the curriculum vitae of two witnesses for the FLOC,
(Christopher Leaflour and Fergus O’Donnel) and a witness for the AJC, (Patrick Jetté). A
PSLRB panel consisting of Chairperson Yvan Tarte, Vice-Chairperson Sylvie Matteau and
Board Member Dan Quigley presided over the proceedings. The trial portion of the hearing
allowed for the litigants to deliver oral argument, enter documents into evidence and examine
witnesses. The PSLRB ordered all four parties to deliver written arguments to it, and each other,
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by 22 December 2005 with replies due by 13 January 2006. The panel reserved its ruling until
28 April 2006, the date of issue for its decision.553

The Board members decided the merits of rival certification applications using section 57
of the PSLRA which outlines the factors the PSLRB considers when determining whether a
group of employees comprise an appropriate bargaining unit. Namely, sub-section 57(3) of the
Act requires the Board to establish bargaining units that are co-extensive with the occupational
group or subgroup created by the employer (unless doing so denies employees within the
proposed unit satisfactory representation). Combined with the Treasury Board’s, AJC’s, and
PIPSC’s support for a bargaining unit of lawyers in the Law Group of which the Treasury Board
is the employer, this statutory provision directed Board members’ attention to the merits of
FLOC’s case. In dismissing the FLOC’s application for certification, but granting the AJC’s, the
Board followed federal labour relations practice of promoting administrative efficiency by
preventing the splintering of members of one occupational group across several different
bargaining units. The Board rejected FLOC’s argument that a Toronto-centric bargaining unit
constituted an occupational subgroup based solely on a pay differential, and that inclusion of its
members in a service-wide bargaining unit would deny them adequate representation. Since the
AJC demonstrated that a majority of lawyers in the workplace wished them to be their
bargaining agent, this allowed the PLSRB to forego a representation vote. Pursuant to section 64
of the PSLRA, the AJC was certified as exclusive bargaining agent and representative for a
bargaining unit consisting of all non-management and non-confidential DOJ lawyers employed
by the Treasury Board in the Law Group. This group also included those lawyers previously
represented by the PIPSC, as the PSLRB annulled its certificate.554
553
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Group certificate to include these two groups of workers within the LA bargaining unit. The PSLRB dutifully
approved the request. See Treasury Board v. Association of Justice Counsel, 2007 PSLRB 84 (CanLII).
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On 1 May 2006, the AJC performed one of its first official duties as agent for the Law
Group bargaining unit by filing notice with the PSLRB that it opted for binding arbitration over
conciliation in the event collective bargaining negotiations with the Treasury Board failed. The
AJC’s purposeful selection of a conservative conflict resolution mechanism was intended to
placate the union membership and modelled the approach of other professional unions.555
National Capital Region lawyer 1 recalled that her colleagues often discussed striking in relation
to provincial Rules of Professional Conduct, thereby giving union representatives a sense of the
bargaining unit members’ tolerance for organized protest. AJC senior administrator 1 expressed
that the union’s approach towards job action was “to get around it:”
When the AJC was organizing lawyers, one of the things that we indicated from the start
is that, should the AJC be determined through the process under the PSLRA to be the sole
bargaining agent for the lawyers’ group, that our method of dispute resolution would be
negotiation-arbitration and not conciliation-strike. One of the reasons we did that is
because we realized very early on—and every lawyer understood that—that if we are in a
dispute resolution mode where strike is one of the options for the resolution of an
impasse, that striking would place many lawyers in an ethical dilemma. So striking by
professionals is not unheard of, as only striking by legal professionals is not unheard of.
But you have to take appropriate steps when you strike to make sure that your obligations
to the client are not jeopardized. But that would be if you were in a situation where strike
was your dispute resolution mode. That’s not the AJC’s mode right now. So we’re
advancing the interests of the LA Group through collective bargaining, but in such a way
that we are not in the strike context; we’re in the negotiation-arbitration context.
The chosen protocol for resolving mass employee grievance, therefore, allowed the AJC to
circumvent a tough-to-implement alternative that would have divided bargaining unit members,
like former Ontario Regional Office lawyer 2, who disliked: “the union is going to tell me when I
can come to work, whether I have to go on strike, whether I have to work to rule—etcetera,
etcetera. No, no, no, no, no! It’s like telling a doctor work to rule. No, it just doesn’t fit.” This
practitioner’s discomfort towards a group mentality exhibits a lawyer’s trait of avoiding conflict
of interest situations by exercising independent discretion. The AJC’s leadership did not want to
incite dissension amongst union members with less extreme remedies being available, much less
than pursue a course of action that deviated from third-party arbitration as one of its selling
points for becoming a professional association.
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Despite section 106 of the PSLRA imposing an obligation on the union and employer to
bargain in good faith and exert every reasonable effort to enter into an agreement, the AJC’s
preference for arbitration expressed their realization that their first contract negotiations could
break down and exhaust mediation. A statutory duty to bargain in good faith, of course, does not
assure negotiations produce a labour contract. At least theoretically, if the collective bargaining
reached an impasse, the arbitration could counterweigh the Treasury Board’s intractability on
contested terms and conditions of employment by empowering an arbitrator to decide on their
reasonableness. The October 2000 Kaplan award proved that interest arbitration could yield
significant wage increases for Ontario government lawyers from an obstinate provincial
employer.

With the process of collective bargaining dispute resolution resolved, on 10 May 2006,
President Jetté wrote to the Executive Director of the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat
(TBS) (which represents the Treasury Board in collective bargaining) and provided Hélène
Laurendeau with notice that the AJC had initiated collective bargaining. The letter thrust the
AJC into the novel position of replacing DOJ management as the direct negotiator with TBS
with respect to the terms and conditions of employment covering DOJ lawyers. The AJC had a
clean slate on which to improve the employment contract; however, it remained unclear whether
the union’s gains would come at the expense of management prerogatives. In any situation,
achieving a freely negotiated, first collective agreement is a complicated and messy process, and
the AJC’s accomplishment was potentially overshadowed by the agreement being birthed from a
polarized union-management relationship. Ideally, the first collective agreement establishes a
foundation for future expectations long after its expiry,556 and that as the bargaining relationship
matures the antagonism surrounding a first agreement may lessen and give way to greater
collaboration between the contractual parties. This trajectory, unfortunately, is not guaranteed.
One matter of certainty was that many of the AJC’s negotiating team delegates had high
expectations heading into collective bargaining as illustrated by member 5’s enthusiasm: “And
we just wanted...the moon. I mean we wanted the cheese, the whole kit and caboodle that we
worked on. And we wanted lots more of these things and lots of that and better language on
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this.” They were naturally confident in their abilities to capitalize on opportunities for an
employment contract moulded by collective bargaining.

The purpose of this chapter, then, is to detail the process by which the AJC and the
Treasury Board reached their first collective bargain. The analysis is presented as a narrative
documentary, which is a format used in case studies in order to portray situations through
illustrative descriptions of key events.557 As members of the AJC’s negotiating team were focal
actors during labour contract negotiations, they were interviewed for their participant
perspectives.

Their personal recollections and perceptions along with evidence from

documentary sources, provide a phenomenological and empirical referent for identifying the
actors, actions, and consequences associated with appointing negotiating team members;
solidifying a bargaining strategy; exchanging bargaining proposals; meetings; bargaining
impasse; demonstrations; political lobbying; first contract arbitration; and judicial intervention.
All of these elements comprise a linear sequence of actions taken in the AJC’s collective
bargaining experience. When tied together, these events create an account that argues the AJC
negotiated a first collective agreement in a contested and mediated model, which resulted in
arbitration and Charter litigation over wage restraint legislation. This legislation limited the
salary gains of the Law Group bargaining unit to roughly the level of inflation over the five-year
term of their first collective agreement.

6.2

Collective Bargaining Phase 1: Preparation

6.2.1 Assembling a Negotiating Team
After confirming the union’s intent to enter collective bargaining, Jetté’s priorities over
the summer months of 2006 involved coordinating bargaining session dates with TBS,
assembling a negotiating team and solidifying a bargaining agenda. He met with the AJC’s
executive to discuss staffing the negotiating team with people demonstrative of interorganizational diversity. Lawyers drawn from different regional offices, who understood the
interests of their local constituents, ensured the geographical diversity of the team as well the
need for bilingual representation. The AJC also included a cross-section of male and female
lawyers of different ages and Law Group classification stages.
557
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representation, the negotiating team members, each with their different legal specialties, could
best assess the impact of TBS proposals on a variety of practice areas and recommend counterproposals that were more reasonable to the interests of lawyers occupying similar positions.

Bargaining unit members applied to fill spots on the negotiating team.

Jetté, in

conjunction with other AJC executives, selected eleven members from the LA-1 to LA-2B ranks.
One candidate was selected from each of the Atlantic, Northern, Quebec, Prairie and British
Columbia Regions, and two members from the Ontario Region were added to the committee.
The National Capital Region put forward four representatives. At a Governing Council meeting
of October 2006, negotiating team member 5 recalled features of the assignment that would
discourage all but the most interested recruit. She explained that the mystique of the negotiating
team solidified her interest in the job:
Patrick made it clear that we didn’t know going into it whether we would be on a without
pay basis or not which could result in some people, going without some part of their
regular salary for some time because we didn’t even know at that point whether the AJC
could carry us or not. So, you were effectively, if you were interested in possibly
volunteering, to do this for free, and also committing your time. We didn’t know going
into it how long these sessions would take. We didn’t know how long you could be
involved in them. We had visions of these, crazy all-nighters, week-on-end sort of thing.
And so you had to be willing to commit your energy, your time and possibly your money
to this endeavour on a go-forward basis. And I thought it sounded marvelous, so I put
my name forward.
Other lawyers committed to the union negotiating team for different reasons. Jetté, for his part,
as AJC president, was an ex officio member of all committees.558 Negotiating team member 3
felt compelled to join the negotiating team after no one else from their office displayed any
interest in the post. The two representative positions on the negotiating team reserved for
Ontario Region afforded a place for a member of FLOC’s contingent to participate and keep an
eye on the AJC’s high-level dealings. Overall, the AJC’s negotiating team formed an eclectic
group.

Involvement with the negotiating team meant an indeterminate time commitment for the
volunteers. Appendix B of an interim agreement dated 7 November 2006 granted the AJC
negotiating team members leave to attend preparatory and contract negotiating sessions, albeit
558
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without pay.559 Negotiating team members still needed to fulfill their daily job duties and their
workloads grew because of the additional responsibilities imposed on them by assisting the
union. Negotiating team member 4 noted that the time involved in preparing for negotiations
was not compensated, yet there was so much to accomplish. He and another negotiating team
member likened their involvement on the union committee as working “two jobs” or performing
“double duty”. The AJC’s negotiating team had to spend time identifying bargaining priorities,
determining the bargaining strategy, and preparing bargaining proposals. Despite the additional
workload, negotiating team members flattened the learning curve of bargaining preparations by
leveraging their skills developed from practice and motivation to climb what remained.
The negotiating team’s importance justified forming an auxiliary committee.

The

Negotiation Advisory Committee was a forum that offered the negotiating team a breadth of
additional perspectives on the conduct of negotiations. Negotiating team member 1 explained
that this special committee operated to:
Give even more of a regional spread and representation from different offices, and there
were all of as many as eight of nine people on it. It was a group to funnel messages and
tell things to the negotiation team itself, to drop ideas and say what we think should be
important or what shouldn’t be important; so, like a committee that fed into the
negotiation team.560
Members of the negotiating team knew of the critical assignment bestowed upon them as well as
them satisfying a vital role in the AJC’s democratic governance by serving on one of the several
sub-committees that were tasked with handling union business. The negotiating team was
accountable to the union’s decision-makers through the AJC’s Executive Committee and
Governing Council.
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Negotiating team members reported to the AJC’s Executive Committee which consists of
seven officers elected by the AJC’s Governing Council.561 The Executive Committee oversees
the AJC’s day-to-day administration between meetings of Governing Council—the AJC’s ruling
and managing body.562 Members of the Governing Council assemble at least four times annually
either in person or through audio/video conferencing, to conduct directorial duties, regulate
internal affairs, and determine policies.563

Representatives from National Capital, Ontario,

British Columbia, Quebec, Atlantic, Edmonton, Calgary, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Yukon,
Northwest Territory, and Nunavut Regions comprise the assembly. Clause 8.3 of the 2006 AJC
Constitution allotted each regional office to appoint one member to Governing Council for every
one hundred lawyers.564 The large cluster of lawyers working within the Ottawa area requires a
special formula for calculating the council member representation for the National Capital
Region. The distribution of positions on the Governing Council allows for proportionate
geographic representation of bargaining unit members. When the PSLRB certified the AJC as
bargaining agent, its Governing Council consisted of forty-three members, twenty-two of whom
were drawn from the National Capital Region.565 The AJC’s governance structure was far more
democratic and purposefully arranged to create greater and varied executive input than LOAC’s
previous one representative limit from each of the regional offices.

Given the task at hand for the new organization, the issue of funding was a priority before
collective bargaining started. A significant financial worry was lifted for the AJC when it
attained institutional stability with union security.

Appendix C of the November Interim

Agreement instituted the Rand Formula. Whether a card-carrying member of the AJC or not, the
employer deducted a sum equal to the amount of membership dues from all employees in the
Law Group bargaining unit as a condition of employment. That amount was outlined by section
6.2 of the 2006 AJC Constitution, which quantified membership dues as a deduction of 0.75
561
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percent of annual salary. The union arranged for dues deduction to begin on 1 November 2006,
but the check-off was not implemented until 10 January 2007. For lawyers who voluntarily paid
annual dues in 2004 to 2006 and prior to the AJC’s certification, the AJC’s by-laws entitled them
to a dues holiday equivalent to 133.33 percent of amounts paid. Now in control of a steady flow
of income, the AJC could defray lines of credit that kept the organization afloat while mustering
the finances to pay for and weather an unknown end to negotiations.

6.2.2 Finalizing a Negotiating Strategy
The AJC followed general union practice of soliciting bargaining unit members’ views on
priorities for negotiations through a survey.566 Participation by lawyers was highly encouraged,
and they were invited to continue adding their feedback afterwards through e-mails and phone
calls to regional Governing Council representatives. The scope of employee demands identified
by survey findings illustrated the many complaints about existing work conditions and terms of
employment. Having assembled a laundry list of potential bargaining considerations, the AJC’s
executive consulted their legal counsel to winnow employee demands. Some requests identified
by respondents were unattainable. Section 113 of the PSLRA restricts the scope of bargaining
issues and sets limits on what negotiations cover. The hiring, assigning, evaluating and dismissal
of positions and the control of pensions and workers’ compensation are handled by other
legislation regulating the administration of the federal public service (and are therefore excluded
from a collective agreement). Other concerns identified by the survey related to benefits covered
by directives issued by the National Joint Council.567

Issues such as wages, working conditions, and overtime entitlement are addressed in
federal public service collective bargaining negotiations. In particular, the focus of the AJC’s
membership on the topic of wages was clear: they identified salary parity with Ontario Crown
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lawyers as their primary monetary issue.568 They further highlighted the non-monetary policies
of annual leave, alternative work arrangements and representation in employee discipline as
other key matters of concern. Part of the bundle of professional obligations concerning the
bargaining unit involved maintaining offices with closed doors as an extension of solicitor-client
privilege, ongoing education and training opportunities, reimbursement for lawyer expenses, and
timekeeping.569 The scope of the Law Group bargaining unit’s demands followed Kleingartner’s
findings that public sector professionals are inclined to seek professional goals associated with
work responsibilities as part of their call for better pay and working conditions.570 After these
bargaining priorities were short-listed, the majority opinion of the negotiating team members
determined the priority demands received.
Before the start of formal collective bargaining, the AJC’s negotiating team finalized
their strategy for pursuing an agreement that balanced employee calls for workplace equity and
better wages with employer demands for efficiencies that warranted the granting of benefits.
The AJC considered either to adopt and tidy the PIPSC agreement or seek a more tailored and
distinct product. Their scrutiny of the PIPSC contract, and of the collective bargains covering
other public sector lawyers, led them to take the latter option. While a few standard articles from
the PIPSC agreement would resolve uncomplicated matters, the stock language and generic
terms and conditions of employment provided by the PIPSC’s compact mismatched the
provisions needed for the more comprehensive agreement sought by the negotiating team. In
contrast, TBS considered the PIPSC collective agreement that expired on 28 February 2006 as its
reference point, which reflected a conventional approach of using comparative agreements to set
a negotiating position.571 The precedent offered TBS’s negotiators a model that was consistent
with the reasonable expectations of past Law Group bargaining units and had the advantage of a
contract with uniform articles found in collective agreements covering other federal public
service workers.572 The AJC’s negotiating strategy was a calculated gamble, but one they
568
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believed would convince a seasoned opponent that their principled demands could not be
accommodated by a collective agreement developed for a group of one hundred or so lawyers
outside of the DOJ. With a resolved bargaining agenda in place, the AJC negotiating team
foresaw a collective agreement that addressed the interests of bargaining unit members and,
therefore, it was the one to best recommend as a good deal once completed.

6. 3

Collective Bargaining Phase 2: Negotiations

6.3.1 Negotiating Team Meetings: Meeting Bargaining Conventions
The AJC’s negotiating team and TBS representatives met in Ottawa on 22-23 November
2006 to commence an inaugural round of negotiations. Toronto labour counsel, Steven Barrett
represented the AJC at the bargaining table.573

TBS’s negotiating committee included its

Director of Collective Bargaining Operations, another negotiator, and representatives from the
DOJ, Public Prosecution Service of Canada, and Veterans Affairs.574 The parties met and
exchanged bargaining proposals. The AJC’s negotiating team addressed salary increases as a
bargaining priority, but was told that non-monetary proposals would be addressed first. This
order of proceedings is typical in labour contract negotiations since agreeing to matters of less
significance allows the parties to achieve initial gains, and generate an atmosphere of progress
before broaching controversial terms.575
meetings for 23-25 January 2007.

The parties planned a second set of negotiating

More dates were arranged for 20-22 February 2007 in

Montreal, followed by additional sittings scheduled for April and June of 2007.
When lawyering for the federal government, the interests of the AJC’s negotiating team
members were aligned solely with those of the employer. Now, their partisanship had shifted to
representing bargaining unit members in order to get them the best deal possible. To participate
in negotiations, members of the AJC’s negotiating team reproduced bargaining conventions.
Preparatory discussions were held prior to bargaining sessions with the AJC’s lawyer, and,
afterwards, the negotiating team members reviewed the plan for future meetings.
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Representatives formed a cohesive group and they assumed particular roles. On this point, AJC
negotiating team member 4 recalled his specific involvement during bargaining sessions:
We did caucus a lot to try to make sure we were not on different pages to try to be
together. My role, I tended not to speak too much, but I sat there and I listened carefully
and I would sort of pipe in at strategic times. I think some members might remember that
I sort of played the role of a second sober thought, is one way to put it.
The efforts of individual negotiating team members bolstered the collective capacities of the
group. As bargaining sessions progressed, Jetté asked negotiating team colleagues to conduct
different tasks and the AJC’s negotiating team members enjoyed empowering responsibilities.
Bargaining sessions were held in camera, but through the recollection of negotiating team
member 2, it is possible to create a picture of how their preparation translated to action at the
bargaining table:
I was actively involved in all of the negotiations. I was active at the table and we all had
a number of things that we did. We did research on particular and specific areas. We
were asked to speak at certain times at the negotiation table about certain topics. So if
you can imagine the contract was very large and there were a number of things that
needed to be looked at. So there were comparisons that were done to other contracts,
there were cross-country comparisons done with respect to salaries, with respect to work,
and different employment situations. All of those comparisons needed to be looked at.
We were involved dealing directly, one-on-one with the lawyers that were representing
us.
During the negotiation sessions between January and April of 2007, the parties discussed
grievance procedures, education, training and career development for lawyers, vacation carryover, sick leave advances, use of video surveillance, court clothing entitlements, leave for union
representatives and the AJC President, union dues deduction for employees in acting positions,
and the no discrimination clause.576 While the AJC’s envoys came to every negotiating session
to argue their bargaining proposals, in terms of movement towards a completed collective
agreement there were few advances that the AJC could report to the bargaining unit.

6.3.2 Negotiating Impasse Sets In
Despite the efforts of a dedicated AJC negotiating team, obstacles to a settlement
between the parties emerged once the meetings began dealing with specific details.

The

employer’s immobile position towards key union demands on monetary and non-monetary
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proposals became increasingly apparent to AJC negotiating team members after observing
disciplined conduct from TBS’s negotiators. Members of the negotiating team perceived that
their counterparts were intentionally stalling negotiations, which created doubt as to whether
TBS’s representatives even possessed bargaining authority. Negotiating team member 4 made
sense of this particular bargaining conduct as follows:
The people who make the decisions are not the people who are at the negotiating tables.
It’s always the messenger that gets sent out and they always have to keep checking with
their masters. That’s what my colleagues have learned from the experience of
negotiating. They thought they could go in and just basically out-lawyer the other side
and they just got hit with a wall.
As the passage alludes to, TBS’s practice of subjecting proposals and counterproposals for
consideration to higher chains of management authority chilled the negotiating dynamic of giveand-take necessary for spontaneous compromise on important articles. Katz, Kochan and Colvin
identify inadequate authority of negotiators as evidence of typical surface bargaining that
amplifies opportunities for impasse and, as such, is common practice in public sector
negotiations.577 Other employer inactions during the bargaining process made AJC negotiating
team members wonder if there was the goodwill necessary for meaningful discussions. On more
than one occasion, TBS was unprepared at meetings, which hampered a day or two of bargaining
progress. The AJC collective bargaining update of August 2007 captured the negotiating team’s
growing unease with TBS’s tactics.

The document revealed that TBS wanted to replicate

provisions of the PIPSC agreement, exhibited a general stubbornness to share decision-making
powers over key employment terms and practices that predated collective bargaining, and did not
satisfy commitments to produce information or counter-proposals prior to bargaining sessions.578
The AJC considered these attitudes and behaviours of TBS as impediments to negotiations.

For some AJC negotiating team members, their expectations for a successful negotiated
settlement progressively lowered as a result of TBS’s conduct. It became apparent to negotiating
team member 2 that the meetings had lost their usefulness. The following passage captures the
mixed motives she believed TBS had for continuing collective bargaining and the trouble that
this posed for the AJC:
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Much of those meetings were completely unproductive. And if they were, there were
certainly questions about whether the Treasury Board was trying to in fact break us where
we weren’t making any progress on really any of the issues even though we were in
agreement on many basic things; just dragging the meetings out. But I’ll tell you, this
was not a two-way negotiation. This was a one-way negotiation with goodwill and good
faith on the union’s side, really just wanting to get to some solution and to work through
solutions. And Treasury Board just taking unreasonable positions and not really having
discussions with us in any meaningful and reasonable way.
The aloofness of the employer’s agents towards collective bargaining motivated the AJC
negotiating team members’ efforts to extend nuanced understanding about union proposals to aid
in advancing discussions. Union negotiating team member 4 reported the following surprise as a
result of one such attempt:
It arose during the course of negotiations. Treasury Board looked at lawyers as being just
another category. I remember directly the negotiator for Treasury Board asking, “Why
are you so different from CR4s or clerical workers or other professionals, like physicians
or pilots”? And we tried to respond in our ignorance that we were unique but we were
sort of coming up flat against the Treasury Board notion that you were not different from
other job categories. So, if we were able to convince that negotiator we would have
definitely had a different outcome from what we did.
In a similar vein, negotiating team member 5 discovered that the employer maintained preconceptions about DOJ lawyers bargaining collectively.

The gap widening between her

expectations for the negotiations and the TBS’s actual tendencies led her to the following
conclusion:
Well, the difficulty of course was that we didn’t understand and appreciate the approach
that the Treasury Board took with everybody in negotiations. Which is, and they actually
said it to us in one of our sessions with them, that you are not special, you are not
different, you are not unique even if you are lawyers. You are still public servants and
you are governed by a collective agreement that we will impose on you basically just like
we do on CAPE or PSAC and all the other public servants of the federal government.
We really went in there thinking they have to appreciate how different we are because we
are their lawyers. And I don’t think we really appreciated that until quite a ways, I mean
almost at the end I think it sunk in that no, they really didn’t think we were different.
The respondent’s perception of the negotiations changed because of TBS’s position: a coalition
of lawyers did not confer greater bargaining authority or power. Her belief that collective
bargaining could compel the employer to reward lawyers for their importance to the department
was dashed.

This was an unexpected bargaining interaction for her that was made more

profound by a forced change in awareness about the standing of lawyers.
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By pursuing a broad spectrum of employment issues, the AJC may have unwittingly
succumbed to TBS’s negotiating ploy—or at least one member of the AJC’s negotiating team
thought so. In particular, she believed the redirected emphasis on non-monetary priorities may
have depleted negotiating capacities over monetary ones. Negotiating team member 3 explained
her view by saying:
Well, I had different view than many of the members of the bargaining team and my view
didn’t prevail. My view was that the real issue to be addressed should be money. That’s
really what people signed up for. They weren’t happy as you said because provincially
employed lawyers were making more money. There was perceived unfairness. So the
real impetus, at least in my region, was the bottom line, which was compensation,
monetary compensation.
Apparently, in some of the other regions, this is just that I’d heard, maybe they weren’t so
unhappy about monetary compensation because you’re being paid relatively well. So,
you might have some other concerns about how many sick-leave days am I going to get?
So there was some other issues and many, many, other issues. I mean it got down to the
minutia of how many court shirts could you buy for the year? Could you have a cellphone paid for?
It just got into every single area and it seems that many in the bargaining unit wanted to
re-invent the wheel from the beginning and have a very comprehensive first agreement
where every issue was argued between the AJC and the management committee and not
just compensation. Whereas my view was why don’t we just sort of agree that all the
terms and conditions as status quo, accept all of them that we’ve been living with and just
say the real issue is money. And that’s not what happened.
Bargaining a long list of demands, article by article, seemed to have surprised the employer’s
negotiators. As TBS’s chief negotiator noted, the union’s position that all terms and conditions
were open to negotiation, as well as the rejection of many standard articles contained in other
collective bargains in the federal public service, led to proposals on most, if not all, aspects of the
employment arrangement.579 As a result, the greater number of demands raised, the more
interests needed to be discussed during meetings, which in themselves only allowed for a small
window of opportunity to settle matters face-to-face.
Without question, the AJC’s negotiating team faced a steep and uphill struggle in having
TBS accept its salary and overtime bargaining demands. The AJC’s compensation proposal of
2004 provided the basis for requesting salary gains in the amount of 35 percent for the LA-1 and
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LA-3B pay scales, 40 percent for the LA-3A pay scale and a 45 percent pay increase for a
merged LA-2 level pay scale.580 As negotiating team member 1 relayed: “We were seeking
parity with Ontario and we wanted to make a lot of headway in that regard. We probably would
have settled for something shorter but that was the number one goal.” The AJC`s bargaining
chip was that the wages paid to federal government lawyers were grossly undervalued and
uncompetitive due to the legislative freezes of the 1990s and yearly economic advances of
roughly 2.5 percent for LA-1 and LA-2A lawyers thereafter. During bargaining, the AJC’s
negotiating team could point to the health of the Canadian economy as a factor justifying wage
demands, and, perceptively, the Treasury Board’s ability to pay fairly. Canada’s economy and
finances were unusually strong in 2005-2006, with the federal government projected to enjoy an
$8 billion budget surplus.581 The union anticipated that a high starting position on wages would
at least stir some compromise.

Instead, the employer’s opening proposal denied overtime

entitlement582 and was silent on a salary proposal.583
It became obvious that the TBS was simply not interested in meeting the AJC’s wage
demands and moving towards what Chaykowski calls a “zone of agreement” and the common
ground necessary for agreement.584 Instead, settling wage and overtime demands started as and
remained a battle of wills between bargaining camps that favoured the much stronger Treasury
Board. According to negotiating team member 4: “We knew the Treasury Board was not going
to agree with us, especially with—it turns out—salary demands being quite high, according to
Treasury Board. So there was no backing down from that position throughout. It was quite
consistent from day one.”

The AJC’s salary proposal typified distributive bargaining by

attempting to secure as high as a wage increase as possible.585 If successful, it would alter the
employer’s practice of benchmarking DOJ salaries to a national median wage by replacing it
with the norm the province of Ontario paid its lawyers. Faced with this proposition, the TBS’s
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negotiators were content with a strategy that held the AJC’s wage demands in check. For the
first seventeen months of bargaining, TBS stalled on delivering a counterproposal to the AJC’s
salary demands, which delayed the costing out of other monetary and non-monetary proposals.
Negotiating team member 1 recounts his view on TBS’s stand towards salary rate increases:
We were really trying to negotiate our own agreement and not just sort of add to the one
already in place. As well, I’m reading into the mind of the other side, but Treasury Board
very much wants to not allow our salaries to go up and to fight us tooth and nail to ensure
that didn’t happen. The reason why I say that is there’s this huge document about the
salaries in the federal public service. And it lays out the whole structure of how it all
works. They would sort of line us up against a certain level of executives and say, okay
this is what these guys’ salaries should be. That’s the way they set our salaries before.
So the long and the short of it is if we were to get a significant pay increase, like the 30 or
40 percent we were seeking to get parity with Ontario that would put immense pressure
on the entire upper part of the triangle of the central public service. Because they all will
say, hey wait a minute here, in our big graph here these guys are equivalent and now they
make 30 percent more than us, so give us all a 30 percent pay increase. I think that was
an immense barrier to us.
The guideline this negotiating team member may have had in mind was the Treasury Board’s
Policy Framework for the Management of Compensation (Employer’s Policy Framework),
which outlined specific principles and methodology for managing compensation in the federal
civil service.

The framework dictated that wage decisions for occupational groups are

determined by external comparability, internal relativity, affordability and individual/group
performance.586 The employer saw the principles of the Framework on Compensation as an
objective standard that demonstrated that compensation for the Law Group was fairly sufficient
as it stood and the AJC wage demands were wholly unreasonable.587

At the close of negotiations on 26 September 2007, the slow progress of discussions
alarmed both the union and the employer, forcing them to consider mediation. On 15 October
2007, the AJC and TBS decided on third-party mediation through the PSLRB. The first of
several meetings with noted labour arbitrator Kevin Burkett proceeded with one-day sessions on
14 November and 19 December 2007, with mediation continuing on 19 and 20 January 2008.
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Sessions facilitated resolution of a few non-monetary matters.588 At the third mediation meeting
of 29 March 2008, the AJC received TBS’s proposal on compensation. The offer proposed
adopting standard language for generic terms and conditions of employment as necessary, an
annual economic increase to salary ranges of 1.5 percent over three to four years, retroactive to
April 2006, and rejecting any change to the pay structure.589 TBS’s proposal struck a chord with
the AJC’s executive: they characterized the tender as an offer designed for rejection.
TBS’s unsatisfactory offer marked an end to conventional negotiations. In retrospect,
negotiations between the AJC and TBS faltered because expectations for a first collective
agreement prevented the two parties from yielding concessions on chief monetary and nonmonetary proposals. Negotiating positions started far apart and remained that way. The AJC
attempted to craft a contract responsive to the financial, professional, and practical demands of
bargaining unit members that conflicted with the TBS plan for re-circulating the PIPSC
agreement. TBS engaged in positional bargaining through its inaction on numerous key article
proposals, which consumed the limited meeting time for resolving the extensive issues, while
subtly informing the AJC that wages were non-negotiable. With bargaining at a standstill, the
AJC realized that it had to initiate binding arbitration through the PSLRB.

The AJC could

satisfy the requirement of sub-section 135(b) of the PSLRA that it had bargained in good faith, as
well as meet the Act’s other condition under sub-section 137(2) that it negotiated sufficiently and
seriously with respect to the matters in dispute, but still could not reach agreement with TBS.
The parties disagreed over all monetary issues and only minimal progress was made on key nonmonetary matters of closed doors, time keeping, and access to education and training.

6. 4

The Dispute Goes Public: Federal Lawyers Deserve Justice
The aborted negotiations did not undermine the credibility of either the AJC or TBS too

much because neither party conceded defeat at the bargaining table. The possibility of an
independent arbitration board imposing terms and conditions carried incentives for both sides to
continue to refine and settle matters they preferred not to leave to third-party resolution. An
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arbitration board, though, first needed to be struck that consisted of either a single member by
agreement of the parties, or, at the request of either group, a tripartite committee consisting of a
chairperson and one representative each appointed by the union and employer. 590 Even in the
process of selecting a chair for the arbitration board, the TBS and AJC disagreed. This impasse
illustrated the skepticism the union and employer had in the judgment of the other, which was
likely exacerbated by the protracted negotiations. The AJC preferred an impartial arbitrator
selected by the parties or through an independent procedure; the TBS wanted a chair who was
familiar with collective bargaining in the federal public service.591 An arbitrator being selected
by the PSLRB’s chairperson disquieted the AJC because that position was tied to a Governor in
Council appointment.

With no deadline looming for reaching and entering a first collective agreement or the
rendering of an arbitral award, the AJC was saddled with managing the expectations of a
bargaining unit of intelligent professionals who were desirous of a contract with significant
salary increases, but who instead saw their wages frozen as of May 2006 by the start of collective
bargaining. As could be expected with a large and diverse group spread across Canada, member
interest in the union ranged from an understanding majority to an impatient minority. Sporadic
negotiation sessions that yielded marginal progress created an information vacuum and
management dilemma for the AJC. The problem of satiating bargaining unit member curiosity
in collective bargaining was compromised by the union and employer agreeing to negotiate in
confidence and on legal advice received by the AJC that instructed them to keep the contents of
negotiations private. For these reasons, the AJC’s release of information bulletins regarding
bargaining sessions was limited, and, when published, reported redacted news.

The informational needs of a bargaining unit new to the tribulations of first collective
agreement negotiations became apparent to negotiating team members who were singled out by
office colleagues as beacons for information. Negotiating team members 2 and 4 tried to fill the
information void by holding meetings to inform attendees about negotiations without, of course,
revealing prohibited details. Negotiating team member 1 recalled dealing with lawyers telling
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him how to advance negotiations. He found informing inquisitive colleagues using ambiguities
challenging, and reveals the feeling as follows:
We tried to keep the word out there that we’re working. But part of the problem also is
that lawyers are kind of difficult clients. Many of them are extremely supportive,
wonderful, but you get a real mix. And with lawyers, when someone has a disagreement,
doesn’t like a particular way something is going, we’re trained to be fairly vocal about it.
We put the strongest argument we can to somebody to say, hey fix this problem—I don’t
like this. And so, from a perspective of somebody on the negotiating team when you get
these e-mails or phone calls they can be really intimidating in a way because they’re
really well put. Even though you know it’s not going to be that we’ll turn and do
whatever this person is saying. Still, they do a good job of telling us what they think.
And that puts a lot of pressure on you.
So, the other thing is that they have high expectations. Not that many federal lawyers
deal with labour relations law. And so a lot of them completely misunderstood how the
process works and how much you can sort of drive the process from the side of the union.
In other words, they thought we should be bringing all these amazing applications in to
the board to do this and to do that and force the employer to speed up everything. And
meanwhile the advice we were getting from our lawyers was no, this is the way it
works—it’s a slow process. If we rush off to the board with that we’ll just get shot back.
It’ll slow things down even more, you shouldn’t do that. So, we were kind of between a
rock and a hard place.
This description illustrates that lay bargaining unit members expressed opinions without full
knowledge of the dispute resolution procedures of collective bargaining. Three negotiating team
members conceded that the AJC did not inform the membership as early, and with enough
information as they could have. The slow, filtered information left lawyers less apprised about
the bargaining process and developments; this was the uneasy course the AJC initially took to
prevent the errant disclosure of information that could inadvertently jeopardize strategic
positions on contract terms.592
The union’s leadership sensed that with little to tout and show about negotiations, the
transition to arbitration unnerved the constituency. At the time, bargaining unit morale was
“very low” according to negotiating team member 2. The AJC faced a bargaining unit full of
frustrated members who complained about the length of negotiations and hold-up in receiving
economic increases, disapproved of the wait in pursuing arbitration to determine salary increases,
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and questioned why salaries were not the only focus for negotiations.593 Further impediments
and delay in arbitration threatened to raise the bargaining unit’s perception of the AJC’s
weakness. Faced with an imminent problem that, if left unattended, could unravel the union’s
legitimacy, negotiating team member 5 spoke about the AJC’s idea for a workable solution: “Our
members were mad as hell and we tried to think of something to do that would help. You, know,
sort of re-energize them and bring more of a positive collegiality, if you will; or, a positive group
mentality.” The AJC’s leadership mulled a campaign to heighten employee solidarity. One
theme of the effort was to hold the Treasury Board accountable for the economic hardships
caused by low pay rates. Another theme was to awaken the bargaining unit to the employer’s
role in undermining the completion of a freely negotiated collective agreement. In a way, a
united expression of employee discontent would demonstrate the bargaining unit to be an active
group involved in, and concerned with, the determination of a speedy and fair arbitrated
resolution. After careful deliberation, the union’s leadership adopted the slogan of “Federal
Lawyers Deserve Justice” to capture the AJC’s cause.

News of the campaign circulated

throughout regional offices on memorandums, stickers, and buttons. Naturally, the strength of
the campaign depended on bargaining unit members buying into the idea.
On 13 May 2008, the “Federal Lawyers Deserve Justice” campaign went public. Patrick
Jetté planned an outdoor brown-bag luncheon between 12:00 and 1:00 p.m. in the courtyard of
DOJ headquarters located at the East Memorial Building on Wellington near the corner of Kent
Street in downtown Ottawa. Every AJC member in the NCR was invited to the luncheon as was
Justice Minister Rob Nicholson and Treasury Board president Vic Toews. Bargaining unit
members in regional offices who obviously could not attend the luncheon were asked to display
their support by posting stickers and wearing blue buttons at work that day. Jetté planned to
address the audience on the state of first contract negotiations, and, hopefully, achieve some
headway in resolving their dispute with TBS. Negotiating team member 1 spoke of advice
received that involved other federal public employees faring well once their labour dispute with
the government garnered publicity. Particularly, negotiating team member 2 recalled talk about
how financial administrators silently paraded on Parliament with pencils in the air and achieved
their goal of a raise shortly after their demonstration.
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Jetté and the other lawyer attendees were dressed in business attire and totting empty blue
legal size folders, distinguishing them from other protestors, which, at that time, included
demonstrators denouncing Canada’s military intervention in Afghanistan.

An oversize white

placard in front of, and adjacent to a plaque of Henriette Bourque, (the first female lawyer
employed by Department of Justice), created a focal point for Jetté’s speech. The union sign
featuring the bilingual motto “federal lawyers deserve – Justice – pour les juristes du fédéral” in
black print, set against the AJC’s blue proprietary logo, dressed the speaker’s pulpit.
Negotiating team member 4 recalled his experience as an attendee:
Well, I was surprised at the turnout. We didn’t have a big space to do it in. Initially we
thought about going out to the street corner and get on the lawn and we were advised
we’re not able to do that. Us being lawyers, we followed the advice. So, they told us that
that place was available, the courtyard in front of the East Memorial Building. And I
know—I remember it was almost like a party because I was just running into all of my
colleagues that I knew personally there and they were just chatting away. Our president
gave a real good speech. I don’t know if the Deputy was listening or not, in his 4th floor
office. But, I doubt he’d be there.
Jetté’s speech enlivened his audience. In covering the event, the newspaper The Lawyers Weekly
reported on the show of camaraderie among an estimated three to four hundred lawyers who
waved their blue folders on the president’s call to symbolize their frustration with an elusive
collective agreement.594 The protest encouraged the President of the Treasury Board to write to
the AJC with interest in discussing the union’s request for appointing an independent chair to
head the arbitration board.595 In an atmosphere of benevolent rhetoric, the parties agreed (with
the help of Kevin Burkett) to try to mediate the selection of a mutually acceptable nominee.
After the rally, the AJC’s executive enacted another strategy for better engaging the
membership: they adopted a new communication platform to report on union dealings. Over the
summer of 2008, the AJC released “All the details,” a rebranded and slick looking newsletter.
The communiqué was posted on the AJC’s website, the union’s communications pipeline, and
distributed through electronic subscription to members. Going forward, developments in the
negotiation and arbitration process were reported more promptly and in greater detail.
594

C. Smitz, “Federal Crowns protest stalled salary talks: The union has opted for binding arbitration to achieve its
first contract” The Lawyers Weekly 28:4 (23 May 2008) at 17.
595
AJC, All the details. 1:2 (August 2008) 1, online: AJC <http://ajc-ajj.net/files/library/01_-_August_2,_2008.pdf.>
(date accessed 1 March 2012).

165

6. 5

Collective Bargaining Phase 3: Conclusion

6.5.1 Bill C-10
On 24 September 2008, TBS’s senior negotiator wrote to the PSLRB with an application
to establish an arbitration board and request that the empanelling process be left to procedures
under the PSLRA as the parties could not settle on a mutually acceptable chair. The TBS and
AJC moved closer to interest arbitration, the next stage of third-party dispute resolution available
to them.

A completed first collective agreement would now result from the adjudicators

determining terms and conditions of employment, which, judging by the Treasury Board’s
application, entailed their significant intervention. Negotiations and mediation resolved clauses
across seventeen articles; however, twenty-eight articles, some of which included work force
adjustment policy and the contentious issue of pay, remained in dispute and were referred to
arbitration.596 The AJC submitted its proposed articles for terms and conditions of employment
that remained contested to the arbitration panel as well.
The holdup incurred by FLOC’s certification application (that initially favoured the
AJC’s wage demands at the start of negotiations with TBS due to the government’s healthy
budget surplus) destabilized the union’s position heading into arbitration. Canadian federal
public service collective bargaining negotiations underway at the time were not immune from the
financial crisis emanating in America as of August 2007. By December 2007, stock, lending,
banking and housing markets crashed, causing industrialized economies uncertainty, insecurity,
and turmoil in what is now called the “Great Recession” (which lasted until June 2009). In
Canada, politics momentarily overtook the economy in the news with federal elections on 14
October 2008, which produced a minority Conservative government. Election results affected
the course of collective bargaining negotiations in the federal public service.

One month later, on 15 November 2008, TBS proposed the AJC reconsider discussions
and possible settlement involving its salary demands in light of the Conservative government’s
immediate fiscal priorities.597 Accordingly, on 18 November 2008, the AJC received TBS’s final
wage offer that indicated the Law Group bargaining unit would receive: a 2.5 percent economic
596

AJC Notice of Application, 8 June 2010 Mendicino Affidavit, supra note 589 (Exhibit “Q”: Marc Thibodeau
letter to PSLRB dated 24 September 2008 and Form 8: Request for Arbitration at 173).
597
AJC v. Canada (A.G.), supra note 59 (Affidavit of Paul Rochon sworn 5 November 2010 at 11-12, paras. 30-31).

166

increase for 2006-7, and increases of 2.3 percent for 2007-08 and 1.5 percent over the next three
years respectively.

The AJC’s consideration of TBS’s offer swiftly came to a head with

Governor General Michaëlle Jean’s speech to the throne of 19 November 2008, which opened
the first session of the 40th parliament with a regimented plan for Canada’s uncertain postrecession recovery. The speech declared an economic policy of fiscal prudence by shoring up
the balance sheet with spending restrictions directed at the familiar pairing of government
operations and federal public service compensation. In particular, it promised legislation aimed
at “responsible fiscal management of public sector compensation,” as well as the Minister of
Finance, Jim Flaherty, delivering in a week’s time the government’s Economic and Fiscal
Statement.598

The spectre of imminent and aggressive legislation pushed the collective

bargaining committees of certain employee groups belonging to the Canadian Association of
Professional Employees and the Public Service Alliance of Canada to reluctantly sign tentative
collective agreements; the AJC negotiating team had to ponder a similar outcome to its
negotiations.

On 27 November 2008, Minister Flaherty’s Economic and Fiscal Statement

outlined the details of legislation that limited annual public service wage increases for 2007-2008
at 2.3 percent and for the following three years at 1.5 percent.599 On 1 December 2008, the AJC
responded to the Treasury Board’s latest wage offer, which provided little more than what had
been previously on the table. In the eyes of the union, this was an offer so low and disparaging
that the AJC stood tall by rejecting it.
On 4 December 2008, Governor General Jean granted Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s
request to suspend Parliament that was designed to evade a non-confidence motion in the
minority Conservatives planned by opposition parties upset with Minister Flaherty’s Economic
and Fiscal Statement (and unafraid of toppling the sitting government in order to replace it with
their own coalition rule).600

After Parliament reconvened, the first order of the chastened
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Conservative government’s business was to present its revised budget to the House of Commons
on 27 January 2009. On 6 February 2009, the omnibus Bill C-10601 received first reading in the
House of Commons and contained at Part 10, the Expenditure Restraint Act602 with its provisions
for implementing federal public sector compensation restraint. The ERA intended to freeze pay
rates and cap maximum salary increases for any collective agreement or arbitral award before 8
December 2008 at rates noted in finance Minister Flaherty’s Fiscal and Economic Statement.603
However, entitlement to performance pay allowing for an annual bonus remained unaffected
during the period of restraint that lasted from 1 April 2006 to 31 March 2011. Sections 34 and
54 of the ERA detailed specific rules as to the ERA’s application regarding a negotiated or an
arbitrated award, as well as the terms and conditions of employment covering the Law Group,
and it made no exception for the AJC as the only group in the federal public service negotiating a
first contract within the restraint period. The negotiated settlements of the Canadian Border
Service Guards and employees in both the Ships’ Officers and Operational Services Group,
however, were excluded from section 23 of the ERA’s provisions prohibiting pay range
restructuring. The legislation also preserved Treasury Board’s ability to change existing pay
allowances associated with a modernization initiative for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

With the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance planning to review Bill C10, the arbitration process involving TBS and AJC continued on its own track. The PSLRB’s
chairperson determined that a hearing should clarify and set terms of reference for the arbitration
panel in light of TBS opposing the AJC’s proposals on terms and conditions of employment that
it referred to arbitration. The hearing was held on 15 and 16 December 2008, and on 12
February 2009, Vice-Chairperson Ian Mackenzie released his decision.604

The Vice-

Chairperson’s legal analysis involved vetting the content of the AJC’s proposals against section
150 of the PSLRA, which sets parameters on the terms and conditions of employment an arbitral
award can determine.

Vice-Chairperson Mackenzie found the AJC’s proposals on key

bargaining issues of time keeping, filling vacancies, promotion from LA-1 to LA-2 after four
601

Bill C-10, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on January 27, 2009 and
related fiscal measures, 2d Sess., 41st Parl., 2009.
602
Ibid. Part 10: An Act to restrain the Government of Canada’s expenditures in relation to employment [hereinafter
ERA].
603
As an addition to the fiscal years initially noted by Flaherty’s speech, the 2006-2007 fiscal annum was added for
inclusion in wage-restraint legislation. Economic increases for the year were capped at 2.5 percent.
604
Association of Justice Counsel v. Treasury Board, 2009 PSLRB 20 (CanLII).

168

years of service, requirement for at least 30 percent of lawyers in the bargaining unit being
classified at level LA-2B or higher, and incorporating the existing Performance Review and
Employee Appraisal Policy into the collective agreement conflicted with the Act and were
therefore excluded from the arbitral terms of reference. The ruling redeemed TBS’s strategy of
denying the AJC’s impugned bargaining demands by using statutory norms as a buffer.

Bill C-10 becoming law spurred the AJC to once again venture into the public realm.
This time, the AJC planned political intervention by retaining the public relations firm Earnscliff
Strategy Group to lobby federal political parties about the Act’s impact on the AJC’s first
contract arbitration.605 In his role as president and spokesperson for the AJC, Jetté appeared on
23 February 2009 before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance’s deliberations
and study of Bill C-10. He argued for: reprieve from the provisions of the ERA directed at the
Law Group; advised on wage discrepancies between federal and provincial counsel leading to
retention issues in the public prosecution service and low morale at the DOJ; urged members to
consider the constitutionality of the legislation given its discriminatory and disproportionate
effect on lawyers; and answered questions from politicians.606 His presentation lasted fifteen
minutes. In the end, the AJC’s request for Bill C-10 being amended was more consultative than
persuasive. On 12 March 2009, Bill C-10 received Royal Assent, and when that caused the
Budget Implementation Act607 to become law, so too did the ERA come into force.
Undeterred, the AJC’s politicking continued. Responsible for the ongoing campaign was
the AJC’s newly appointed President, Marco Mendicino. On 25 April 2009, the succession from
Jetté was executed by the Governing Council unanimously approving a motion tabled to appoint
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Mendicino as acting president.608 His ascension to the post during a tumultuous arbitration
process magnified the responsibilities demanded of an already tough assignment, but Mendicino
was capable of leading the bargaining unit flock. Like his predecessor, Mendicino’s calling was
driven by a desire to improve the lot of federal government lawyers. Gritty, articulate, and
affable, the federal crown from Toronto was no stranger to high-pressure roles. He prosecuted
sensitive and complex anti-terrorism charges as part of Canada’s post-9/11 national security
regimen. Within short course, his advocacy was showcased before proceedings of the Standing
Senate Committee on National Finance regarding Bill C-10.

Not one to miss a critical

opportunity for promoting the AJC, President Mendicino called upon the senators to tell the
Treasury Board that in future collective bargaining it should better value its lawyers and treat
them fairly on compensation and non-monetary terms.609
6.5.2 Arbitration Hearing and Judicial Review
As arbitration neared, the AJC replaced Sack Goldblatt Mitchell with the Ottawa law firm
of Nelligan O’Brien Payne to represent them in the upcoming hearings set for June 8-10, and 2425, 2009.610 The AJC and TBS recommended their appointees to the arbitration board, which
would then nominate a third person to serve as chairperson, or, in the event the nominees
disagreed, allow the Chairperson of the PSLRB to appoint the third member. Preparations
ramped up with the parties delivering briefs to the arbitration board and to each other, which
contained proposed models for monetary and non-monetary contract articles.

These briefs

illuminate the extent of division that prevented negotiators from reaching a collective agreement.
Particularly, the AJC’s brief disclosed where the AJC sourced its non-monetary article proposals.
608
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note 608 at 2; AJC, All the Details 2:10 (8 May 2009) at 1, online: AJC <http://ajc-ajj.net/files/library/Bulletin__Vol_2_No_10_-_May_8_mai_2009.pdf> (date accessed: 1 March 2012).
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Contract terms and language informing proposals were drawn from labour contracts between
lawyers and the provinces of Ontario,611 Manitoba,612 British Columbia,613 and Quebec.614 Other
influences were terms and contract language from the PIPSC collective agreement,615 legislated
standards,616 Provincial Rules of Professional Conduct,617 National Joint Council directives,618
and extant terms governing the employment contracts of DOJ lawyers.619 The proposed articles
illustrate the negotiating team’s use of precedents to establish favourable terms and conditions of
employment while still viewing lawyers as distinct professionals (rather than as “ordinary”
white-collar civil servants). They also underlie the AJC’s legal argument that an arbitral award
should yield a contract containing terms and conditions of employment that are common in
agreements covering other collectivized public sector lawyers.
On the side of management, TBS opposed the AJC’s proposals on the grounds that the
proposed changes could impact any one of the twenty-six collective agreements between the
Treasury Board and other federal public sector unions.620 TBS’s argument on twenty-three
disputed

articles

invoked

the

stock

phrase

of:

“The

Employer

proposed

provision/definition/language is consistent throughout almost every collective agreement to
which the Employer is a party.

This provision was contained in the previous collective

agreement applicable to the LA employees previously represented by PIPSC. These provisions

611

PSLRB File, 585-02-25, supra note 305 (Submissions of the Association of Justice Counsel, Art. 3.01 – No
Derogation from Employee Rights; Art. 10.8b-10.16 – Leave for Association Business; Art. 10.17 – Leave with Pay
for Association President and Officers; Art. 11.03 – Disclosure during grievance process; Art. 13.02-13.04 –
Accumulation of Vacation Credits; Art. 20 – Benefits).
612
Ibid. Art. 7.01 – Management Rights; Art. 10.8b-10.16 – Leave for Association Business; Art. 12.02 – Alternate
Work Arrangement; Art. 13.02-13.04 – Accumulation of Vacation Credits; Art 14.07 Additional Remuneration for
Work on Paid Holiday; Art 15.02 – Allowances and Expenses (court clothing); Art. 26.05 – Sick Leave.
613
Ibid. Art. 12.06 – Compensatory Leave (in lieu of overtime).
614
Ibid. Art. 10.17 – Leave with Pay for Association President and Officers.
615
Ibid. Art. 12.04, 12.05, 12.07 – Overtime Pay; Art. 12.06 – Compensatory Leave (in lieu of overtime); Art.
12.10-12.15 – Travel Time; Art. 23.04 – Employee Performance Review and Employee File; Art. 43 – Injury-OnDuty Leave With Pay; Art. 45 – Other Leave With or Without Pay.
616
Ibid. Art. 6.01 – Information; Art. 11.03 – Disclosure during grievance process, Access to Information and
Privacy Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. A-1; Art. 11.02, 11.05, 11.07, 11.14, 11.19, 11.30, 11.22, 11.36, & 11.45 – PreGrievance, Grievance and Adjudication Process, PLSRB Regulations (SOR/2005-79); Public Sector Equitable
Compensation Act, S.C. 2009, c. 2, s. 394.
617
Ibid. Art. 16.01 – Professional Responsibilities; Art. 49.06 – Paid Professional Days.
618
Ibid. Art 15.04 – Allowances and Expenses (Overtime meals); Art. 20 – Benefits.
619
Ibid. Art. 13:06 – Vacation Leave; Art. 13.07 – Carry Over and Liquidation of Vacation Leave; Art. 15.01 –
Allowances and Expenses; Art. 17.02 – Health and Safety (Taxi re-imbursement); Art. 26:05 – Sick Leave.
620
TBS, Law Group Arbitration Brief, supra note 574 at 21.
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have not proved to be problematic in that context”.621 The Treasury Board clearly strove for
conformity in its collective agreements including the one intended for the AJC.

The parties continued seeking agreement on clauses referred to arbitration but on which
they were close to a resolution. Senior AJC administrator 2 discussed that administrative clauses
were resolved before the start of hearings because of compromises at the “eleventh hour” as the
parties realized that their interests were best served by settling less contentious issues.
Arbitration commenced with mediation absorbing the first three days of hearings. Two days of
oral hearing were reserved for the Board to determine disputed contract articles. Employer and
union counsel made their arguments on proposed articles in light of section 148 PSLRA, which
outlines the factors arbitrators consider in the making of an arbitral award in the federal public
service.622 As for pay and remuneration (notwithstanding the salary caps provisions of section
16 of the ERA) the AJC argued that section 34(1)(a)(iv) of the Act allowed for the awarding of
additional remuneration for a particular position level. They reasoned that the ERA defined
additional remuneration as a differential, which they maintained characterized the Toronto rate.
Union counsel urged the panel to award a salary increase to the level of the Toronto differential
to all lawyers at level LA-2A and above not receiving the pay, but cap increases beyond the
amount at rates imposed by law. TBS countered the union’s arguments through its interpretation
of the factors set out by section 148 of the PSLRA.

621

Ibid. Art.2 – Interpretations and Definitions; Art. 5 – Management Rights; Art. 6 – Rights of Employees; Art. 7 –
Representatives; Art. 9 – Information; Art. 11 – Leave With or Without Pay; Art. 12 – Membership Dues; Art. 15 –
Pay Administration; Art. 16 – Designated Paid Holidays; Art. 17 – Vacation Leave with pay; Art. 18 – Sick Leave
with Pay; Art. 19 – Other Leave With or Without Pay (Bereavement Leave) (Maternity and Parental Leave)
(Immediate Family Care) (Personal Needs) (Volunteer Leave) (Other Leave With or Without Pay) (Maternity
Reassignment or Leave); Art. 20 – Career Development; Art. 22 – Severance Pay; Art. 23 – Employee Performance
Review and Employee Files; Art. 26 – Safety and Health; Art. 27 – Employment References; Art. 28 – Registration
Fees; Art. 29 – Agreement Re-Opener; Art. 30 – National Joint Council Agreements; Art. 31 – Part-Time
Employees; Art. 32 – Statement of Duties; Art. 33 – Publications and Authorships; Art. 35 – Standards of
Discipline.
622
These considerations are: (1) the necessity of attracting and retaining competent persons to the federal public
service; (2) the necessity of offering compensation and terms and conditions of employment that are comparable to
those employees in similar occupations in the public service; (3) the need to maintain appropriate relationships with
respect to compensation and other terms and conditions of employment as between different classifications levels
within an occupation and between occupations in the public service; (4) the need to establish compensation and
other terms and condition of employment that are fair and reasonable in relation to the qualifications required, the
work performed, the responsibility assumed and nature of the services rendered; (5) state of the Canadian economy
and the Government of Canada’s fiscal circumstances.
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On 26 October 2009, the PSLRB released the arbitral award, and with it, the AJC reached
a milestone. The Treasury Board’s proposals on: representatives, leave with or without pay for
association business or other activities under the PSLRA, membership dues, designated paid
holidays, other leave with or without pay, and sick leave found favour with the arbitration panel,
while the AJC’s proposals won out on existing benefits, overtime and travelling time for LA-1s
and LA-2As, reimbursement of meal expenses and court clothing.

The panel sided with

proposals drawn from both parties on management rights, information, standards of discipline,
and overtime for LA-2B and LA-3 lawyers and vacation leave. As for the AJC’s argument on
salary increases, the award deferred to section 16 of the ERA. The panel returned matters of pay
administration back to the parties to resolve. The question of office space was determined
through an article detailing a joint-consultation provision. The arbitrator’s order permitted a
ninety-day implementation period for the award, except for overtime and travel time, which was
set at 120 days. The arbitral award was made effective as of 1 November 2009, and its term
lasted until 9 May 2011. A provisional first collective agreement between the AJC and Treasury
Board was now in place on decided matters, wage adjustments and retroactive salary entitlement
effective to 10 May 2006. Finalizing the collective agreement, however, depended on the
outcome of a potential judicial review of the arbitral award, and the AJC and Treasury Board
resolving matters returned to them by the panel. Indeed, the AJC believed the arbitral board
exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering a 120-day implementation phase for overtime and travel
time when, without an agreement between the parties, it was under a mandatory ninety-day
implementation period; so, it appealed the ruling by filing a notice of application to the Federal
Court of Canada.623 On 3 December 2009, the employer filed their own judicial review of the
award’s ruling on overtime, travel time, meal allowances, and court clothing. Final resolution of
these collective agreement provisions was left in the hands of a federal court judge.
The arbitral award confirming the ERA’s disposition on salary increases disappointed the
AJC’s leadership, but they were prepared for the outcome. Undermined at the bargaining table,
unsuccessful within the political realm, and wedded to an arbitration process with a fixed wage
result, the AJC considered recourse to the courts to vindicate lost rights. The AJC requested a

623

Canada (A.G.) v. AJC, supra note 306 (Applicant’s Application Record, Appendices A and B at 30, para. 10).

173

legal opinion on the potential of a constitutional challenge to wage-restraint legislation.624 In
August, the Governing Council caucused during a special meeting dedicated to addressing the
merits of a suit.625 Ultimately, the decision to initiate Charter litigation proceeded by a vote of
the Governing Council in consultation with bargaining unit members. On 23 December 2009,
the AJC announced news of an impending action against the Attorney General of Canada.626
Despite this move, imminent litigation still could not bring the parties together to finalize and
sign a collective agreement as a lingering impediment was the TBS confirming insurance and
disability coverage for articling student bargaining unit members.

A meeting between

Mendicino and Treasury Board President Day seemed to have overcome the roadblock.627
Finally, on 27 July 2010, the AJC’s negotiating team and TBS’s representatives signed a
monumental first collective agreement. With an expiry date of 9 May 2011, the question of
whether the lifespan of a settled labour contract would overlap with outstanding provisions
depended on the speed of the federal court determining judicial review applications.

With the Treasury Board withdrawing their initial claims for reimbursement of court
clothing and meal expenses before the start of judicial review proceedings, its case involved
overturning the arbitral award regarding overtime and travel time. The employer argued that the
arbitral award rendered overtime duplicative remuneration considering that the extant DOJ Law
Group performance pay plan already rewarded lawyers for performing additional work hours.
Under this logic, section 34(1)(a)(iii) of the ERA628 prohibited overtime because the section
required arbitrators to maintain the same performance plan in place as of 9 May 2006. A second
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AJC, All the details 2:7 (30 March 2009) at 3, online: AJC <http://ajc-ajj.net/files/library/Bulletin__Vol_2_No_7_-_March_30_mars_2009.pdf> (date accessed: 1 March 2012).
625
AJC, All the details 2:17 (5 August 2009) at 4, online: AJC <http://ajc-ajj.net/files/library/Bulletin__Vol_2_No_17_-_August_5_août _2009.pdf > (date accessed: 3 March 2012).
626
AJC, All the details 2:27 (23 December 2009) 1, online: AJC <http://ajc-ajj.net/files/library/05__December_23_décembre_2009.pdf> (date accessed: 1 March 2012).
627
AJC, All the details 3:5 (25 June 2010) at 1, online: AJC <http://ajc-ajj.net/files/library/05_-_June_25,_2010.pdf
> (date accessed: 1 March 2012).
628
Section 34.(1) of the ERA notes: The following rules apply in respect of any collective agreement or arbitral
award that governs employees in the Law Group whose employer is Her Majesty as represented by the Treasury
Board, and in respect of any period that begins during the restraint period: (a) in the case of a collective agreement
entered into — or an arbitral award made — after the day on which this Act comes into force...(iii) it must provide,
for all employees in the Law Group, for the same performance pay plans that were in effect on May 9, 2006 for any
employees in the Law Group and, in relation to any particular position level, those plans must be at the same
amounts or rates that were in effect for that position level on that date, but those plans may not have retroactive
effect.
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extension of the argument sourced section 34(1)(a)(v) of the ERA,629 which disqualified overtime
and paid travelling time as additional remuneration akin to a performance bonus or pay. A
further claim proposed that the overtime award upset sections 148(b)(c)(d)(e) of the PSLRA630
for reasons ranging from overtime being unusual in the practice of law, creating pay
discrepancies favouring LA-2A counsel over LA-2B, and ignoring the status of Canada’s
economy. In Justice O’Keefe’s ruling of 6 May 2011,631 he first rejected TBS’s argument on
section 34(1)(a)(iii) of the ERA by finding that no equivalency existed between working
additional hours and performance assessment resulting in increased pay. To support his point, he
noted that the DOJ’s system for rewarding additional hours was through management leave, a
system separate from the performance pay plan. Second, that the arbitral award on overtime and
travel time did not provide for payment that exceeded rates in place as of May 2006 (as provided
by the PIPSC collective agreement) was not contrary to section 34(1)(a)(iv) of the Act. Third,
the court dismissed the argument regarding section 148 of the PSLRA since the arbitrator’s
reasoning contemplated the principles raised by the section. For its part, the AJC failed to
convince the court to shorten the 120-day implementation period for overtime and paid travel
time provisions after the award became binding. Neither party appealed the ruling.

6.6

Conclusion: Negotiating Lessons Learned from the Bargaining Table
A collective bargain is a living document. The terms and conditions by which the Law

Group bargaining unit members provide legal services to the federal government and its
departments and agencies will evolve in subsequent rounds of contract renewal negotiations.
Just as in the past, a ruling government’s legal policies, budget constraints, and civil service
reforms loom over the AJC attaining salary parity with Ontario government lawyers. Other
bargaining priorities may surface from time to time with the union reviewing terms that worked
better in theory than in practice. Insight from AJC’s negotiating team members’ reflections on
collective bargaining signals a maturation of knowledge about the process that, when applied to
future practice, will better equip the negotiating capacities of the union.
629

Subsection (iv) adds to section 34.(1) and 34.(1)(a) by indicating: it may provide for any additional remuneration
— other than a performance bonus — that applied to any position level in the Law Group on May 9, 2006, but the
amount or rate of that additional remuneration for a particular position level may not be greater than the highest
amount or rate that applied to employees of that position level on that date.
630
See supra note 622 for a description of the relevant factors.
631
Canada (A.G.) v. AJC, supra note 306.
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In their roles as the representatives of the AJC, the negotiating team members were
enlightened about the assumptions they carried into collective bargaining. Negotiating team
member 2 realized that a vibrant negotiating team requires diverse representation from the
people it serves and embraces differences in regional representation, gender, culture, areas of
legal practice, and union experience. Negotiating team member 6 described how the assignment
required dealing with the practical realities of bringing a team together, reconciling competing
interests and finally realizing that not everyone’s needs could be satisfied. Negotiating team
member 4 echoed similar appreciation for working as a collective:
And so, it really taught me how to sort of work with a disparate group of people in terms
of a bargaining committee. This is different from when I did bargaining for Canada
where we all—it was just one voice. It was basically the negotiator; we support the
negotiator and that’s it. In negotiating in the union, you have to work with a bunch of
different interests, come to some kind of resolution to provide points of position contrary
to what the employer was saying. So, that’s a lot of work.
These observations suggest bargaining team members developed relationships with one another
to effect orderly and effective bargaining. Over the course of bargaining and interest arbitration
the composition of the AJC negotiating team members changed. Some team members took other
posts within the department, while others bowed out due to other commitments, and were
replaced by new individuals. There is enough experience imparted between past and present
AJC negotiating team representatives to instruct pragmatism as a guide for advancing
negotiations. The interests of bargaining unit members are best represented by progress at the
bargaining table.

Uncertainty about what bargaining with TBS holds has passed. A wiser negotiating team
will conduct contract renewal negotiations. Negotiating team member 5 sees the experience of a
first round of collective bargaining as creating a window with a view on their opponent’s
practices. Gone is the naivety bargaining team members first possessed with their lofty contract
demands and belief in the good faith intentions of TBS. The AJC negotiating team members
learned through trial and error, that stalemate is an enemy in collective bargaining
notwithstanding the fact that in first contract negotiations there will always be more terms and
conditions of employment to determine than when renewing a collective agreement. The focus
now is to judiciously weigh areas that improve the collective agreement. Negotiating team
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member 5 continues by identifying pursuable terms and conditions as those that are crucial to a
better labour contract, putting aside those of less urgency as future possibilities. Bargaining
demands that improve fringe benefits and salaries will be pursued in relation to whether they can
yield gains from the employer. This can mean that in future negotiating sessions, the AJC will
have to overcome the TBS’s adherence to standard contract articles used in other public service
collective agreements and have it accept demands deriving from the unique needs of the
members in the bargaining unit. Negotiating team member 1 expresses that learning process is
ongoing when he says:
So, there are some areas where we realize having gone through the process, that yeah, we
can actually say fine whatever, we’ll settle for that. Even though we thought it was
important, we’ll settle for that. But there are others that don’t work that way and we
really want to kind of change the way Treasury Board looks at everything to get
something custom tailored. So again, that’s kind of the learning from a filter process of
what’s important and what isn’t worth fighting for. We’ve learnt an awful lot in our
negotiations about where we ought to be in the future.
This bargaining team member perceives that assessing future goals should be done in relation to
past experiences. Overall, this individual reflection that, when pooled together with the thoughts
of other negotiating team members, reveals germane perspective on what collective bargaining
with TBS entailed.
The end result of first contract negotiations is the establishment of terms and conditions
of employment for members of the Law Group bargaining unit within a unionized workplace.
These first contract negotiations have also modelled a paradigm for the AJC’s negotiating team
to follow in future rounds.

They will attempt to bargain in a style consistent with the

professional goals and ideals that resonate with bargaining unit members. Negotiating team
member 7, a newcomer to the committee, comments that: “We don’t want to be caught doing
things that we’re accusing the employer of doing. We don’t want to be caught being accused of
surface bargaining because that’s not our intention, so we do try the principled negotiation
approach.” Thus, the AJC will demonstrate the standard its wants emulated during negotiations
with TBS. Ultimately, the success of this idealized approach depends on the AJC’s negotiating
capacities to deliver on improvements to the collective agreement.
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C H A P T E R 7: Conclusion

7.1

Introduction
This dissertation investigated the phenomenon of DOJ lawyers unionizing. Chapters 1, 2,

3, 4, 5, and 6 each added a different component to the inquiry by respectively introducing the
study, canvassing doctrinal studies and social scientific theories on lawyer unionization,
outlining case study methodology, describing the history and application of the legal framework
governing non-unionized human resources practices at the DOJ, detailing the context for lawyers
supporting the AJC, and documenting the union’s involvement with collective bargaining and
the courts. Chapter 7 aims to synthesize the findings of earlier chapters in order to assess some
key implications that arise from having addressed the study’s two research questions. Another
goal is to reflect on what the future may hold for labour relations between the Treasury Board
and the AJC given that federal Conservative government austerity hinders DOJ lawyers
exercising employee voice. The chapter concludes with a “slice-of-life perspective” drawn from
the perceptions of AJC bargaining unit members on practicing law under a labour contract. I
include their views to question the belief that collective bargaining by lawyers is
“unprofessional”—an assumption that prevents employed counsel from considering the viability
of unionism.

7.2

DOJ Lawyers Unionizing: Proletarianized Employees or Rational Actors
The findings from this case study allow for some interesting parallels to be drawn

between federal public service staff associations obtaining collective bargaining rights (with the
PSSRA’s enactment in 1967) and the AJC’s start as a bargaining agent (after the PSLRA became
law in 2005). As touched on in chapter 4, the staff associations’ frustration with the hollow
association-consultation practice fueled their demands for collective bargaining legislation and
direct negotiations with the government over terms and conditions of employment. Similarly,
while functioning without the benefit of labour legislation, non-management Beyond LOAC
members also determined that collective bargaining was the only meaningful way to influence
the employment contract. Another connection involves the political promises of past Liberal
Prime Ministers as the penultimate steps for formal committees and task forces attaining
mandates either to investigate the introduction of collective bargaining or to provide
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recommendations for its overhaul. Finally, the access to collective bargaining of both federal
public servants and non-management DOJ lawyers’ came about through new labour legislation
designed to quell civil servant unrest (though three-and-half decades apart) and, ostensibly, to
improve employer-employee relations. These historical similarities were discovered by studying
a change in employment systems at the DOJ.
The AJC’s creation was explained using inferences about behaviours that were contextbound (hence the descriptive orientation of the analysis).632 I assessed the motivations for initial
associational activity and union formation with a fundamental premise derived from the research
literature: a professional employee’s decision to support a union unfolds at the individual level
and in relation to job dissatisfaction.633 Job dissatisfaction served as a construct for filtering the
events that comprise the narrative presented in chapter 5, with its goal of addressing the first
research question of understanding what led DOJ lawyers to unionize with the AJC. The
analysis advanced in that chapter can now be revisited in order to analyze the theoretical
implications of the AJC’s establishment and emergence as a union using the processual model
concepts of: (1) salary and working conditions; (2) employee leadership; and (3) appropriate
environmental conditions.634

To recognize the initial moves towards unionization, employment relations between the
DOJ and its unrepresented lawyers were studied as a flashpoint for employee dissatisfaction. It
was discovered that the introduction of the Toronto differential (and its extension by a legislative
freeze) was a Treasury Board decision that situated wages as a paramount employment concern
and influenced employee perceptions of workplace inequity.635 The department’s treatment of
lawyers under an individual employment regime precipitated a grassroots, employee-driven
movement that incrementally developed in response to policy adjustments affecting the
department’s management of its staff. Professionals will support an association or union based
on its relevance, which, in turn, flows from its perceived utility. DOJ lawyers abandoned LOAC
632

Hartley, supra note 82 at 325.
J. Barling, C. Fullagar & E. K. Kelloway, The Unions and Its Members: A Psychological Approach (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992) at 48.
634
Harrison, supra note 200 at 1208.
635
H.N. Wheeler & J.A. McClendon, “The Individual Decision to Unionize” in G. Strauss, D. G. Gallagher & J.
Fiorito, eds., The State of the Union (Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1991) 49 at 50.
633
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and formed the AJC for the purpose of having formal representation in grievances and dealings
with management along with using collective bargaining to improve wages and working
conditions.

This project’s interview and documentary evidence uncovered few signs to support an
argument that lawyers’ dissatisfaction and corollary interest in unionization was tied to an overbureaucratized workplace (with feelings of a lack of professional autonomy and control
associated with such ideological proletarianization).

In their interviews, in fact, four DOJ

lawyers commented on the quality of work at the department. Two of these respondents, and
most of the other lawyer interviewees, noted that they supported unionization to gain better
salaries, transparent promotions, and recognition for overtime. Their responses did not suggest
that collective bargaining’s other function of taking wages out of the competition factored as a
consideration. A more quantitative assessment of perceived economic improvements in terms
and conditions of employment achievable through collective bargaining supports the lawyers’
primary interest in improved pay and promotion rates—roughly three-quarters of the DOJ lawyer
population is designated at the LA-1 and LA-2A ranking, with majority located at the latter
stage.636 With the DOJ’s management not addressing pay discrepancies between the Toronto
and national salary scales, those directly affected by employer indifference realized that inaction
came at an appreciable cost to finances and morale.637 Suing the employer over the Toronto
differential appealed to only several dozen or so of the most displeased counsel situated at the
Vancouver Regional Office, leaving other DOJ lawyers eager for a more moderate redress
mechanism: the AJC. Supporting the AJC was a calculated choice for DOJ lawyers based on the
perceived need for employee representation relative to federal labour legislation restricting the
agent’s powers.
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27 September 2004 Prior Transcript, supra note 461 at 83, line 5; 10 September 2004 Lehmann transcript, supra
note 437 at 73, lines 29-31. For a count of the DOJ’s lawyer workforce demographic as of 31 March 2007 see : AJC
Notice of Application, 8 June 2010 Mendicino Affidavit, supra note 589 (Exhibit “E” Department of Justice Human
Resources Management Plan 2007-2010 at 96). The Human Resources Management Plan listed the composition of
the DOJ Law Group as follows: Articling, 45 (1.9 percent); LA-1, 340 (14.1 percent); LA-2A, 1348 (56.0 percent);
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the LA-2A range is uncertain with many lawyers spending their career with the DOJ at the LA-2A level.
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M. Hannay, “The Unionization of Professionals: A Case Study” (2002) 23:3 Journal of Labor Research 487 at
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This study exposed the importance of a strong leadership organizing their fellow
employees, a construct that is also central to mobilization theory.638 LOAC’s non-management
members advocating for a new organization marked an embryonic stage for the AJC. They
executed an ambitious plan for fixing LOAC’s deficiencies by demanding a new organizational
format that Deputy Minister of Justice Rosenberg conceded warranted further investigation. A
core three-person transition team lead by Lois Lehman assumed the task of seeing the Beyond
LOAC process to fruition. This group was able to clearly articulate to their cohort the benefits of
employee representation that was similar to models used by Ontario and British Columbia
government lawyers. The AJC’s transitional leadership adopted a plan, monitored progress, and
modified strategies to seize a propitious environment for instituting the AJC that was triggered
by the Kaplan award dispelling comparability between Ontario MAG rates and the Toronto
salary scale.639 Lehman enjoyed an active and crucial tenure overseeing the AJC’s formation,
which was a solemn responsibility that Patrick Jetté carried on as her replacement. Jetté’s work,
aided by a small executive, subsequently increased when he was called on to coordinate a
certification drive, prepare for collective bargaining, and oversee first contract negotiations.
Negotiating team member 6 who worked with Jetté during the early stage of his presidency
poignantly remarked how: “The president worked unbelievably hard. He really gave his life and
soul to the AJC and I think he felt that responsibility not as just as the president, but because he
was being paid and he knew that the rest of us were volunteers”. Jetté fulfilled his duties,
making up for limited institutional resources available to the AJC once departmental funding ran
out and fundraising and voluntary dues from association members kicked in.

Enabling collective bargaining legislation is crucial to processual model analysis for
proposing that professionals, like other workers, will unionize when it suits their interests. This
is not to say that workers will not force coverage where excluded from a federal or provincial
labour statute, but the risk-to-reward calculation of law suits and political campaigning are other
considerations a group must weigh. The capacity of the AJC’s initial leadership to obtain
collective rights clearly depended on the Treasury Board voluntarily recognizing them as a
638

J. Kelly, Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilization, Collectivism, and Long Waves (London: Routledge,
1998) at 35.
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Academy of Management Review 510 at 516.
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bargaining agent, which the Treasury Board did not do because of the PSSRA’s prohibitions. To
overcome this legislative inadequacy, the AJC lobbied the Quail Task Force on Modernizing
Human Resources Management for inclusion under new labour legislation, and by conducting an
organizing campaign of lawyers to prepare for an eventual change in the law. As the AJC’s
experience shows, where restrictive legislation prohibits professionals from collective
bargaining, it also becomes a site for various activities directed at changing prevailing
exclusions.

7.3

The AJC’s First Contract Negotiation and the Law of Collective Bargaining
The second research question posed by this dissertation was to detail the AJC’s

experience in negotiating a first collective agreement. Chapter 6 addressed this goal by noting
union preparations for bargaining, providing insight on the conduct of negotiations, detailing the
reasons for an impasse in negotiations with TBS and its impact on relations between the union
and its members, as well as by detailing the process of resolution, which involved court battles to
both uphold the arbitrated first collective agreement, and challenge its statutorily imposed wage
limits Chapter 6’s empirical presentation of collective bargaining negotiations stands as its own
social scientific depiction of the process, in addition to offering a rich account that supplements
the predicate facts reported by Ontario Superior and Court of Appeal judges in their reasons for
judgment on the AJC’s case.640 The AJC’s involvement before the courts warrants attention
because for the new AJC to have dedicated the time, expenditure, and energy to launch a Charter
challenge (and willingness to engage the Attorney General of Canada in high-stakes litigation all
the way to the Supreme Court of Canada) was a long-shot strategy with very significant
ramifications if successful. The AJC’s application tested the legality of the state’s unilateral
conduct of overriding collective bargaining negotiations to engineer compliance with a tough
budget that accounted for economic recession and uncertainty. Had the outcome favoured the
AJC, the ruling would have rebuked legislatures for drafting overbearing legislation, demanded
more care from them in the future by instilling a greater respect for collective bargaining, and
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K..L. Levine, “The Law is Not the Case: Incorporating Empirical Methods Into the Culture of Case Analysis”
(2006) 17 University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy 283 at 301.
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established a persuasive legal precedent aiding other unions in their suits against the government
for imposing the ERA’s wage caps.641

The cycle of federal public servants having to the bear the economic burden of legislated
wage controls was regularized in 1982 with Trudeau’s Liberals implementing the Public Sector
Compensation Restraint Act, which suspended collective bargaining and striking by extending the
wage plans and arbitral agreements of all federal collective agreements for two years, and by
fixing wage increases by 6 percent in 1982 and 5 percent in 1983.642 The Public Service Alliance of
Canada put the constitutionality of this controversial Act before the Supreme Court of Canada,
which concluded, nonetheless, that no freedom of association rights protected by the Charter
were violated since the law did not restrict the union’s role as employee representative.643 What,
then, made the AJC’s Charter challenge to the ERA noteworthy? The case seems to confirm a
scenario predicted for collective bargaining where legislatures impose temporary restrictions at
will.644 It would also suggest the federal government uses economic instability to introduce
legislation that effectively resolves collective bargaining disputes. 645 The whole background
leading to litigation also casts a negative light on the apparent goodwill surrounding the PSLRA’s
introduction that was intended to erase past attitudes and stoke fresh approaches for more
equitable dealings in labour relations.

Certainly, the AJC’s Charter challenge to the ERA

contributes to an emerging dialogue unions have opened between the courts and legislatures on
the legality of restraint legislation and the utility of the courts, rather than the political process,
for upholding new freedom of association protections for collective worker activities.
641
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Collective bargaining is an exercise of negotiating power, advanced through institutional
resources, and tempered by a statutory duty to bargain in good faith. The law acknowledges that
any party that exercises more strength and resources between the negotiating table and shop floor
(or office) to impose contract terms than its adversary is simply leveraging their might and will
not attract censure.646 A different claim arises, however, when a negotiating party infringes their
obligation through actions and proposals on standard contract terms that show no intent for
reaching agreement.647 Likewise, not complying with requests for disclosure during negotiations
is actionable for bad faith in an unfair labour practice complaint, as progress occurs only through
adequate information sharing on which proposals originate and counter-proposals are
assessed.648 The AJC’s Charter application put into issue the legality of whether the employer’s
negotiating tactics of dilatory disclosure, unproductive bargaining sessions, and stalled salary
proposals denied the union procedural fairness during collective bargaining in light of the
important precedent established by the case of Health Services.649 This June 2007 Supreme
Court of Canada decision partly reversed two decades of the court’s own jurisprudence laid
down in the “Labour Trilogy,” which had excluded collective bargaining and striking from
freedom of association protection.650 Health Services determined that a procedural right to
collective bargaining (but not a substantive or economic outcome) has constitutional protection
under section 2(d) of the Charter and correspondingly obliges a government employer to bargain
in good faith.651 The ruling implies that collective bargaining negotiations should be devoid of
substantial state interference in the form of laws or state actions that usurp discussion,
meaningful negotiations, and consultation over key working conditions.652
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Based largely on their assessment of Health Services’ ratio, lawyers for the AJC believed
that their client did not get the full benefit of the law during first contract negotiations with
Treasury Board’s representatives. They were partially correct. At the application stage of the
hearing, Grace J. of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice agreed with the AJC’s lawyers’
contention that for the 2006-2007 fiscal years, sections 16(a) and 34(1)(a) of the ERA infringed
their clients’ rights under section 2(d) of the Charter and failed the minimal impairment test
under section 1 of the Charter.653 A monumental victory, it was celebrated only until the Ontario
Court of Appeal vindicated the employer by overturning Grace J.’s ruling and annulling his
remedy.654 The appellate decision clarifies that government employers can engage in hard
bargaining and satisfy their good faith negotiating obligations, so long as meaningful discussion
and engagement occurs with a union prior to the introduction of legislation that resolves the
impasse. The reversal of fortunes for the AJC’s bargaining unit is an example of the flaws
academics cite with Charter legalism. Their observations are that it reinforces a loss of unions’
political power;655 symbolizes litigation as a defensive, reactive, and narrow response; 656 and
places faith and confidence in judges who are expected to interpret formal abstract principles in a
linear fashion to produce legal precedents that sequentially improve worker protections.657
When called upon, appellate judges understand very well the balance of power the law affords
unions and employers under Wagner-styled collective bargaining legislation,658 and, as Tucker
argues, will read down earlier decisions to scale back overbroad legal entitlements benefitting
unions.659 Consider that in AJC v. Canada (A.G)660 the Ontario Court of Appeal relied on the
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Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser.661 Fraser, a
constitutional challenge to the Ontario Agricultural Employees Protection Act,662 refined the test
for assessing a breach of section 2(d) of the Charter to require that an impugned law or state
action must make it impossible to act collectively to achieve workplace goals, thereby ratcheting
down protections established by Health Services.

Sharpe J.A. writing for a unanimous court (Armstrong and Peppal JJ.A. concurring)
determined Fraser was dispositive law for determining the AJC’s appeal.663 Sharpe J.A. also
referred to Mounted Police Association of Ontario, released twelve days before the hearing of
the AJC’s appeal. In that case, Juriansz J.A.’s interpretation of the derivative rights inquiry from
Fraser confirmed that a duty on a government employer to bargain in good faith is imposed
when legislation makes it effectively impossible for employees to act in concert and pursue
collective goals.664 Having outlined the guiding case law, Sharpe J.A. turned to analyzing the
facts of the case, and the ERA’s impact on collective bargaining between the AJC and TBS.
Sharpe J.A. used Fraser to confirm that constitutional protection in the collective bargaining
milieu guarantees a basic process, but not a result. Accordingly, the court confirmed that section
2(d) of the Charter is not violated if negotiations do not yield a collective bargain, nor does
Fraser offer a constitutional right to an arbitrated settlement in the event of failed negotiations.
In sum, the Attorney General of Canada won its case before three judges of the Ontario Court of
Appeal because they found that the ERA’s removal of wages from the arbitration process did not
preclude the AJC from meaningfully engaging in a collective bargaining process or prevent TBS
from considering its demands in good faith.

The upshot of the appellate ruling is that it

maintained the acceptability of the ERA restraining negotiations or arbitration from
independently determining lawyers’ salaries. The AJC’s Charter application received the first
appellate determination on the constitutionality of the ERA.665 By virtue of this distinction, the
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ruling also became the first case involving the constitutionality of the ERA that the Supreme
Court of Canada declined to hear.666
The AJC’s Charter challenge reflected the union’s limited choice for using the courts to
level the disproportionate bargaining power wielded by the Treasury Board in first collective
agreement negotiations. The AJC’s own bargaining strength was diminished after the union
rejected the option of conciliation and strike, replacing its most forceful weapon with more
conservative political action and litigation (as typically used by other government unions).667
Despite the AJC supporting a Charter action for both principled and financial reasons, the
disposition of the Ontario Court of Appeal reinforces the highly speculative nature of litigation
that is subject to jurisprudence unpredictably changing. In the final analysis, no matter how the
AJC’s loss was a significant letdown that thwarted its professed mission for securing significant
salary gains, and shook union members’ expectations of the courts delivering justice, the
outcome illustrates that its litigation against the state was an imperfect remedy for counteracting
legislation that unduly interfered with the collective bargain process.

7.4

Employee Voice at Work under the AJC and its Future Prospects
Chapter 4, and the first portion of chapter 5, presented an individual employment

relationship covering non-management DOJ lawyers that the Treasury Board had determined at
will and then modified in 1990, for example, to remedy the labour turmoil at the department’s
Toronto office. In this scheme, the input of DOJ lawyers regarding the terms and conditions of
work was limited to what, if anything, DOJ representatives choose to relay from LOAC’s reports
on their consultations and proposals with TBS’s agents. Once lawyers were determined to
reform LOAC—and discussed the various reasons for doing so and the necessary measures to
take—the course of events that followed outline the creation of a new union in the federal public
service. As the legally certified representative of 2,600 federal government lawyers, the current
organization, the AJC, is a small but highly specialized craft union (especially in comparison to
666
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others in the federal public service that represent much larger and more diverse professional
groups such as PIPSC, whose numbers total 60,000, or CAPE whose members total 12,500). 668
By documenting a new entrant to the federal labour relations scene (when current prospects for
union growth are limited),669 this study’s presentation of the AJC’s history, organization, and
mission provides original insight about a dynamic union.
A third objective of this study was to assess DOJ lawyers’ ability to exercise greater
employee voice (influence in organizational decision-making) because of their unionization
under the AJC. The findings from chapters 4, 5 and 6 satisfied this goal by comparing and
contrasting the level of employee voice available under the initially ineffective LOAC to that
afforded by the AJC. Dissatisfaction at work as the precursor to DOJ lawyers supporting the
AJC’s creation and transformation into a union is consistent with Frost and Taras’ assessment for
workers exercising voice.670 Unions both legitimize and optimize employee influence through
collective bargaining and its purpose of expressing desired employment conditions to the
employer.671 Indeed, the first collective agreement has fundamentally transformed the social and
cultural environment for lawyers employed at the DOJ (and other places where members of the
Law Group bargaining unit work) by minimizing some of the authority of management.
Management reign over how lawyers worked once went unquestioned, and now, job obligations
and entitlements are distributed across thirty-eight articles and five appendices that comprise an
enforceable and written record of the rules for providing services. National Capital Region
lawyer 2 noted, “I mean if all managers were perfect we would not need any unions...There are
rules that have not been respected, implicit rules have not been respected and we think that
through unionization through the collective agreement will guarantee certain rights, at least”.
Entitlements under the collective agreement assist bargaining unit members of all stripes. This
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makes for a more egalitarian workplace. National Capital Region lawyer 3 expressed, “The
benefits of being in a union...ensures that lawyers, whether you are incoming first year call or
somebody who has spent an entire year career, twenty-five—thirty years with the department,
you’re equally and fairly represented before Treasury Board.” The respondent continued, “It
makes a big difference that lawyers are allowed, I wouldn’t say luxury, but we can now be
focussed on lawyering as it were, and not be taking up matters of benefits and pay and working
conditions and so on. We have representatives who act on our behalf.” This lawyer values the
certainty of terms of employment being fixed for the life of the collective agreement. Like her,
other lawyers will realize the full utility of the collective agreement by guiding their work
according to principles established by each of its articles.

Bargaining unit member participation in the union is another dimension of employees
exercising voice in the work context.672 The PLSRB certifying the AJC as a bargaining agent
was a crucial first step in forcing the Treasury Board to recognize the AJC as the exclusive
representative of the Law Group bargaining unit, granting lawyers access to industrial relations,
and permitting their involvement in shaping the AJC’s bargaining agenda. But, in order for the
AJC to achieve its goals for collective bargaining, the process still demanded skillful negotiation
from the union’s representatives and lawyers. The Treasury Board denying the AJC’s salary
demands forced the union to unite its membership in a common cause that was necessary for
shifting the battle against the employer from the bargaining table to public, political, and judicial
arenas.

The union’s attempt at periodic mobilization was designed to dispel member

complacency and vest lawyers with a direct stake in first contract negotiations. Its effect has
been to improve opportunities for member involvement in union activities.

Clearly, the AJC has matured in its information sharing and activist capacities since the
start of collective bargaining. Bargaining unit member involvement in union business has grown
from the early days when lawyers provided survey input in the setting of collective bargaining
priorities and sourced negotiating team members from within its ranks. The opening of the
union’s information network was a culmination of the AJC’s Executive Committee decision in
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the midst of first contract negotiations to liberalize the content and the frequency of
communications with members and to satisfy their growing expectations. Now that it has been
opened, access to greater knowledge and more in-depth perspective about the AJC’s dealings
will not be easily shut, and this transparency can be used to encourage lawyers’ input in a
collective decision-making process.673 While a second initiative, the Federal Lawyers Deserve
Justice Campaign, informed that the AJC, as a newly formed organization, could enlist
bargaining unit members to exercise collective agency, attempt to influence the determination of
an arbitration board, and leave, in the process, an imprint of the effort in the public record. The
AJC may well have to re-mobilize its members to resist the federal government reducing funding
to the DOJ that limits its expenditures and invites service and personnel cutbacks. The current
political economy pervading the federal public service is marked by a decidedly adversarial and
confrontational turn in labour relations that threatens employee voice. A neoliberal approach to
governance is unlikely to dissipate any time soon.

Several commentators point out that in the wake of the Great Recession, public sector
unions are channelling employee voice into protest against governments streamlining their
operations and interfering with collective bargaining.674 Amidst Jackson’s plea for the labour
movement to contest right-wing political ideologies steering Canadian public sector employment
policies, federal public service professionals are crusading against Conservative federal
government austerity.675 The AJC is one union that solicited its members’ input for affiliating
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with other employee organizations. In September 2011, in anticipation of the introduction of
2012 Federal Budget, with five other federal public sector professional unions, the AJC formed
the “Professionals Serving Canadians Campaign” with its purpose of using a broad social media
platform to expose government cuts in the federal public service (as well as forming a
community outreach of public program and service defenders).676

The AJC supported the

endeavour due to a Law Practice Model hollowing out the DOJ’s operations by eliminating
$12.5 million from the salary budget and passing increased responsibilities on to junior
counsel.677 Moreover, by 2014-15, the DOJ intends to trim its workforce by 6.5 percent.678
Treasury Board policy has further directed that the DOJ evaluate its litigation branch, and
consider whether outsourcing its work to private law firms would realize savings.679 Labour
speed-up at the DOJ has escalated for lawyers with billable-hour targets being increased from
1,300 to 1,400 hours and the results being measured as part of the annual performance review.680
Job intensification and degradation have forced today’s DOJ lawyers to adjust their practice of
law to pressures far different from those of their predecessors a decade ago (and even more so
from their predecessors of twenty years earlier). As the DOJ re-evaluates its spending priorities,
the AJC’s Governing Council may also wish to reconsider conciliation and strike as a possible
dispute resolution procedure. It might be time to contemplate a coordinated withdrawal of
labour as a means for defending collective bargaining gains.681
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During the study’s participant interviews, lawyers were asked to evaluate whether
tensions exist between adhering to provincial law society Rules of Professional Conduct and
collective activity.

Ontario Regional Office lawyer 1 highlighted the choices that need

consideration if the union asked bargaining unit members to take up job action: “it’ll be a
question for the individual professional to have to determine how he’s going to resolve that
conflict, and in my mind, you know your profession has to come first.” This response captures
the recurring theme of the professional balancing act. Government lawyers weigh professional
responsibility as officers of the court and as public servants. The federal prosecutor is obliged to
promote the administration of justice rather than secure a criminal conviction. The government
civil litigator conducts trials to advance the best interests of the Crown within adversarial
proceedings. As a public servant, however, the government lawyer is also required to conduct
their responsibilities with regard for the public interest, which speaks to observing the general
welfare of the public at large.682

Lawyers spoke passionately about representing the government client, be it the Minister
of Justice, a department or agency head, or the tax-paying public at large. Prairie Regional
Office lawyer 2 indicated that bargaining unit members hold their public service obligations in
high regard.

For some respondents, the choice between these duelling loyalties is

straightforward. Prairie Regional Office lawyer 1 stated that the supremacy of a lawyer’s oath to
the profession supersedes union loyalties as the obligation imposes a professional responsibility
to advance and defend a client’s legal interest.

National Capital Region Office lawyer 5

expanded on this idea by noting that the upholding of professional standards is inherent in the
provision of legal services since being a lawyer comes first and union membership comes
second. Given these responses, if the AJC was to ask bargaining unit members to support job
action, there would be a great deal of contemplation over reconciling professional interest with
union solidarity.
From the respondents’ answers, this project suggests that unionization has not interfered
with the ethics of bargaining unit members during the life of the first collective agreement
682
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between the Treasury Board and AJC. This was mainly due to the AJC opting for arbitration to
resolve disputes during collective bargaining negotiations. The measure was to prevent extreme
circumstances that might force the likelihood of an unpopular labour disruption that could then
possibly discredit the public service image of the legal profession (which bargaining unit
members represent).

However, after the tabling of the Budget Implementation Act, 2009,

President Jetté averred a remarkable change in the AJC’s position to the press: the bargaining
unit would, if possible, strike to protest the ERA.683 Providing that his assessment remains
accurate, and a disagreement over collective bargaining escalates into a future labour dispute, the
AJC would determine the muscularity of job action based on its members’ professional
responsibilities.

The need for compromise is evident in this passage from AJC senior

administrator 1:
So if we were in a situation where our efforts to advance our interests by way of
collective bargaining should that run into a conundrum with respect to our ethical
obligations or professional obligations to our clients, we would probably have to govern
ourselves—and would govern ourselves—in a way that allowed us to preserve our ethical
obligations to our client and still allow us to pursue our legitimate interests by way of the
collective bargaining process.
The AJC’s Governing Council may have to advise bargaining unit members on the
appropriateness and ethicality of job action. Their position will be determined after a careful
review of the issues involved, interests being affected, careful study of the test cases and
instructive examples set by lawyers who have conducted previous slowdowns,684 and, likely, a
comprehensive legal opinion that assesses legalities and demonstrates the leadership’s due
diligence in recommending a position. The union’s advice to its members would substitute for
the recently implemented Department of Justice Values and Ethics Code, which is a protocol
intended to direct lawyers’ ethical behaviour and decision-making in professional activities. In
the case of unusual ethical issues or in potential conflicts of interests or duties, lawyers are
683
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directed to discuss concerns with their manager.685 The sensitive subject of labour protest,
however, exposes the paradox of this code’s utility, and constrains its normative value. Law
review articles have lately debated the correctness of law society Rules of Professional Conduct
imposing the same ethical and behavioural standards on counsel with no differentiation between
public or private practice.686 These theoretical exercises add little to the job action debate
affecting DOJ lawyers because they do not conceptualize collective bargaining as a unique
component of government employment that may even bolster calls for distinct forms of
regulation (since a collective exercise of a labour right may impact the public interest). Nor, can
the AJC look to provincial law societies for guidance as Thornicroft urged them to establish
policies on the ethics of work stoppages.687 The Law Society of Quebec did not take a position
685

Section 5(1) of the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, (S.C. 2005, c. 46) [hereinafter PSPDA] required
the Treasury Board to establish a code of conduct applicable to the public sector. On 12 April 2012, the Values and
Ethics Code for the Public Sector (Public Sector Code) became law and replaced the 2003 Values and Ethics Code
for the Public Service. The Public Sector Code is a service-wide code of conduct for the federal public service.
Section 6 of the PSPDA further required that each organization to implement its own organizational code of conduct
that is consistent with standards of behaviour set out in the Public Sector Code. See Treasury Board of Canada
Secretariat, “FAQs On the Values and Ethics Code of the Public Sector”, online: Treasury Board of Canada
Secretariat <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/faq/pdaf2-eng.asp#faq> (last modified: 23 November 2012). On 26 February
2013, the Department of Justice Values and Ethics Code came into effect. Its protocols form a part of lawyers’
condition of employment.
686
In D. MacNair’s article, “In the Service of the Crown: Are Ethical Obligations Different for Government
Counsel?” (2005) 84 Canadian Bar Review 502, she recognized that the ethical challenges between public and
private sector practitioners are different, but not necessarily requiring an imposition of higher ethical duties.
Hutchinson, supra note 111 argued government lawyers should have their professional responsibilities and ethical
expectations governed according to circumstances relevant to their practice rather than those geared towards the
private sector, especially with respect to client advocacy and confidentiality. Dodek, in “Lawyering at the
Intersection”, supra note 111, argued that the current model of professional ethics does not account for practice
responsibilities incumbent on government counsel as they serve as public servants, as lawyers, and as
representatives of the Attorney General. To address forms of inadequate regulation regarding the exercise of public
power, he proposed introducing specific codes of conduct for Crown lawyers, proactive government disclosure, and
implementing an office of professional responsibility at both federal and provincial departments of justice. Dodek’s
proposals for imposing higher ethical duties on government lawyers were counter-argued by M. Wilson, T. Wong &
K. Hille “Professionalism and the Public Interest” (2011) 38:1 Advocates Quarterly 1 at 14-17. M.H. Morris & S.
Nishikiwa’s article, “The Orphans of Legal Ethics: Why government lawyers are different – and how we protect and
promote that difference in service of the rule of law and the public interest” (2013) 26 Canadian Journal of
Administrative Law & Practice 172 at 173, attempted to re-focus the debate from whether government lawyers
should be held to a higher standard to appreciating their existing ethical role, which is to protect and promote the
rule of law and public interest. They called for better appreciating the ethical role of government lawyers play
internally, so that position could be promoted through localized codes of conduct.
687
Thornicroft, supra note 29 at 146. Thornicroft’s prescription raises a policy implication that this study
considers. Public sector lawyers are represented by various bargaining agents located in several different provinces.
As such, the Federation of Law Societies of Canada could spearhead a policy initiative at the national level by
developing a prototype rule regarding lawyers and job action for inclusion in its Model Code of Professional Code.
The Federation of Law Societies of Canada is the national coordinating body of Canada’s provincial and territorial
law societies. Its Model Code of Professional Responsibility is a template for the Rules of Professional Conduct that
several law societies have implemented while others study its adoption. The Model Code attempts to harmonize
professional standards across different jurisdictions.
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between Quebec public sector lawyers and the province during protracted and failed labour
negotiations that forced lawyers to strike in 2011.688 When determined lawyers erected picket
lines, staged public demonstrations, and walked off the job for two weeks, the province’s
legislature ordered them back with ad hoc legislation that ended their strike along with granting a
6 percent wage increase over five years.689

Assessing the integrity of service disruption by the AJC bargaining unit thus entails an
analogous application of principles drawn from Rules of Professional Conduct regarding a
solicitor–client relationship being terminated by a lawyer withdrawing services. The competing
interests at hand propose that the salutary effects of the AJC bargaining unit members exercising
Charter protected labour activities, such as picketing,690 outweigh the deleterious effects
imposed by ethical guidelines attempting to mitigate the impact of a government client losing
non-essential legal services. In any event, whatever job action the Governing Council proposes
to the bargaining unit, a majority of its members would still need to approve of it in a
referendum.691

Their decision could be swayed by sustained retrenchment that negatively

influenced lawyers’ psychological affiliation with professional standards and public
accountability. A workplace injustice could also galvanize the appeal of militant action.692

7.5

Post Script: Practicing Law under a Collective Agreement
The introductory chapter of this dissertation argued that significant transformations in the

legal labour process may pique lawyers’ interest in collective bargaining as a defense against job
688

L. Millan, “Quebec public lawyers ready to strike: Frustration mounts for Crown prosecutors and government
lawyers” The Lawyers Weekly 30:36 (4 February 2011) 1 at 2.
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L. Millan, “Quebec public lawyers forced back to work: Indignant lawyers vehemently admonishing Quebec
government” The Lawyers’ Weekly 30:40 (4 March 2011) 1 at 1.
690
Provincial Rules of Professional Conduct are governed by the Charter: Klein and Dvorak v. Law Society of
Upper Canada, [1985] O.J. No 2321, 16 D.L.R. (4th) 489 (Ont. Div. Ct.). In Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] 1
SCR 395, 2012 SCC 12 (CanLII) at para. 59, the Supreme Court of Canada assessed the correctness of a Law
Society’s discipline panel reprimanding a lawyer for lacking professional civility to the bench, and the application of
the Charter-protected right of freedom of expression to a lawyer’s professional duties. In a much earlier case, the
Supreme Court of Canada determined that disruptive picketing in front of a court interferes with the proper
administration of justice and is a contempt of court. A court injunction restraining the conduct impeded strikers’
freedom of association rights, but it was a justified infringement pursuant to section 1 of the Charter. See
B.C.G.E.U. v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1988] 2 SCR 214, 1988 CanLII 3 (SCC) at paras. 41, 67-72.
691
2006 AJC Constitution, supra note 561 at Article 5.5 Membership Decisions informs that: “any collective job
action by the membership of the Association must be approved by a majority of the votes cast in a vote of the
membership that is proposed to be involved in the action”.
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Kelly, supra note 638 at 27.
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insecurity. This case study did not formally test whether the deprofessionalization hypothesis
explains why DOJ lawyers unionized under the AJC (although a cursory assessment suggests
that the thesis would bear little relevance). First, the statutory monopoly of the DOJ over the
provision of legal services to one client—the federal government and its departments and
agencies—largely shields its practitioners from the competitive pressures tied to an open private
market saturated with lawyers and budding new service providers.

Second, the study

documented changes affecting the DOJ’s operations and the PSSRA’s repeal that pre-date the
onset of outsourcing and information technology threatening lawyer jobs. In this regard, the
findings of this case study provide little support for the deprofessionalization paradigm.
However, given the seeming relevance of deprofessionalization to account for changes in the
practice of law today, a future study of lawyers unionizing would benefit from testing the
theory’s application to more contemporary events at hand. As well, this study did not analyze
legal solutions for overturning prohibitions contained in Canadian provincial labour statutes,
such as those in Alberta and Ontario, that exclude lawyers and other professional occupations
(medical, dental, architectural) from organizing to collectively bargain or belong to a bargaining
unit with other non-professionals.

The legality of outdated exclusions applying to certain

professions is a topic for investigation given that the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged in
Health Services that at international law, and under the Charter, collective bargaining is an
extension of the basic human right of freedom of association.693

This dissertation was intended to increase understanding about lawyer unionism in
Canada. Presenting the AJC’s story helps familiarize unrepresented lawyers with how a
bargaining agent secures legal recognition, and the probable conduct of a public sector employer
negotiating a first collective agreement. The content of the thesis establishes the informational,
theoretical, and methodological groundwork for conducting further studies on collective
bargaining by lawyers. Research has the important role of expanding on this, and other related
works by assessing the highly variable and contextual dimensions that would motivate a new set
of employed lawyers to collectivize their labour relations. Another useful contribution this study
makes is to reveal the condition of lawyers practicing law under a collective agreement. This
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Health Services, supra note 649 at para. 79.
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analysis can encourage a qualitative investigation that develops theory on organized counsel
making sense of lawyering in a non-standard employment situation.

To study unionized lawyers at in action, I observed the prosecution of criminal law by
members of the AJC’s bargaining unit at the Old City Hall Courthouse in downtown Toronto. It
is where the Public Prosecution Service of Canada (PPSC) staffs a team of about fifteen Crown
attorneys who conduct federally-prosecuted summary and select hybrid trials under the
Controlled Drug and Substances Act,694 and who also service Drug Treatment, Mental Health,
and Gladue (Aboriginal offender) Courts.695 Prosecution of drug crimes in the city of Toronto
falls under the jurisdiction of Old City Hall Courts, which makes these the busiest criminal
tribunals in Canada. Prosecutors, early in their careers with the PPSC, discussed their work
during informal interviews. They reported appearing before different criminal courts—bail, set
date, plea, federal practice—which is an experiential circuit for them honing their craft. For
three respondents who articled with the PPSC (and were then hired in 2009, 2010, 2011,
respectively), they are familiar with practicing law under a first collective agreement. When
asked how belonging to a union affects their daily work, they shared similar sentiments, as did
two other prosecutor colleagues, who all saw little conflict between their duties and union
membership given the responsibilities they owe to the court as Crown attorneys. One respondent
noted that the collective agreement allowed the AJC to discuss with management new
accommodations for dealing with an overcrowding of lawyers confined to an inadequate office
that would allow them to better observe professional standards and uphold their sense that the
employer cared about the quality of the workplace.

A factor for DOJ lawyers that extends beyond any one regional office or courthouse and
that affects bargaining unit members is the interplay between professional responsibilities and
collective bargaining.

During his interview, National Capital Region lawyer 2, noted that

membership with the AJC did not imply suffering a loss of professional status. The idea of being
both a lawyer and a proud union member did not faze this long-standing AJC member. It was
694

Controlled Drug and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19.
Sittings of the Drug Treatment are held on Tuesdays and Thursdays while Gladue Court occurs on Wednesdays
and Fridays. Both take place in Old City Hall Courtroom 116. Mental Health Diversion Court proceedings are in
Old City Hall Courtroom 102.
695
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about a change in perceptions, as he remarks: “...It is a sacrifice of perhaps preconceived ideals
one had when one was entering law school. No one enters law school saying I’m going to be a
lawyer, and I’m going to be a unionized lawyer.” The observation touches on an assumption
implied from private practice that lawyers’ fortunes stem their “rainmaking” talents and prowess
for winning big cases that brings them a favourable reputation, paying clients, and a lucrative
income. The perspective, however, does not seem to mesh with lawyering in the federal public
service where success is based on speedy progress along a defined career track, despite the
current roadblocks to promotion.

The collective agreement has made advances in fashioning the delivery of legal services
closer to the professional standards desired by the AJC. Prairie Regional Office lawyer 2
informed that the first collective agreement allowed the union to reduce terms and conditions of
employment into clauses that enhance professional values. Senior AJC administrator 1 noted
that the first collective agreement confirmed policy and procedure on lawyer entitlement to legal
professional development days. For example, Article 20 of the labour contract provides for paid
leave allowing unit members to attend conference and workshops as part of their career
development. The clause responds to the licensure and competency requirements of continuing
professional development programs administered by provincial law societies that force lawyers
to complete annual programs of study or suffer summary administrative suspension. Overtime, a
welcomed development from arbitration, is another example of how several respondents see the
collective agreement enhancing professional values.696 Lawyers shared different beliefs on how
that occurs.

National Capital Region Office lawyer 5 explained that daunting files sometimes cross
her desk, which is an inescapable facet of the work life of a small, federal government agency
lawyer. She complained of being under-resourced and disadvantaged when litigating claims
defended by prominent law firms representing dominant corporations who systematically flex
696

Between the time interviews were conducted and the case study being completed, the practice of overtime ceased
as of 1 April 2013. The policy amendment came about from negotiations for renewing the first collective agreement
after its expiry on 9 May 2011. In exchange for overtime and travel time, the second collective agreement (ratified
by the bargaining unit in October 2012) secured a 15.25 percent salary increase over the course of its three-year
lifespan, lasting from 10 May 2011 to 9 May 2014. The practice of management leave, which rewarded lawyers
working for extended periods of time before the dawn of collective bargaining replaced overtime.
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their powerful clients’ resources against a lone government counsel. These are the types of cases
that raise a potential ethical dilemma. Her conundrum is to work longer and harder and satisfy a
demanding workload, or, otherwise risk generating the impression of file unpreparedness before
keen judges. With a collective agreement in place, her additional efforts can be remunerated and
the extra time invested in preparing for a big file should not be in vain. Atlantic Regional Office
lawyer 1 observed that, in the past, a lawyer’s overtime was considered in an annual performance
review, which induced him to simply produce more work as required. As he noted, this practice
was detrimental to lawyers because: “...I think the history we’ve experienced is the employer is
depending on people...people’s own sense of integrity to pursue and maintain their professional
values irrespective of the demands put on them and the actions by the employer.” Overtime
entitlement ends the practice of forced professionalism guiding conduct.

However, Prairie

Regional Office lawyer 2 noted, entitlement and receipt of overtime are two different things.
Management authorization for overtime is difficult in cost-sensitive environments. The quantity
and importance of work at hand will guide negotiations between lawyer and supervisor in
claiming and actually being compensated for their work.

To conclude, case studies are used to build theories about an organization where changes
in its industry, employees’ interests, and legislative environment activate forces that yield some
phenomenon which becomes a subject for social research. This dissertation on DOJ lawyers
unionizing under the AJC provides one such example. One can critique the study for describing
an isolated event and surmise that collective bargaining by lawyers is restricted to the public
sector. Law firm associates and corporate counsel will not revolt against their employers and
risk losing a well-paid job or ruin career advancement. Surely, a “fight or flight” scenario would
see most practitioners opt for a peaceable exit by joining another firm, but not those lawyers who
would want to stay and resolve a conflict. The fact is that their dissatisfaction would be
subjective and experienced relative to the wants and attitudes about improving work conditions.
As Kearney and Mareschal put it, dissatisfaction alone is not enough to establish collective
bargaining, but it requires workers believing that union representation will achieve valuable
benefits that outweigh the costs and risks associated with unionizing. 697 This, then, is the
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R.C. Kearney & P. M. Mareschal, Labor Relations in the Public Sector, 5th ed. (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2014)
at 23.
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ultimate issue any group of lawyers would need to consider when deliberating on the merits of
bringing in an association or union to serve as their spokesperson at work. Researchers of
professional unions can only hope that another group of lawyers see the inherent value of
collective bargaining and pursue it.
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APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR JUSTICE CANADA LAWYERS
Good Morning/Afternoon. Thank you for speaking with me today and sharing your insight on
Justice Canada lawyers unionizing. Your participation allows for research on this subject. The
interview seeks your thoughts on why Justice Canada lawyers unionized and the negotiation of a
first collective agreement. The interview canvasses five research themes that are explored
through supplementary questions.
By speaking with you today I assume that I have your voluntary consent to participate in the
study. That said, you can stop participating in the study at any time, for any reason, if you so
decide. Your decision to stop participating, or to refuse to answer particular questions, will not
affect your relationship with the researcher, or York University. In the event you withdraw from
the study, all associated data collected will be immediately destroyed.
Study participation is on a non-attribution basis. Your confidentiality and anonymity in
participating in this study is assured. Your name will not be used in the study. The interview
will be digitally recorded, unless you prefer me to take notes of our discussion. Once completed,
the interview will be transcribed. A copy of that transcript is available to you on request. The
interview should take about 45 minutes. Full and frank responses are welcomed and encouraged.

Research Issue #1
Are ethical obligations a concern in the decision to unionize
1.1

What tensions are there between the rules of professional conduct and collective
bargaining?

1.2

Do you see collective bargaining as a way to preserve professional values and autonomy?

1.3

Should ethical values such as upholding the public trust influence membership in a union
(duty to client/employer, withdrawal of legal services, and strikes)?

1.4

Does choosing a union mean sacrificing professional values?

Research Issue #2
Whether DOJ lawyers perceived bureaucratic over-administration as a factor in the decision to
unionize under the AJC. If so, what form did this perception take
2.1

Why did you enter the federal public service?

2.2

What are your perceptions of the DOJ as employer?

2.3

Prior to unionization, did you notice working conditions deteriorating?
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2.4

Was management responsive to addressing any workplace concerns prior to the AJC
being certified as bargaining agent?

2.5

Prior to unionization did management encroach on workplace autonomy or performance?

2.6

Are there other quality of work issues that made unionization attractive?

2.7

Do you think that any specific action of management influenced the decision to unionize?

2.8

When did you realize that union representation was necessary in the workplace?

Research Issue #3
Whether DOJ lawyers perceived the prospect of improved wages and benefits associated with
collective bargaining as a factor in the decision to unionize under the AJC? If so, what form did
this perception take
3.1

Was the unionization decision influenced by job security?

3.2

Do you believe that DOJ lawyers are underpaid in comparison to other public sector
lawyers?

3.3

Were perceived economic improvements in terms and conditions of employment
achievable through collective bargaining a factor in the unionization decision?

3.4

Were other issues of economic gain important in the decision to unionize, and if so, why?

3.5

What benefits has collective bargaining delivered for DOJ lawyers?

Research Issue #4
How was the AJC able to conduct a successful organizing campaign among DOJ lawyers
4.1

How did you first hear about the AJC?

4.2

Why do you think the AJC was selected as the bargaining agent for DOJ lawyers?

4.3

Was the AJC able to get your support? If so, why?

4.4

What other factors do you think were important to the AJC’s organizing drive and why?

4.5

In your opinion, why did DOJ lawyers unionize under the AJC?
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Research Issue #5
Has the delay in negotiating a first collective agreement with the Treasury Board altered your
outlook on the decision to unionize
5.1

Was the membership involved in the process of establishing bargaining priorities? If so,
how well?

5.2

Why do you think completing the first contract between the Treasury Board and the AJC
took so long?

5.3

Do you believe that the delay in signing a first contract was an attempt by management to
undermine the union?

5.4

How did the union keep the membership involved in union activities during first contract
negotiations? How well did it do?

5.5

How did you keep up to date on developments from the bargaining table?

5.6

Do you foresee any further challenges the AJC faces in representing the membership?
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INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR AJC MEMBERS
Good Morning/Afternoon. Thank you for speaking with me today and sharing your insight on
Justice Canada lawyers unionizing. Your participation allows for research on this subject. The
interview seeks your thoughts on the AJC’s experience in organizing DOJ lawyers and
negotiating a first collective agreement. The interview canvasses three research themes that are
explored through supplementary questions.
By speaking with you today I assume that I have your voluntary consent to participate in the
study. That said, you can stop participating in the study at any time, for any reason, if you so
decide. Your decision to stop participating, or to refuse to answer particular questions, will not
affect your relationship with the researcher, or York University. In the event you withdraw from
the study, all associated data collected will be immediately destroyed.
Study participation is on a non-attribution basis. Your anonymity is assured and no reference to
your name will be made in the study. Unless you direct me otherwise, I’ll audiotape our
discussion. Once completed, the interview will be transcribed. A copy of that transcript is
available to you on request. This interview provides the data I’ll be using in my dissertation.
This may include any direct quotes from the interview or from information recorded in my notes.
Research Issue #1
Involvement with AJC
1.1

When did you begin working for the DOJ? What attracted you to this work?

1.2

Why do you believe the AJC was formed?

1.3

Tell me about your work with the AJC? How did you become an AJC member?

1.4

Why did you get involved with the AJC?

1.5

How do you find time to balance competing obligations between work and the union?

1.6

Could you speak about the idea behind having AJC representatives in regional offices?

Research Issue #2
The AJC’s conduct of a successful organizing campaign
2.1

Why did DOJ lawyers unionize?

2.2

How was the AJC able to conduct a successful organizing drive of DOJ lawyers?

2.3

Why do you believe DOJ lawyers chose to have the AJC as their bargaining agent?

2.4

Is there an employment climate particular to your office that would influence the
unionization decision either positively or negatively?
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2.5

Did the introduction of collective bargaining change how you go about your work?

Research Issue #3
First Contract Negotiation
3.1

How was the negotiating team selected?

3.2

What was your role on the negotiating team?

3.3

Did you bring the concerns and interests of your constituents to the bargaining table or
was there a pre-determined agenda?

3.4

Are there challenges of having the office’s concerns voiced within the overall AJC?

3.5

How were bargaining priorities selected, then?

3.6

What is the relationship between the bargaining team and the executive?

3.7

What goals did the AJC pursue in negotiating a first contract?

3.8

Tell me about how the negotiating process unfolded with the Treasury Board? How did
the negotiating team prepare for the meetings?

3.9

Did goals change during negotiations? How did you feel about that?

4.1

What were the difficulties in negotiating a first collective agreement?

4.2

As negotiations proceeded how did the AJC keep its membership involved?

4.3

Tell me about the AJC’s website

4.4

I noticed that as the AJC was negotiating its 1st collective bargain with the Treasury
Board the media took an interest in the story. How did that came about?

4.5

Why do you think the Treasury Board took the position it did?

4.6

What was the idea behind the AJC’s Federal lawyers deserve justice campaign of 2008?

4.7

What was your reaction to the first collective bargain being referred to arbitration?

4.8

What do you think about the AJC litigating the Expenditure Restraint Act?

4.9

Has your experience in negotiating a first contract taught you about the process of being
on a bargaining committee? If so, what?
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APPENDIX C
Telephone: (613) 952-8361
Facsimile: (613) 957-2303
Access to Information and Privacy Coordinator
275 Sparks Street, 9th Floor
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0H8

PROTECTED B

Our File:

January 9, 2013

Mr. Andrij Kowalsky

Dear Mr. Kowalsky:
This letter is further to your request of December 18, 2012, filed under the Access to Information
Act to obtain:
(1) All correspondences between LOAC/Association of Justice Counsel and the Deputy
Minister of Justice/Attorney General's office between 1998-2005;
(2) Any minutes of meeting of the Association of Justice Counsel, the Department of
Justice, and/or the Associate Deputy Minister of Justice;
(3) All correspondences between FLAG/FLOC, and the Deputy Minister of
Justice/Attorney General's office;
(4) All submissions/records maintained and/or produced by the Department of Justice to
a task force or government body regarding the exclusion of legal officers from
collective bargaining.
I am pleased to enclose the releaseable documents relevant to your request (17 of 17 pages).
You will notice that information is exempt from release by virtue of sections 19(1) [personal
information] of the Access to Information Act.
This completes our processing of your request. If you have any questions concerning the above,
do not hesitate to contact
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Please be advised that you are entitled to complain to the Informational Commissioner
concerning the processing of your request within sixty days of the receipt of this notice. In the
event you decide to avail yourself of this right, your notice of complaint should be addressed to:
Office of the Information Commissioner
Tower B, Place de Ville
112 Kent Street, 7th Floor
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 1H3

Sincerely,

Coordinator
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